

Global Dialogues 4

A Multi-disciplinary Mosaic: Reflections on International Security and Global Cooperation

Markus Böckenförde (ed.)



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Editorial

A Multi-disciplinary Mosaic: Reflections on International Security and Global Cooperation

Markus Böckenförde



Dr Markus Böckenförde, LL.M., is Executive Director and Senior Researcher of the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research. In the context of the Centre's agenda, his legal research interests include constitution-building processes, legal pluralism, constitution writing and religion, and law and development. Since 2012 he is also Visiting Professor at the legal department of the Central European University (CEU), Budapest.

'International security' is a catch-all phrase behind which lie hidden some very disparate assumptions and expectations. One thing on which all may perhaps agree, however, is that such security is only achievable in concert, through global collaboration. Opinions as to which measures of global rapprochement should be given priority vary according to the region and set of assumptions involved. This issue of 'Global Dialogues' brings together the reflections of a group of twenty-five scholars on the theme of international security and cooperation. Though they hail from five different continents and represent a wide range of disciplines, one thing these scholars have in common is time spent, in 2013, as Fellows of the Centre for Global Cooperation Research. They were asked to give a brief outline of their thoughts on the topic proposed here. Often what they write reflects an aspect of their research at the Centre. It sometimes also challenges our preconceptions about the sorts of things that can be discussed under the general rubric of 'international security' and thus enriches debates that have perhaps become rather stale. Although written independently of one another, these 'snapshots' in some cases complement each other and draw differing strands together. They are therefore arranged here in groups of two or three, with the groups themselves being viewable as a single narrative.

With their choice of R2P (Responsibility to Protect) as a theme, the first two articles opt for a classic approach to the

paired concepts under review. Whereas **Lothar Brock** sees R2P as an avenue through which to explore the conflict of interests that sometimes arises between the security of the state and the security of the people, **Siddarth Mallavarapu** warns against placing too much hope in this instrument, given that in its present form it can only be used in a highly selective way.

Implementation of the R2P idea in Libya is also the starting-point for **Bernd Lahno's** piece on confidence as a basis for cooperation. In Lahno's view, we could learn much here by taking a look at the notion of the *ehrbarer Kaufmann* (what might nowadays be called the ethical businessman) and his *gute Sitten* (moral principles), as still adhered to by some sections of the international business-world in their dealings with one another. A similar feature is addressed by **Noemi Gal-Or**. She does this not by exploring practices inside the business world, but by highlighting the obligations and standards of accountability which both governmental and non-governmental actors should be observing in helping to stem the trade in 'blood diamonds'. For **Sarah van Beurden** too, the way cultural property is handled internationally in the attempt to deal with the legacy of colonial spoliation is an important factor in building confidence and working towards a new form of coexistence based on equality. A sensitive approach here can help overcome paternalistic tendencies in the handling of the world's cultural heritage and facilitate cooperation on an equal footing.

How far culture can be used as a basis for promoting international security and cooperation is a question posed by **Morgan Brigg**. In his contribution, Brigg calls for cultural differences to be acknowledged as a starting-point rather than seen as something to be battled against. Genuine acknowledgement of these differences will enable us jointly to overcome global challenges and thereby create a new, cosmopolitan (sub)culture. A route to this kind of (sub)culture is offered by **Jan Aart Scholte** with his 'transculturalist path to democratic global cooperation', potentially leading to a form of 'transculturalism' based on seven principles. When these seven principles are applied, it turns out the 'Western world'/'international community' and its self-image are the first to come under scrutiny.

The difficulties involved here are demonstrated by **Steven Pierce** in his account of the case of the Nigerian politician Umaru Dikko in the mid-1980s and the tensions, contradictions, and paradoxes to which it gave rise in post-conflict situations in the Global South. Inconsistently applied standards, unequal negotiating-positions, and self-interested notions of security are challenges that persist to this day. In the quest for alternative approaches, **Abou Jeng**, writing in regard to Africa, proposes strengthening the continent's regional structure as a way of enabling it to emancipate itself from a hegemonial and asymmetric world-order. **Peter Thiery** highlights economic imbalance between states as one of the challenges

to global cooperation. Assuming that democracies are more inclined towards cooperation, the standstill, or indeed decline, in dynamic processes of democratization since the start of the century is a worrying sign (notwithstanding the Arab Spring, from which only Tunisia appears to be emerging as a consolidated democracy). The Chinese model, tending towards a system of economic growth under authoritarian rule, is gaining in appeal and developing into a counter-model that inhibits cooperation.

The posture adopted by an economically strong China amongst the ranks of the 'great powers', and its position in the world and vis-à-vis its neighbours, provide the starting-point for the piece by **Hung-jen Wang**. Ambivalent Chinese foreign-policy slogans indicate a process of orientation – shifting between cooperation and hegemonial ambition and shaped in part by the extent to which China perceives itself as being entrusted with the role of a responsible partner. China's practical relations with two other major Asian powers – India and Japan – are explored in two further contributions. **Herbert Wulf** analyses the three Cs (conflict, competition, and cooperation) in the recent, eventful history of the world's two most densely populated countries. As a way of containing the simmering hostilities between China and Japan – Asia's two strongest economies – **Dong Wang** suggests that the two nations effect a rapprochement through the exchange and exploration of their differing views on past wars.

Jaroslava Gajdošová looks generally at situations in which people have the opportunity to recall traumas which they have suffered as a community, and thereby overcome them. Referring to certain Eastern European states, she establishes how far it is possible to work through the communist past in order to overcome it – and where the limits of this process lie. **Birgit Schwelling** provides an insight into the concepts, mechanisms, and instruments that are called upon, under the rubric of 'transitional justice', in order to enable societies ravaged by war or dictatorship to make a return to normality. In the course of her investigation, she establishes that the various approaches in use here are becoming increasingly global in nature and that international experts are introducing them into all countries that have a history of trauma, as an aid in coming to terms with the past. The challenge here is to work out how global concepts can be effectively adapted to suit local realities and what local experience and mechanisms already exist.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is regarded as the key international legal instrument through which the idea of transitional justice is put into practice. Operating at a global level, it strives to ensure that grave human-rights violations do not go unpunished. Using the example of the dynamics at work in Kenya, **Stephen Brown** asks to what extent global cooperation in the area of criminal justice creates more insecurity than it

resolves. Following what was initially a high level of support for ICC prosecution of the acts of extreme violence that followed the 2007 elections, the political elites charged with the crimes succeeded in changing the public mood and portraying the legal proceedings as a neo-colonial act on the part of the West. The author makes a distinction here between the short- and long-term effects of international criminal jurisdiction. **Mario Schmidt** also turns his attention to the elections in Kenya, but from a different perspective. He investigates how the elections were viewed by the Luo people (Kenya's third-largest ethnic group) in Kadongo and what they took them to be. The way the Luo construe the place of the individual within society leads to a different understanding of elections and democracy and casts the violence that followed the 2007 elections in a different light. Schmidt's account highlights the importance of exploring the concepts used by 'the other' ('altered concepts') in order to be able to follow differently configured thought-processes and avoid misunderstandings.

The importance of questioning supposedly solid assumptions and reviewing one's own patterns of interpretation is demonstrated by two further examples from the African continent. **Isaline Bergamaschi** reminds us how the international donor-community marketed Mali as a showpiece of democracy whilst ignoring the existing and emergent dynamics at work behind the façade and failing to recognize the danger they represented. Given the true situation, to those who were paying attention, the events of the last few years in the land of the erstwhile 'donor darling' did not come as much of a surprise. The challenge now is to coordinate and prioritize the different international intervention-measures in such a way that the international community becomes part of the solution rather than part of the problem. Using the example of the plague of locusts that beset West Africa in 2004, **Christian Meyer** shows how the international press constructs its own narrative on particular events. In fact, the locust invasion was not catastrophe that overtook the region unforeseen; it was known about in advance and, with the kind of preventive measures that had been called for, could have been controlled. Meyer's piece also illustrates how the local population perceives risk as it goes about dealing with this kind of event. The ranking of risk-scenarios and the influence which politics exerts on the perception of risk are topics addressed by **Mathieu Rousselin**. Citing two countries (the USA and France) as examples, Rousselin shows how both external and internal perceptions of insecurity are sometimes constructed as part of a political agenda: in the USA, the manufactured 'culture of fear' has engendered a willingness to support the 'war against terror'; in France, the 2007 presidential elections saw Sarkozy succeed in stoking fear by pointing to the country's crime-rates.

Such tactics cause other, genuinely serious threats to be relegated to the sidelines. Thus, problems of hunger, if left unaddressed, can endanger global security and lead to increased migration and increasingly bitter conflicts over resources. **Margret Thalwitz** explains what concrete measures are needed to deal with the challenge of global food-security. World-renowned scholars are amongst those who consider the threats posed by climate change to be much greater and more urgent than those posed by 'terrorism'. According to their most recent findings, the consequences of climate change for humanity, and the political and social changes triggered by it, will be unprecedented. Given this fact, it is astonishing that the global negotiations on environmental protection remain gridlocked. Despite the sombre picture, **Gianluca Grimalda** offers us some grounds for hope, which he ties to three specific features: 'tipping points' and the growth in popular awareness which these bring with them; the pioneering role being played by certain countries; and technological progress, which creates new systems of economic incentivization). In her contribution, **Jessica Schmidt** explores the place occupied by human beings in the discourse on climate change. Findings from social psychology suggest that human behaviour in emergencies and extreme situations is intuitively cooperative. However, if the shaping of a 'we-identity' as an embodiment of global cooperation is only achievable through a concatenation of acute events (the financial crisis, ebola, bird flu) and is not the result of a shared system of values regarding the preservation of the earth, we end up with a paradox: the ethics of self-elimination.

International negotiations continue to be an important forum for global cooperation. Their limited effectiveness has motivated economists to try to identify the conditions under which they might be more successful. As **Marlies Ahlert** shows in her contribution, all these attempts have so far failed to render the complexity of such negotiations. The notion of a purely rationally motivated *homo oeconomicus* cannot adequately reflect the realities operating in multi-dimensional contexts. **David Chandler**, our last contributor, offers us a glimpse of this complexity with his delineation of three categories of knowledge famously summed up elsewhere as: known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns. From this context, the question then arises as to how we should tackle non-linear causalities as we work to develop appropriate governance-strategies.

We hope these reflections by our 2013 Fellows on the theme of international security and cooperation will prove a thought-provoking and entertaining read.

Markus Böckenförde

I Responsibility to Protect

Special thanks to Martin Wolf and Nadja Krupke who contributed to the conceptualization of this volume.

R2P and its Selective Application

Siddharth Mallavarapu



Dr Siddharth Mallavarapu is Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations of the South Asian University, New Delhi. He was Senior Fellow at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research, working on 'Cognitive Studies and Institutional Designs for Cooperation'. The project's main objective was to bring recent developments in the field of cognitive neurosciences into dialogue with potential institutional designs with the aim of promoting human cooperation.

An important facet of international security and global cooperation relates to the future of evolving norms like the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). From the perspective of the Global South, it is not unusual to ask to what extent emergent norms such as the RtoP remain genuinely global, where they fit in terms of the broader lineages of interventionism, what claims to humanitarianism they advance and how they might need to be re-habilitated or even re-conceived afresh if they are to be perceived as more just and legitimate instruments to guarantee international peace and security. While some may view the intervention in Libya (2011) as a success, as far as the Global South was concerned it served as a reminder of how crude geopolitical ambitions trump all proclamations of good samaritanism.

On the face of it the RtoP seeks to address the deepest infractions of humanity. These include responding collectively to the possibilities of 'genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity', most clearly articulated in the World Summit Outcome Document of 2005. The doctrine consciously seeks to distance itself from its predecessor – humanitarian intervention which invited considerable criticism for the double standards and inconsistencies that were reflected in its actual operationalization. However, it is fair to assess how successful RtoP has been in its early career. My sense is that it has not been very successful in terms of accomplishing its own stated mandate nor does it show any signs that things will be very different in the foreseeable future. Three basic arguments suggest why this might continue to be the case.

First, RtoP does not operate in a political vacuum. It seeks to present itself as a neutral effort to restore humanity in dire theatres of conflict but in reality it is inevitably mired in partisan

power politics of the major powers. When the stakes (strategic interests) are high the major powers seek to alter the cosmetics of a conflict theatre and sometimes proceed to effect 'regime change' well beyond the stated mandate. When the stakes are low, the response is one of indifference or denial. However, it does this without in any way addressing the fundamental structural dimensions of domination that throw up these gross infractions in the first place. The structural asymmetries are unlikely to be easily altered considering that they cement privilege of dominant actors in the international system.

Second, it is clear that the claim to achieve a degree of universalism also remains suspect. The current configuration of the Security Council (another asymmetric institution) suggests that there is a fair lack of consensus of the conditions that might merit the invocation of the doctrine of RtoP. Even those closely associated with the RtoP process like Edward Luck argue that the problem of 'selectivity' remains a contentious political issue. China, Russia, Brazil, Germany and India abstained in response to the UNSC 1973 Resolution expressing their discomfiture with the enthusiasm the United States, United Kingdom and France displayed for an invocation of the doctrine in Libya (2011). Others have argued that the Libyan intervention in 2011 went quite evidently well beyond the authorized mandate.

Third, the crisis of neutrality and universalism also poses fundamental legitimacy problems for the doctrine of R2P. There is an interesting repertoire and language of graduated responses (in the RtoP arsenal) to address humanitarian crises. The use of force is viewed as a last resort measure. However, the temptation when geopolitical stakes are high is to invoke the military option much earlier than warranted. Such invocations emerging from deeper anxieties of the security and well-being of select powers in the international system pose yet another serious challenge in terms of the operationalization of the doctrine.

For all the reasons suggested above, we need to be far more circumspect about treating RtoP as the magic bullet that will address the worst of human excesses. This is not to suggest in any way that we do not need a constraining mechanism to rein in the murkiest sides of human conduct especially in the light of our recent history. However, for principle to triumph over political expediency requires sagacious leadership and a willingness to be genuinely multilateral and inclusive – attributes which appear scarce and out of sync with the prevailing *Zeitgeist*.

From Humanitarian Intervention to Humanitarian Cooperation? The International Protection of People from Mass Atrocities

Lothar Brock



Dr Lothar Brock is Visiting Professor at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), and Lecturer (Professor Emeritus) at the Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany. He is one of the leading scientists of the country in the field 'Development and Peace'. Brock has been Senior Expert Fellow at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research. During his one-year fellowship he conducted his research on 'Cooperation in Conflict. Civilizing Difference?'

In the modern international system, 'security' first and foremost relates to the security of states. Obviously, the security of states also affects the wellbeing of people. But it does so in an ambiguous way. While the security of the state is usually invoked in the name of the people, national governments (or those in power) time and again have sacrificed the lives of thousands and millions of people in order to protect what they define as the existential interests of the state. So there is need for change and there are signs of change. Just as 'national security' has been challenged by the call for 'international security' which does not focus on inter-state competition for security in a zero-sum game but rather on cooperative security to be provided by and for the entire international community. So the relationship between the security of states and the security of people is in a process of reassessment. It would be premature to state that national security is being redefined in terms of human security, yet the latter increasingly serves as a point of reference in international politics. The crux of the matter is that the focus on human security may help to recreate and even deepen the ambiguity of the link between the security of states and the security of people. The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) was invented to cope with this predicament. Does it

stand a chance to do so? Siddharth Mallavarapu is quite pessimistic in his snapshot. Here is an attempt to take a second look.

All through the history of the modern system of states, political actors have claimed that sovereignty should not shield governments from external attempts to protect people subjected to mass atrocities. Since the end of the nineteenth century, this claim is being debated under the term of humanitarian intervention. The problem with humanitarian intervention is a twofold: The plight of people may serve as a mere pretext for the use of force in a specific case and it may be used for a general loosening of the strings attached to the use of force by the UN-Charter.

The UN-Charter spells out a general prohibition of the unilateral use of force and as a concomitant provides for collective action in order to preserve or restore international peace (chapter VII). Since the 1990s, the Security Council increasingly refers to intra-state mass atrocities as a threat to international peace thus opening up the possibility of collective action under chapter VII. This practice underlines the importance of doing something about mass atrocities which in turn seems to substantiate the question of what to do if the Security Council is blocked by disagreement. The version of the RtoP which was included in the outcome document of the UN Summit of 2005, specifically refers to the Security Council as the appropriate organ to decide on enforcement measures should a government be unwilling or unable to live up to its responsibilities. While some observers in the 'Global West' read this as a mere statement of preferences which allows unilateral action after collective action has been tried unsuccessfully, the 'Global South' insisted on a reading which saw Security Council authorization as a precondition for any enforcement action. But since the UN vote on the RtoP and successive Security Council resolutions underline the responsibility of the international community to act against mass atrocities, the question of what to do if collective enforcement action does not come about remains unresolved. As a matter of fact, under the present constellation of actors in the Council, it remains intractable.

When chemical weapons were used in Syria in August 2013, the British government claimed that it had the right to intervene militarily without Security Council authorization and that this right emanated from the 'doctrine of humanitarian intervention'. So is the whole debate moving back to square one (i.e. to the 1990s)?

The RtoP does not provide a straightforward answer to the issue of whether the prohibition of the unilateral use of force has priority over the protection of basic human rights or vice versa. It rather tries to move the debate away from this juxtaposition. It does so by opening up the specter of possible responses to humanitarian crises, by de-emphasizing military enforcement and by calling for a cooperative approach to the

protection of people from mass atrocities. So instead of forcing governments to respect basic human rights, they are now to be helped to live up to their responsibilities. This approach deserves more attention than it has received so far, especially with regard to past experience with military intervention. The crucial issue is not Security Council authorization, because even if the Security Council authorizes the use of force (as it did in the case of Libya), collective action quickly can turn into a war by the interveners which is beyond the control of the Council. And even if this problem is being solved along the lines suggested by Brazil ('Responsibility while Protecting'), there remains the problem that military enforcement action amounts to an attempt to cut crudely through the complexities of local conditions with the help of a Gordian stroke. With rare exceptions (possibly East Timor) such attempts have failed.

This experience calls for concise efforts to take up the non-military thrust of the RtoP and to improve the existing system of civil conflict resolution in connection with the already existing routine of protecting people in the context of UN peace missions. These peace missions, too, need a substantive overhaul. This should be taken as an opportunity to merge the issue of protecting people in conflict with the protection of people from mass atrocities. The more even the most powerful countries recognize the limits of their power to control even the weakest states, the more obvious is the need to move from humanitarian intervention to humanitarian cooperation at the inter- and transnational level. Of course, this should lead to a deeper debate on how to cope with unintended consequences of all the good one claims to do and on the unintended consequences of refraining from doing good.

II Trust & Responsibility

Trust as a Source of Global Cooperation

Bernd Lahno



Dr Bernd Lahno is Professor of Philosophy and Quantitative Methods at the Department of Legal Studies and Ethics at the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Germany. He was Senior Fellow at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research. Building on his previous work on rule-following behaviour and social norms, Lahno examined 'Norms and Rules as a Foundation of Social Cooperation'. This project attempted to contribute to the critical assessment of the Rational Choice Theory, and the exploration of potential refinement or radical reform of it in search for a powerful and appropriate theory of social cooperation.

The conflict in Syria poses a growing threat to peace and stability throughout the Middle East. Although atrocities in this conflict are obvious, the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC) fails to take effective action, including a military intervention. At first sight this stalemate might come as a surprise after the UNSC's approval of the military intervention in Libya referencing to the doctrine of 'responsibility to protect' (R2P). In a nutshell it holds that when a sovereign state fails to prevent atrocities, foreign governments may intervene to stop them. Following the implementation of the respective UNSC resolution (UNSCR 1973), voices from the international community questioned not the appropriateness of the principle but its execution. Beyond curbing atrocities the military intervention also aimed for regime change. Some argue that the overreach of the resolution made countries like Russia and China apprehensive of supporting any kind of resolution going in a similar direction. They lost confidence in applying R2P in a restrictive manner. The impossibility to trust each other is at the heart of this failure of international cooperation.

The problem is of a very general kind. Like any other cooperative endeavour, global cooperation is threatened by a particular kind of risk. A cooperating partner regularly faces the danger of being outsmarted and taken advantage of. Trust is a mechanism to cope with such risks. Control is another. In a very wide sense we attribute trust to a person, if that person bases his or her decisions on a rational assessment of the risk of being harmed by his or her partner's actions given the available information about the partner and the particular circumstances of interaction. Such a purely cognitive form of trust may be referred to as '*pure reliance*'.

With the disintegration of the once dominant blocs and the rising significance of small but resolute and effective actors who can hardly be controlled or calculated the quest for global cooperation has become more and more urgent. But, given the complexity of the international arena and the diversity of its actors, it seems hardly possible to rationally calculate or directly control the risks of being harmed by others. No system of pure reliance and control alone seems to suffice as a solid foundation of global cooperation.

Of course we all know from our experience with personal relationships that there are other, more emotional forms of trust that transcend what can be rationally calculated. But are such forms of trust plausibly available in international relations?

Genuine trust in the more narrow sense is a specific emotional attitude toward the trusted partner including

- a feeling of connectedness to him or her by shared aims, values or norms, and
- the disposition to react emotionally to the affirmations or frustration of related expectations.

The perception of a shared normative fundament motivates incurring the typical risks of trust beyond what can be warranted by the bare facts. And, as a matter of fact, it can actually be successful in overcoming these risks by creating the very reliability it imputes. Accepting to share a common normative scheme of action is an attractive option offering individual guidance and ways to coordinate with others in a complex world to the trusted person. This in combination with a general reluctance to negative and the want for positive emotional reactions of one's partners gives trust a seemingly magical power to bring about what it predicts.

Obviously international relations form a difficult context for trust relationships in this more narrow sense. Genuine trust would seem to presuppose ongoing intercourse between actors such that personal relationships and a shared normative outlook onto the world may evolve. But, international relations are typically formed in interactions between varying, often anonymous individuals. These individuals act as representatives of collectives; they are committed to the various interests of these collectives with a possibly fragile and changing identity. For all these reasons it is difficult to hold these individuals personally responsible in the same way as one would do with partners in ordinary interpersonal interaction.

Moreover, in many cases it seems hardly possible to define a set of values that international partners may share to coordinate their efforts and cooperate in order to produce mutual gains. National interests too often seem antagonistically conflicting and not reconcilable; potential partners are separated by a seemingly unbridgeable cultural divide. And all this happens in a tradition that holds that moral scruples within

politics or diplomacy indicate a lack of professionalism or are simply a sign of naivety.

Still, if control and pure reliance do not suffice as a foundation of global cooperation we are doomed to find a framework of international relations that allows for deeper forms of trust. If that is true it will not suffice to install and maintain stable international institutions that are safeguarded against domination by national partisan interests. We will also have to find and promote a simple but clear normative frame of fairness and human rights that can be shared by all humans in principle and may serve as a guiding background of trustful cooperation in international relations. Stimulating all sorts of peaceful exchange between individuals from different nations and cultures will be an important step in this process. Exchange fosters sympathy and mutual understanding among people with different national and cultural backgrounds. It is, thus, an enormously valuable source in our search of a common normative frame of trustful cooperation. And, sympathy and mutual understanding among the peoples will inevitably constitute a normative frame that will constraint officials and representatives.

Hope comes from international business. Businessmen have found ways to trustful cooperation across political, geographical, and cultural borders, and even though economic exchange is often only insufficiently backed by international institutions and law. Although the driving forces behind business are generally taken to be bare material interests individuals have managed to tacitly agree on rules of conduct in international business that provide sufficient protection against opportunistic trickery. As a matter of fact, global business might breed the common interests and values that we need in order to realize global cooperation in general.

Making of the Non-State Actor Responsible: The 21st Century Challenge of Global Cooperation in Security

Noemi Gal-Or*



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By now, the Non-State Actor (NSA) has become an undisputed fixture of global affairs. This fact has attracted wide scholarly interest because it both reflects, and requires, adjustments in global governance as well as in domestic governing. The NSA is extremely heterogeneous, and in this regard, also very different from the State. Unlike the State, the term NSA describes a comprehensive category of divergent actors rather than the actor itself.¹ It includes the inter-governmental organization (IO); multinational business corporation (MNC); non-governmental (not-for-profit) organisation (NGO); transnational organisations comprising of any mix of State, IO, MNC, and NGO; non-state armed group (NSAG) which include also transnational criminal organisations; entities of a singular character such as the Holy See; and – the individual person. While all these actors, along with the State, engage in the never-ending reshaping of world affairs, they are very different from each other in authority, power, and influence.

Besides the many welcome influences of the NSA, there is also a growing range of NSA activities exerting unwelcome, often devastating, impact. These include the rather common effect of destroying the natural environment, the livelihood, and way of life of human and wild life communities for gains obtained in association with mineral extraction operations

¹ Sincere thanks to the participants at March 2014 colloquium at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research for their very helpful comments offered during my presentation on this subject.

¹ Gal-Or, Noemi (2010). 'Observations on the Desirability of an Enhanced International Legal Status of the Non-State Actor', in Math Noortmann, and Cedric Ryngaert (eds.), *Actor Dynamics in International Law: From Law Takers to Law Makers*, (Non-State Actors in International Law, Politics and Governance Series), Aldershot: Ashgate, 125–49, and this anthology in general; International Law Association (2010). *Non State Actors in International Law: Aims, Approaches and Scope of Project and Legal Issues*, First Report of the ILA Committee on Non-State Actors, The Hague Conference (2010), <http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1023>; International Law Association (2012). *Non State Actors in International Law: Lawmaking and Participation Rights*, Second Report of the ILA Committee on Non State Actors, Sofia Conference (2012), *id.*; and International Law Association (2014). *Non State Actors*, Draft Third Report of the ILA Committee on Non State Actors, Washington Conference (2014).

or illicit trade in drugs, humans, and 'exotic' species. Often, these activities cause massive displacements of people and unleash violent conflict, collaterally undermining the authority and power of government, and destabilising inter-state relations. To prevent and counter these activities, repair the harm caused, and withstand the deleterious trend, international cooperation and coordination are called for; international collaboration is indispensable in sustaining State capacity to regulate and administer the impact exerted by the activities of trans-national NSAs on national, including foreign, affairs, and by extension – national and world security. Thus the question arises: Does global governance imply that the conduct of the participating NSA must be circumscribed by international responsibility?

Both the social sciences and legal discourses have expansively explored the rise of the NSA on the global scene, studying its modes of participation in, and the influence it wields, on global governance. In this conversation, the question of *legitimacy* has figured prominently as a crucial aspect the role played by the NSA. Notable examples include the contestation by the NGO of the legitimacy of the WTO and IMF; challenges to the power and legal rights of MNCs; the questioning of the legitimacy of the UN Security Council or its conduct, for instance, for establishing the anti-terrorism no-fly '1267 list'; and last but not least, probing the legitimacy of the NGO itself for its lack of representative authority. Examples abound and reflect NSAs' concern with the legitimacy of both different actors and their conduct within their NSA category as well as of state practice.

Unsurprisingly, this discourse has spanned further deliberation, especially about the concept of accountability as a correlate of legitimacy. It has generated a movement of practical engagement with the legitimacy-cum-accountability challenge, again, initiated chiefly by the NSA itself, in search of legitimizing its activities, and through them, its legal rights,² and even existence, or encouraging other NSAs to legitimise their activities by establishing and following accountability standards. Examples are manifold and cross the entire range of global governance areas (political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, etc.). They are illustrated in recommended and voluntary codes of conduct, guiding principles, certifications, fora of negotiations and dialogue, etc. They infer an expectation of adherence by the addressees of the codes of conduct, or the parties to a dialogue, to these not-legally binding modes of cooperation, therefore labelled (international) 'soft law'.

Because devoid of legal sanctioning authority, soft law does not entail legal consequences. The challenge that subsequently arises is whether the many instances of soft law, that bestow recognition of participation and identify instances of

² Some NSAs, in certain circumstances, have been successful in securing recognition of a right of participation in treaty negotiations through consultation and monitoring processes, e.g. the Aarhus Convention (The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 'Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters' of 25 June 1998 in force, 30 October 2001, <http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf>) or with only partial success in international adjudication process, e.g. filing amicus curiae submission with the WTO Appellate Body (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_settlement_cbt_e/c9s3p1_e.htm).

³ Such rules operate both with a view to future (*ex ante*) and past (*ex post*) conduct.

⁴ Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted in UNGA Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, and Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations (RIO), adopted in UNGA Resolution 66/100 of 9 December 2011.

⁵ Note that some NSAs, for instance, MNCs such as Microsoft, or Shell Global, or the Vatican, are significantly more powerful than many a State, for instance, Vanuato, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Timor-Leste, and with capacities that leave regional IOs far behind, for instance, of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) or International Organisation of La Francophonie.

accountability of the NSA (including to whom the different NSAs are accountable), be translated into enforceable ('hard') law, and how? In other words, should rules be made in international law that would govern the NSA's conduct and bind it by certain international obligations regarding its conduct, and for the breach of which it may be held responsible and become subject to sanction/counter-measures/penalties?³ After all, State and IO (which is a NSA) authority and power, which are reflected in their legal rights, have elicited counterbalancing via commensurate responsibility.⁴ Shouldn't the same logic apply also to the NSA?⁵

Evidently, the responsibility approach applicable to the State and the IO does not match the condition of the NSA hence cannot serve as a model for an international responsibility regime for the NSA. Equality in reciprocity, which is not and cannot be fully applicable in the relations of State and IO, or even in the relations among IOs themselves, is even less so in inter-NSA relations. Notably, some NSAs are law conscious and preconditioned to respect the law (e.g. corporations which are created in law) whereas others are oblivious to it (e.g. al Qaeda type terrorists). Therefore, while the international laws of State and IO responsibility have sought a uniform and all-encompassing framework for these actors, the law on the responsibility of the NSA must be departmentalized, characterized by gradation in the reciprocal core of responsibility, attuned to the NSAs' different origins and divergent capacities. An asymmetrical web of international responsibilities of the NSA may thus be forming as a distinct legal regime, commensurate with the chief categories of NSAs.

The remainder of the paper offers an illustration of the process whereby this web is being woven. The following is an example of how NSA accountability is being gauged, gradually progressing towards what may eventually lead to its responsibility international law pertaining to international peace and security. The well-known Kimberly Process (since 2000) is a multi-stakeholder enterprise bringing together states, IOs, industry (MNCs), and NGOs in a project to curb the flow of so-called 'conflict diamonds' – rough diamonds that finance NSAs' wars against legitimate governments. Members to the process subscribe to an international certification scheme which legitimises rough diamonds via a 'conflict free' label, approves their shipment and legitimises their trade. Non-members to the process are penalized since it deters business away from non-certified trade in diamonds, ultimately weakening all those engaged in the practice, including NSAs, and thereby contributing to diffusing armed conflict.

Over ten years after the Kimberly Process was launched, and as this paper is being written, the European Union's published a 'Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council Setting up a Union System for Supply Chain

⁶ European Commission, COM (2014) 111, 2014/0059 (COD). The EU proposal follows among others a similar US initiative known as the 'conflict minerals' law. *Id.* p. 3.

⁷ *Id.* p. 5.

⁸ The details of the Kimberly Process application to EU member states by comparison to this recent proposal cannot be addressed here for lack of space.

⁹ Article 2 (g) and (h), *id.*

¹⁰ Article 14, *id.* p. 12.

Due Diligence Self-Certification of Responsible Importers of Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten, their Ores, and Gold Originating in Conflict-affected and High-Risk Area'.⁶ While the proposed regulation is designed to 'lay down the supply chain due diligence obligations of Union importers who *choose to be self-certified* as responsible importers',⁷ it carries the extra authority of being an EU regulation.⁸ It could therefore foretell a second 'wave' following and bolstering the regulatory movement embodied in the Kimberly Process. Binding the EU member states to a certain procedure, obligations are created which apply to them and through them – to the main addressee of the proposed regulation, namely the 'responsible importer'.⁹ The latter is a voluntary participating NSA submitting among others to 'rules Applicable to Infringement'.¹⁰ In other words, the proposal stipulates sanctions that are enforceable by the EU in regards to the member states (through general EU law and the proposed regulation), and via the member states in regards to the responsible importer. Because the proposed regulation targets a supply chain, it may, in addition, indirectly bring into its fold a diverse public of NSAs, much wider than its immediate addressees. The responsible importer is thus the 'hook' on which a chain of obligations is hanging, potentially binding all those located along the respective supply chain. It may consequently compel these NSAs to abide by EU law, which albeit *sui generis* international law, informs public international law at large.

International Security and Global Cooperation: The Politics of Cultural Property

Sarah van Beurden



Dr Sarah Van Beurden is Assistant Professor at the Department of African American and African Studies at the Ohio State University. During her stay as a Fellow at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research Van Beurden worked on the project 'Postcolonial Cultures of Cooperation: Belgium, Congo and the Rise of an International Conservation Regime'. She examined the history of postcolonial cooperation and aid, using the case study of cultural cooperation between Belgium and its former colony Congo (today's Democratic Republic of Congo), specifically their collaboration in the creation of an Institute for National Museums in the Congo.

The terms 'international security' and 'global cooperation' immediately elicit thoughts about war and peace, UN intervention, and global geo-economic relations. These global relations, however, do not only include border disputes or military conflicts, but also cultural disputes, as well as programs of cultural cooperation. The latter can be crucial to international security because of their potential for demonstrating respect for the identity and traditions of other nations. On the other hand, they can also be deeply problematic in their reflection of the continued inequalities of the colonial past. The international politics of cultural property illustrate these long terms tensions particularly well, especially from the perspective of debates about the possession and rightful belonging of African cultural heritage.

Under European colonialism, a tremendous amount of objects left the African continent and ended up in museums and private collections in the west. Initially these objects were regarded as exotic curios, or at best ethnographic artefacts. Under the influence of modernist artists such as Picasso, the west slowly changed its opinion and allowed a selection of these objects (usually wooden sculptures) into the hallowed category of 'art.' This process re-created these objects as valuable commodities in an international art market. By and large, this trend has not benefitted African economies. The financial gains were – and are – made mostly by western collectors and traders.

The struggle that led to the independence of African countries, at its height in 1960, is usually depicted as a political battle, but it also initiated a struggle over the possession of cultural heritage, most commonly expressed in demands for cultural restitution.¹ The continued presence in the west of many museum collections and art objects, now regarded as the national heritage of African countries, was seen by many as the reflection of a continued inequality.

Museum curators and art collectors in the west responded, often arguing that if objects were not acquired by force or theft, their possession was legal. African art collections were also redefined as world, and not merely African, heritage. This gave western nations the moral responsibility to protect them. And exactly that protection was often referred to as the main argument against the repatriation of objects; it was assumed African countries were unable to provide safe and proper conditions for their preservation.

Of course the absence of a proper cultural infrastructure in the former colonies was usually due to a lack of interest of the colonial rulers in developing it.² As a solution, a number of European museums started cooperation programs with African museums. The Museum of Ethnology in Leiden (NL), for example, has had a working relationship with the National Museum in Mali, and the Royal Museum for Central Africa in Belgium has worked with the Institute for National Museums in the Democratic Republic of Congo. While some of these collaborations are successful, others are fraught with tension and accusations of neo-colonial motives.

International organizations have also played an important role, developing legal and semi-legal frameworks for the repatriation of cultural property. Originally created in the aftermath of the wartime destruction and plundering of World War II, these regulations were modified in 1970 by the 'UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property'. Created in order to help nation-states protect the cultural heritage within their borders against illegal removal, it emphasized that nations had the right to their cultural heritage. However welcome this convention was to newly independent countries, it held an important caveat: the regulations were non-retroactive, which meant they side-stepped the issue of material removed during the colonial era.

The significance of this and other conventions, however, is broader. They created an atmosphere, as well as an international infrastructure (with organizations such as the International Council of Museums) that facilitates bilateral negotiations. A number of these have been successful. For example, in 2003 the German state and the Völkerkundemuseum (Ethnological Museum) in Berlin returned part of a rare soapstone sculpture, collected in the ruins of the Great Zimbabwe, to current-day

¹ This is not to say that demands for the restitution of cultural heritage are uniquely African. On the contrary, they also take place between western nations – just think of the famous controversy surrounding the British Museum's possession of the Elgin Marbles. I do believe, however, that former colonial relations deeply complicate these cases because they are part of a broader set of inequalities.

² This was not universally the case, though. Some countries did possess the infrastructure, either because there were colonial precedents (for example in Kenya) or because postcolonial governments invested in culture (as was the case in Senegal).

³ When it comes to art objects or archeological remains that are in private hands, these options also tend to be less useful.

Zimbabwe. Negotiations and regulations are not always effective, however, as is demonstrated by the decades-long conflict between Nigeria and Britain over the many Benin bronzes in Britain, the result of the British plundering of the Benin capital during a punitive expedition in 1897.³

In terms of security and cooperation, such bilateral negotiations, cultural cooperation and international regulations cannot undo the past, but they can take the sting out of certain disputes and avoid broader conflict.

III Towards Transculturalism

Culture: A Resource for International Security and Cooperation?

Morgan Brigg



Morgan Brigg, Ph.D., is Senior Lecturer in the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia. He joined the Centre for Global Cooperation Research as a Senior Fellow to work on the project 'Relational Difference and Universalism: Utilizing Culture as a resource for Conflict Resolution and Global Cooperation'. It shows that culture is a crucial yet frequently overlooked phenomenon in the pursuit of global cooperation, and extends the basis for viewing cultural difference as a resource rather than a problem in conflict resolution. His work was captured in a Global Cooperation Research Paper titled 'Culture, "Relationality", and Global Cooperation'.

Culture occupies an apparently ambiguous position in relation to the challenges of international security and cooperation. All human societies share culture, and culture seems crucial to our human sense of meaning and social purpose – perhaps even to our very existence. It would thus seem that culture, as a shared human phenomenon, is a shared and valuable resource for facilitating security and cooperation. But culture, as is well known, also differentiates, creating in-groups and out-groups and, potentially, friends and enemies.

Perhaps, then, culture helps us to cooperate *within* groups, but not *among* them. This formulation no doubt partly captures how culture facilitates human behaviour, but this apparently commonsensical understanding also does not align with how culture operates in intercultural exchange. Here it is *precisely* cultural difference among peoples that is the basis for cooperation among them. At least to some extent, culture appears ambidextrous: able to help humans to *both* articulate their differences and to get along together across difference.

The curious and paradoxical capacity of culture to bring together difference and sameness has only recently begun to be more fully explored in social science. In earlier times the tendency was to think of culture in broadly aesthetic, spiritual or intellectual terms, *or* as the way of life of a particular social group of people. However, recent debates have affirmed that different cultures are not fixed or tightly bounded; culture is a much more fluid and dynamic phenomenon than many have previously allowed. One result is growing acknowledgement that cultural difference emerges, at least to a significant

degree, through interaction (rather than relative social isolation), and hence through shared processes.

Recognition that cultural difference often arises through shared processes might suggest new ways of pursuing cooperation, but it is necessary to tread carefully. It does not mean that cultural difference formed through interaction is not important or significant for being formed in this way. Culture is a major force in social life and social change, regardless of how difference forms, with people willing to in cases lay down their lives for the cause of cultural recognition. And while globalisation brings people into closer and more intensive contact, it has not lead to a decrease in cultural differentiation. Culture is here to stay. Indeed, some scholars argue that humans share a need to differentiate social groups from each other. Somewhat paradoxically, that which we share at a very fundamental level might be our desire – and processes – for creating difference. It is thus necessary to deeply value and work with cultural difference rather than to try to will it away through ideas about the universality of the faculty of reason or the development of a cosmopolitan world culture that would trump local differences.

Thinking through the paradoxes of culture is not straightforward, but it does offer avenues for rethinking and expanding our knowledge of global security and cooperation. Working to better understand the shared formation of cultural difference promises to offer greater comprehension of both the force of culture and dynamics of cooperation in global life, including in ways that are more attuned to the interplay of difference and sameness than has hitherto been the case. Such analysis suggests possibilities for responding the international security and cooperation challenges. We might, for instance, respond to deep sectarian and cultural conflicts, some of the most challenging issues in contemporary global life, not by attempting to do away with, overcome or reform cultural difference. Rather, we should deeply value cultural difference and yet do so without endorsing particular claims to culture (or beliefs and actions generated thereby). This can be a platform for exchange to explore how cultural difference came about and to develop negotiated accommodations that support and sustain differences in mutually agreed ways.

Increased globalisation and the emergence of large-scale dilemmas such as those posed by climate change currently pose serious challenges to international security and global cooperation. In addressing these challenges we should certainly pursue efforts that would unite humanity. But it also seems unlikely that we could be so fortunate as to manage the scale and depth of contemporary cooperation challenges *without* the assistance of that which makes us different from each other.

To be sure, the possibilities that cultural difference might suggest for global cooperation currently tend to be either

trumped or obscured by ‘harder’ conceptualisations of international public life, whether realist theories of international relations or technocratic formulations of global governance. However, these approaches are found wanting as we attempt to address security and cooperation challenges of the early twenty-first century. They therefore deserve to be complemented by other approaches. Drawing upon culture and cultural difference offers one such alternative. Culture has been crucial to making humans who we are; it is likely more important for our future than is realized in current international security and cooperation scholarship and practice.

A Transculturalist Path to Democratic Global Cooperation

Jan Aart Scholte



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Discussions of security in world politics often emphasise its material aspects (e.g. ecology, economy, military) to the neglect of its ideational dimensions. Yet security – a condition and experience of safety, protection, soundness and confidence – crucially involves culture also. When people are secure in their life-worlds and life-ways – both within themselves and vis-à-vis others – they enter world politics on a less defensive footing and to that extent can be more open to cooperation.

The problem of attaining global cooperation amidst cultural diversity is frequently and often urgently affirmed. However, the main existing prescriptions for handling cultural diversity in global politics have major deficiencies. An alternative politics of cultural diversity – here termed transculturalism – takes a different approach.

Global cooperation is vital in contemporary society. A host of pressing concerns today demand enlarged and strengthened global-scale responses. Yet on the whole people have not ascribed legitimacy to global governance in anywhere like the degrees that they have accepted the authority of nation-states and local governments. Global cooperation is the more limited as a result.

One of the greatest challenges for building legitimate global governance is cultural diversity. Even if contemporary globalisation has brought greater transplanetary convergence in some practices, great cultural heterogeneity persists. The countless cultural variations relate *inter alia* to age, class, (dis)ability, faith, gender, geography, indigeneity, institution, language, nationality, pastime, race, sexual orientation, and vocation.

Established approaches to global governance have largely denied or avoided issues of cultural diversity. Denial has been the response of liberal-universalist cosmopolitanism, which holds that western-modern ways can and should be the reference point for all parties to global problems. Avoidance of cultural diversity in global politics has been the response of communitarianism, which suggests that humanity can be divided into neatly circumscribed cultural groups who best lead separate lives in a spirit of mutual tolerance. A third more recent approach, interculturalism, encourages more cross-cultural communication, but replicates multiculturalism's assumption that culture maps onto neatly separable groups. Interculturalism also downplays the degree to which the negotiation of cultural differences is subject to power relations and overlooks that some cultural differences are unavoidably a source of deep conflict.

A more positive alternative cultural politics for deeper global cooperation could be pursued under the label of 'transculturalism' and build on seven main pillars. The first, *insistence on reflexivity*, demands that parties to global cooperation are constantly alert to, and questioning of, the particularity of their ideas and practices. Negotiation of cultural differences can be facilitated when, through reflexivity, parties are more attuned to precise character of their differences.

A second anchor of transculturalism, *acknowledgement of culture/power relations*, underlines that the social construction of meaning is always suffused with enabling and disabling potentials for the parties involved. Sustainable global cooperation is advanced to the extent that the parties are open and honest about cultural power hierarchies in their relationships, refuse opportunities to abuse unfair advantages, and strive in principle to accord all cultural positions equal opportunities for respect and voice.

A third pillar of transculturalism, *recognition of complexity*, notes that culture is not manifested in neatly bounded and mutually exclusive populations. Culture involves not clearly delimited, discrete and fixed spheres, but porosity, intersections, overlaps, permutations and movements. Appreciation of cultural complexity invites deeper exploration of, and more careful communication with, counterparts in global politics. The resulting more nuanced and open understanding of both self and other selves lays firmer ground for global cooperation.

A fourth mainstay of transculturalism, *celebration of diversity*, suggests that pluralism in life-worlds is not only recognised, but also in principle positively embraced and actively promoted. In transculturalism global cooperation is not made contingent upon a consensus around meaning. On the contrary, by providing multiple and dynamic responses to global problems, furtherance of cultural diversity might even be key to the survival of humankind and other life.

A fifth building block for transculturalism is *humility in the face of difference*. Situations arise in global politics where different constructions of meaning are incommensurable. Yet, instead of immediately adopting a stance of confrontation and affirming one's own greater virtue, parties to transculturalist exchanges acknowledge the imperfections of their own life-worlds and their severely limited comprehension of contrasting life-worlds. Global cooperation amidst cultural diversity is far more achievable among the humble than the self-righteous.

Humility facilitates a sixth core principle of transculturalism, namely the *promotion of deep listening*. Transcultural listening entails concentrated, careful and patient attention that strives maximally to hear, empathise with, receive from, and respond to counterparts. Thereby transculturalist listening becomes an act of solidarity which, when practised on all sides, fosters a deep acquaintance and trust that advances global cooperation.

Seventh and finally, transculturalism presumes that global cooperation is a process of ongoing *reciprocal learning for positive change* among diverse life-worlds. Engaging cultural diversity is an opportunity to discover that new ways are possible, including new insights and practices for enhanced global cooperation.

The preceding summary suggests that transculturalism could bring significant benefits for democratic global cooperation that are less available through other approaches to cultural diversity. That said, transculturalism is not a panacea. Its implementation would not automatically end struggles with, say, ecological damage and socioeconomic inequality. Moreover, powerful forces can work against transculturalism. For instance, global elites might see their privileges better served by the assimilationist demands of liberal cosmopolitanism, while certain social movements may gain much of their strength through multiculturalist insistence on conserving 'tradition'. Given these powerful counterforces, transculturalism needs well-positioned, adept and committed advocates to move forward to implementation. Transculturalism may involve leaps of ambition, but urgent needs for deeper global cooperation, in the service of greater security, call for major reinventions of politics.

IV Imbalance

Tensions, Contradictions, and Paradoxes in Post-War Regimes of International Security and Global Cooperation

Steven Pierce



Dr Steven Pierce is Lecturer in Modern African History at the University of Manchester. He joined the Centre for Global Cooperation Research as a Fellow with the project 'Government and the Body in Pain: Humanitarianism, Vulnerability, and the Culpabilities of Power'. This research project contributes to the historical assessment of how global initiatives for humanitarianism and human rights have developed in tandem with paradigms of human difference.

In July 1984 a customs official based in London's Stanstead Airport made a last-minute decision to inspect a crate. The item had been loaded onto a Nigerian Airways plane shortly due to depart for Lagos. Though the plane's crew protested it was diplomatic cargo and thus not subject to customs inspection, the official grew suspicious and called in the anti-terrorism police, unwittingly setting off a major diplomatic incident. Inside the crate the police found a man under heavy sedation, and beside him an Israeli doctor tasked with keeping him alive. The man was Umaru Dikko, a Nigerian government minister until military coup seven months previously. Dikko had been kidnapped from outside his Notting Hill flat, to which he had fled after the Nigerian coup and from which he had emerged as a major spokesman for the deposed government and against the military regime. He had recently threatened to wage a 'jihad' against the military regime.

Nigeria had been seeking custody of Dikko for some time; in his official capacity he had been notorious for corruption and for being the architect of the then-ruling party's dubious electoral victories. Dikko's presence in London placed the British government in a difficult position: on one hand, the accounts of his alleged crimes were compelling; on the other, he was a genuine political dissident, and the coup was objectively un-

democratic. Nonetheless, the crate incident decided the issue, and Dikko was permitted to stay. Granted limited asylum in 1987, he remained in Britain until the 1990s.

The incident would be a minor historical footnote except for its illustration of tensions, contradictions, and paradoxes in post-war regimes of international security and global cooperation. These are very much terms of the present day; they evoke evolving international norms after World War II and chart how these have been transformed by changing global orders after the end of the Cold War. At the same time, the concerns they index have a much longer history. Both conflict and cooperation understood through the paradigms of international security and global cooperation are structured by tension between more powerful countries and the less powerful, global haves and have nots. Their seemingly universal ethos disguises longstanding relations of power and privilege.

The current international order takes for granted on the principle of national sovereignty. Maintaining international security is an issue of relations between states that are equal in the sense of being independent and able to exercise sovereign authority. Similarly, global cooperation presumes a formal equality of the actors cooperating – cooperation is not coercion. At the same time, the international community is factually unequal. This contradiction inflects cooperative negotiation and indeed the ways in which country's security needs are judged. The Dikko case reflected many of these paradoxes. Initially, and at least on the surface, there was a straightforward case for extradition. Compelling evidence existed that he had diverted vast amounts of rice that had been imported to feed hungry Nigerians, and there could be no doubt he was central to rigging Nigeria's troubled 1983 elections. Though the military government had achieved power in an irregular fashion, Nigerians had danced in the streets when the civilians had been overthrown. Moreover, the British government recognized the federal military government. To compound the embarrassment, over the years many British nationals were implicated in Nigerian corruption cases. Principles of sovereign equality conflicted with humanitarian obligations to provide asylum to the politically oppressed. As Nigeria's former colonial ruler, Britain had violated Nigerians' human rights and for many years thwarted their democratic aspirations. Almost every crime Dikko and his military opponents might be accused of had earlier been committed by British officials in Nigeria. In short, The United Kingdom had little moral claim to judge any of the Nigerian actors. And yet, Dikko's petition for political asylum, and the egregious kidnapping forced Britain to do so anyway.

Countries of the global south correctly condemn the global north for violating principles of sovereign equality and of maintaining double standards – about human rights, about

national security, and about all forms of global cooperation. Today's world is markedly more multi-polar than that of 1984, and Nigeria's current government is better able to assert itself on the international stage than were its rulers thirty years ago. And yet, principles of national sovereignty are frequently most loudly asserted when they are being breached – as drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan attest. Negotiations are often most successful when unequal and coercive, as those over debt restructuring have demonstrated. And human rights continue to be protected in an unequal and haphazard fashion. While international security and global cooperation lay claim to an international order of sovereign equals, their roots are in a world order structured by colonialism and unequal exchange, in which humanitarianism and the protection of countries' national interests served as euphemisms for brutal acts of conquest and domination.

In the late nineteenth century groups advocating the abolition of slavery turned their attention to slave-raiding and the persistence of large populations of slaves in sub-Saharan Africa. In their activism, they formed a powerful constituency for the annexation of a myriad previously independent areas and polities. In some areas, colonial annexation was justified as a response to what was perceived as a humanitarian crisis, a series of wars, epidemics, and famines that had killed much of the population of interior east Africa, themselves ultimately caused by slave raiding and a global appetite for slave-produced commodities like cloves. Additionally, some areas were conquered because they were claimed to pose a threat to Europe's existing African colonies. Expanding European powers annexed territories through military conquest and through unsavoury forms of diplomatic skullduggery.

African countries managed to reclaim their sovereignty less than a century later, but their violent, inegalitarian incorporation into the international state system has powerful legacies, ones that cannot be wished away by paradigms of cooperation. Until and unless the international community can come to terms with the unequal bargaining positions of different countries, and unless powerful countries can admit 'security' is often a euphemism for exporting violence to the less powerful, genuine security and global cooperation will prove elusive. The burdens of history go beyond the question of how we got to the present. They dictate the terms through which we can imagine the future.

International Security and Global Cooperation: A Quest for Alternatives?

Abou Jeng



Dr Abou Jeng had a one-year fellowship with the Centre for Global Cooperation Research. Being a Postdoc Fellow at the Centre, he conducted his research on 'Memory, Human Rights, and Democratization in Africa'. Jeng came to Duisburg from the University of Warwick, UK, where he was Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Human Rights in practice. He is a Human Rights Lawyer and Coordinator of the Centre for Research, Development and Social Justice Advocacy (CreSpsa).

It is generally agreed that the dawn of the post-war order in 1945 ushered in a particular normative and institutional framework upon which legality and legitimacy of international conduct are both sourced and referenced. This framework feeds from a set of values that are perceived as neutral, just and universal. The claim to universality and neutrality is driven as much by the belief that the core of what constitutes international law remains organized around a grand ambition for the realization of international security – peace, justice and order. Such is the importance attached to the ethos underpinning this international order that many continue to argue that an alternative to the *status quo* stands to achieve no meaningful purpose. Francis Fukuyama, a notable voice in this regard, has even gone lengths to equate the perceived intellectual triumph and universality of liberal internationalism to the end of history and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the ultimate form of government.

But of course, these perceptions and interpretations are now being robustly contested. Increasingly, voices continue to emerge seeking to expose the unfairness, inconsistencies and devastations arising from the structures of international legality. Such contestations are premised on the understanding that universality is often not an ideal departure point both in terms of mediating an acceptable framework for international security and pursuit of global cooperation. Opinions are in no short supply as to ways of mitigating current international faultlines. But in so doing, regard must be had to the argument that global challenges and possibilities of coopera-

tion cannot be confined to the mere proposition of ideas, but that essentially, there is an urging for what the Portuguese sociologist, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, calls the 'alternative thinking of alternatives.' This sense of reflective outreach to other sensibilities and epistemologies may well trigger a kind of reclamation which could minimize as well as humanize some of the uneven sketches of international order.

While it is accepted also, that the founding basis for the universality of the post-war order is rooted in the United Nations Charter, the formational principles and praxis that anchor it are largely determined by the politics of dominant powers and their affiliated interests. Perhaps nowhere is this power of politics more visible than in the realm of international intervention. Over the years, much has been said and written about intervention across disciplines. But like other such concepts, the debate is fraught with competing claims as to its utility, legitimacy and legality. Bruno Simma, the distinguished German jurist, has in a fascinating debate with the late Antonio Cassese, expressed fear and cautioned against the substitution of the language of legality with the language of legitimacy on the grounds that this may dangerously amount to a needless assault on international society, and in effect, render the possibilities of global cooperation distant. Simma's admonition however, has long been echoed in African regional organizations, which historically resigned to accepting peripheral roles in the decisions that matter in global politics.

The collateral effects of global politics are particularly felt in Africa, and where the effects are a matter of life and death, the consequences can be devastating. In 1994, for instance, hundreds of thousands of people were killed in the Rwandan genocide within yards of the United Nations military base in Kigali. The painful irony is that the killings unfolded while the UN Security Council entertained itself in debates on the virtues of sovereignty in the backdrop of teleological interpretations of its Charter. The response from an indignant Africa was an attempt to appropriate intervention on its own terms and for its own purposes, as a counter-narrative to the insensitivity of hegemonic liberal internationalism. And so in its Constitutive Act, the African Union becomes the first international organization to grant itself the right to intervene – through military and non-military means – in the affairs of its member states to prevent war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide as well as restore legitimate public order.

Corollary to this, the African Union has created the African Union Commission on International Law. While the dynamics of global politics have polarized and hindered the quest for a just world order, the African Union's attempts at rejuvenating regional international law as resistance may not, on their own, be sufficient to recalibrate the faultlines in international order. For one, the African Union feeds into and leans on, the

pillars of international society, for another, its institutions remain weak, unstable and asymmetrical. Yet international security and global cooperation stand to benefit from a strong and effective African Union. When and how a mutually reinforcing international order is within reach will most certainly occupy academics and policy-makers. Whatever is done by the day's end, the projection of internal freedom and international peace as formulated by Immanuel Kant, must be at the heart of international legality.

International Security, Global Cooperation, and the New Authoritarian Challenge

Peter Thiery



Dr Peter Thiery is Lecturer at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Heidelberg. As a Fellow at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research he worked on the research project 'Democracy in its "Third Transformation": Exploring the Meaning, Scope and Limits of Democracy and Democratization in a Pluri-cultural World'. Apart from summarising the limits and possibilities of democracy found by empirical research, one major topic was the changes in the 'scale of political life' derived from the transformation of the nation state and its diminishing capabilities as political order.

Throughout the last decade we have witnessed what may be called the rise of a new authoritarianism. This is in stark contrast to the 'democratic' climate 25 years ago. After the fall of the iron curtain, social scientists, political decision-makers, and organizations for cooperation in development and the promotion of democracy regarded the trajectory of democracy with a general sense of optimism. Metaphors such as Samuel Huntington's 'third wave of democratization' or 'the end of history' (Fukuyama) appeared to signal an upcoming new era of democracy worldwide. This was accompanied by the revival of Kant's 'democratic peace theorem', promising not only a more inclusive, but also a more peaceful world inspired by cooperation and disarmament.

However, entering the new millennium and hit by 9/11, these hopes and promises increasingly lost momentum. Accompanied by a form of democratic exhaustion and the rise of a new self-confidence of authoritarian rulers, the notion of a 'global retreat of democracy' has replaced the democratic ideal of the 'end of history', and the 'return of the authoritarian great powers' appears to have halted the global advance of democracy. There is indeed sufficient empirical evidence of these changes, though the interpretations vary. First, since the mid-1990s, regime changes from dictatorships to democracy have become increasingly rare, while a number of democratization processes have been reverted, and some

attempts – most recently in the Arab world – failed. Second, the remaining autocracies have also proven highly resistant to the challenge of democratic transformation. Third, the gap in democratic quality in new democracies is growing increasingly larger. While some scholars interpret this development as the rise of a new authoritarianism or the reversal of the third wave, others simply hold that there may be a stagnation of democratic development. In any case, however, there is a new balance between democracies and authoritarian regimes, above all since China and Russia have confirmed their power and their growing influence abroad.

This scenario of a new authoritarian challenge poses some questions not only about the prospects for peace and security, but also for the prospects of cooperation at the global and international level as such. Which effects may the stabilization or even expansion of authoritarian rule have for security and cooperation? Can liberal democracies cooperate with authoritarian regimes? And are authoritarian regimes able to cooperate in the long run? These questions point to the inherent logics of different regime types – and regime subtypes – and their systemic effects on global cooperation and international security. The answers appear to be not very promising.

From a theoretical point of view, the very nature of authoritarian regimes casts some doubt on the credibility of their rule compliance. These social orders have remained under the control of entrenched elites who are able to restrict democratic procedures to maintain their own power. In order to preserve their own privileges, they deny inclusiveness and responsiveness to their citizens and try to evade any form of accountability. Thus, despite their comparatively new strength, authoritarian regimes in the 21st century are inherently unstable because of their profound lack of legitimacy. Apart from repression, authoritarian elites therefore tend to use all sources of output legitimacy, which may also lead to a trade-off between compliance to their international commitments and maximizing the likelihood of preserving their domestic power. There is of course a debate – picking up the democratic peace theorem – concerning the different types of authoritarian regimes, and above all the presence of functional equivalents to accountability mechanisms. Empirical evidence, however, has remained somewhat contradictory until now.

Recent developments also seem to nourish some pessimism about the future of cooperation. Among them is the growing attractiveness of the Chinese model of economic growth under authoritarian rule which is used to justify the perpetuation of dictatorships. Authoritarian regimes of the different nature have also learnt to cooperate among themselves to confirm their domestic power, including technology exports, security service cooperation or even military intervention. This 'authoritarian internationalism' – to use Daniel

Calingaert's concept – has also engaged to challenge existing international norms or to undermine international institutions, e.g. the UN Human Rights Council. On the other hand, the authoritarian advance may in turn provoke decided counter-strategies of democratic states. And taking the democratic peace theory seriously – democracies are less likely to go to war with each other, but are just as likely involved in violent conflicts with non-democratic states – the result would be an exacerbation of conflict. This scenario – which reminds somewhat of Huntington's 'the West against the rest' – might thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

From a democratic point of view, the hope might be a further extension of democracies around the world. However, the prospects for further endogenous democratization are bleak. Reviewing the temporary success of the third wave, it seems that social forces in poorer countries – which are seen as unlikely to democratize – used the window of opportunity after 1989 to push their countries towards higher degrees of freedom. But the same structural conditions which usually impede democratization then hampered their consolidation or provoked their reversal. The democratic world – and especially the Western democracies – maybe has to learn that a deeper democratization towards liberal democracy not only requires time and good institutional choices, but also the necessary conditions and – above all socio-economic – pre-requisites. The deep global inequalities surely do not foster democracy, and are also detrimental for cooperation. The global GDP per capita (PPP) in 2013 was estimated at 12,700\$, ranging from 400\$ in the Democratic Republic of Congo to 141,100\$ in Liechtenstein (USA: 49,000; Germany: 38,400). Far from proposing zero-sum calculations, at least a serious political debate on global redistributive justice might be helpful.

V China

China's Approach to Global Cooperation

Hung-jen Wang



Dr Hung-jen Wang obtained his doctorate in Political Science from the University of Tübingen, Germany, and was a Postdoc Fellow at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research. Wang's research project at the Centre – 'China's Rising Power and Global Governance' – analysed China's rising role in world politics in two aspects: Chinese perspectives on global governance concepts; and Chinese legitimacy strategies in justifying their rule of order.

I. The Institutional Style of China Rising

Theories of international relations can explain conflict and cooperation between nations from either the structural or the process point of view. Research on whether or not the rise of China will lead to a conflict can also adopt a structural or a process approach. Structural explanation relies largely on analysis of China's relative power and interest. It explains conflict and cooperation behaviour as structurally determined. Process analysis requires attention towards style, such that belief and choice of China and its interaction with other nations are all relevant. It assumes that conflict and cooperation are not determined until they actually take place. Given China's rise generates uncertainties in structure, the analysis of Chinese policy of conflict and conflict resolution should call for analyses of styles that reveal how particular interactive processes between China and other nations evolve over a series of policy choices.

One particular mode of process analysis looks at the choice of institutional mechanism pertaining to conflict and conflict resolution. Specifically, this involves the choice among multilateral, bilateral and unilateral frames or their combination to resolve conflicts. China on the rise compels both the country and its interactive counterpart to choose institutional frames in order to cope with the rise. In the case of China, its mixed use of the multilateral harmonious world, the bilateral agreement, and the unilateral self-help has incurred anxiety among its audience regarding which is real.

II. The Harmonious World Shelved?

Since the end of the Cold War, China's rising power and political system have been perceived as threats to the existing hegemonic power, the United States. The most pessimistic view is that a serious confrontation between China and the United States is inevitable; the more optimistic view is that the world can and will accommodate China's rise, using either multilateral or bilateral approaches. Multilaterally, Western-dominated rules and institutions are already facilitating China's international integration into the world. Bilaterally, American engagement with China is designed in the hope to lead China to become a responsible power. However, even among the optimists who welcome China's multilateral efforts at engagement, there are those who suspect that China is using both multilateral and bilateral means in support of its own national interests, and is biding its time for opportunities to revise or undermine the established order.

Amidst the general atmosphere of suspicion toward his high profiled slogan of 'the China Dream', Chinese President Xi Jinping held a workshop in November 2013 to launch a new platform to deal with neighbouring countries. He has renovated the principle of China's foreign policy from 'the harmonious world' to 'striving for achievement' (*fenfa you wei*), singling a move from multilateralism toward unilateralism. However, the direction of the move is not self-evident. Note that the toning down of the harmonious world takes place in the realization that the world continues, sometimes increasingly seeing China either as a threat or as a profiteer despite China's wish for the recognition of being a responsible major power. Apparently China has not been able to meet western expectations. China therefore should make friends, instead of money, according to the new slogan. The uncharacteristic motto of 'striving for achievement' in terms of China sharing a common destiny with friends so as to form one 'life community' (*mingyun gongtongti*) with each of its neighbours appears to be a harmonious world in spirit nonetheless. It sanctions a peculiar combination of bilateralism and unilateralism, and yet by no means multilateralism one would expect to see a responsible major power adopt.

The studies of international relations consider multilateralism of collective security and cooperation among three or more actor-states, bilateralism of reciprocal bonds between two primary states and the US style of unilateralism marked by pre-emptive intervention. Chinese foreign policy has been consistently alienated from multilateralism, despite the seeming active participation in UN peace keeping in the new century and the alleged commitment to multilateralism of the new leadership under Xi. In fact, a veteran China watcher had already concluded a couple of decades ago that China:

[i]n most domains seems to be propelled by unilateralism in bilateral clothing with a little Asian multilateral regionalism ...

... What gave rise to the growing perception of a rising dragon rampant in the post-Tiananmen and post-Cold War era is Beijing's assertive unilateralism in its legislative pre-emptive strike, in creeping southward expansionism, in the fastest growing military budget, and in major naval and air build-up with power projection capabilities which include aerial refuelling technology.¹

¹ Kim, Samuel S. (1995). 'China's pacific policy: reconciling the irreconcilable', *International Journal* 50 (3) (Summer): 469.

The abstract yet clearly multilateral harmonious world theme that emerged in 2005 under Hu Jintao's leadership is no longer convincing in the contexts of multiple maritime disputes with China's neighbours.

On top of that is China's lukewarm attitude toward global governance. Despite such distrust toward China's alleged harmony, the substitution of striving for achievement for the harmonious world has coincided with the suspicion that Chinese foreign policy is changing in nature – a more assertive and expansive China will not refrain from self-revealing any longer. Xi's goal of making friends and the self-encouraged striving do not appear all that different from what the critics of Chinese foreign policy in the early periods already said about it.

China, India and the Three C's

Herbert Wulf¹



Professor Dr Herbert Wulf shaped the activities of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) as founding Director in 1994 for seven years. Since then, he has been working as Researcher and Research Associate at BICC as well as Adjunct Senior Researcher at the Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen. Wulf has been Senior Expert Fellow at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research, working on the project 'India's Foreign Policy and its Role in Global Governance'. The research goal was to understand the basis of India's global aspirations, which contrast so starkly with the enormous difficulties it faces at home and outside its borders.

¹ Reprint of a INEC-blog entry at: <http://inec.usip.org/blog/2014/mar/04/china-india-and-three-cs/>, March 4, 2014.

China and India are the two most populous countries in the world. Both countries have dynamic – although, recently, slightly stuttering – economies. Their actions are likely to decisively influence global politics in the near- and medium-term. For decades, relations between China and India have been oscillating between conflict, competition and cooperation – the three Cs.

In economic terms, China and India could emerge either as fierce competitors or as amiable cooperation partners. World attention is presently focused on the display of force between China on the one hand, and Japan and the United States on the other hand, played out via a conflict over a couple of small islands in the East China Sea. But China's maritime activities might also bring it into conflict with India. However, if China and India can transform their fragile and unstable relationship into something more cooperative, this could have an enormous positive impact on the two countries – and on global politics.

The First C: Conflict

The good times of the 'hindi-chini bhai bhai' (India–China brotherhood) of the early years of independence under Nehru and Mao Tse-tung are long gone. The 1954 treaty between the two countries (known as 'panchsheel' in India) establishing peaceful co-existence was supposed to regulate territorial integrity and institute a non-interference policy. But the period of their common anti-imperialist ideology of the 1950s ended with a border war in 1962 in which Chinese troops occupied disputed territory and caught India unprepared. This bloody conflict was and

remains a traumatic experience for the Indian elite. Although careful diplomatic initiatives have led to a cautious rapprochement, relations are far from being trustful and cordial.

Indian foreign and security policymakers are currently irritated by at least three conflicts. First, the territorial dispute in the north-east of India remains contentious, despite negotiations in numerous bilateral working groups, and neither China nor India is willing to give up its claims. China claims that large parts of the territory of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh are part of Tibet, calling it South Tibet. A second, closely related conflict concerns insurmountable differences over China's role in Tibet and Tibetan refugees in India. While more than a million Tibetan refugees live in India today, China refuses to recognize the Tibetan Government in exile in India or the presence of the Dalai Lama, who fled to India in 1959 after the Chinese occupation of Tibet. Third, the Indian Government is concerned by China's activities in India's immediate neighbourhood – particularly China's defence cooperation with Pakistan and its ambitions in Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka.

The Second C: Competition

Meanwhile, the Chinese Government is anxious about increased cooperation between India and the USA, which comes after a long period of alienation. The 2005 nuclear deal between the two countries codified India's de facto nuclear weapon status and thereby paved the way for closer cooperation. In the eyes of China, this partnership is part of the US strategy of rebalancing Asia – a move clearly directed against China. In turn, China's current diplomatic, economic and maritime ambitions in several Indian Ocean littoral states are a concern for strategists in India. For example, China has invested in harbours in Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka) and Chittagong (Bangladesh) as well as in harbour and communication installations in Myanmar. The Chinese Government categorically denies that any of these projects has military relevance. India, for its part, invests in its maritime presence in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and pursues a strategy of friendly relations with countries in the Strait of Malacca, a vital bottleneck in terms of Chinese oil trade routes. India's former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Deepak Kapoor, warns against a Chinese 'string of pearls' around the Indian Ocean. Indian strategists speak in alarmist, geopolitical terms about a Chinese footprint in India's sphere of influence and a possible encirclement. They call for a speedy and forceful investment in a blue water navy. If hardliners on both sides have their way, all this could result in a fierce maritime arms race. India's investments in its armed forces have been substantial, but have slowed recently due to sluggish economic

growth. Comparing the military expenditure of the two countries illustrates China's phenomenal growth: at around \$170 billion, China's defence budget is more than three times as big as India's.


The Third C: Cooperation

India–China relations are characterized by contradictory factors. Apart from the worrying conflicts and the potential for an Asian arms race, both countries emphasize their willingness to cooperate. China is one of India's biggest trading partners, and bilateral trade has flourished in recent years. Both countries cooperate within the G20 and with other regional powers including Brazil, Russia and South Africa – together with whom they meet as the so-called BRICS countries – in order to break Western dominance of the global governance architecture, particularly international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

China and India are also partners in other multilateral forums, including the global climate negotiations. The BRICS countries have also agreed to establish a development bank, in an ambitious plan that could indeed change global economics. If these countries can overcome their differences, this could have positive effects on China–India relations and make their disagreements over disputed territories and other conflicts, as well as their competition in the Indian Ocean, irrelevant. Together, China and India could change the global power balance, with positive effects on economic development and security in Asia. Nevertheless, the influence of conflict, competition and cooperation on China–India relations continues to produce a somewhat unbalanced power dynamic; and China is economically more dynamic than India. However, India's soft power, together with its culture, its functioning democracy, its values of free press and liberty, its pluralistic society and religious diversity could, in the long run, be the more sustainable concept.

How Reconciled Memories of the Past Can Help Move Forward China-Japan Relations?

Dong Wang



Dong Wang has worked in North America, Asia, and Europe as professor of modern and contemporary Chinese history, executive director of the East-West Institute of International Studies, and director of the Centre for East Asian Studies. She is also research associate of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University and vice president of the Historical Society for Twentieth Century China based in the United States. During her one-year fellowship at the Centre Wang examined 'Chinese Conceptions of Effective and Just Global Governance' with special reference to intellectual property rights.

Unlike in Europe, the post-World War II and post-Cold War orders in the Asia Pacific are unsettling, compounded by China's ascendancy and international geopolitics. In the last few years, tensions between China and Japan – the world's no. 2 and no. 3 economies – have been at its worst since the end of WWII. In the age of multilateralism and cooperation, military confrontation is not a viable option for these two regional powers. Given their close cultural, economic ties and importance to international security, they have obligations to improve their long troubled relationship. One way forward is to reconcile their discrepant memories of wartime history through respectful, inclusive, and cosmopolitan diplomacy.

First, leaders of both neighbouring countries should recognize the pain and suffering resulting from wartime atrocities. History revisionism promoted by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is not a recipe for national greatness. Japan should admit its historical aggression of China, Korea, and other Asian countries more openly. China should forgive Japan and turn over the dark page of history while remembering that the Japanese people too were victims of WWII and of the atomic bombs dropped by Americans. Rather than the Yasukuni Shrine, Abe and other Japanese leaders should visit the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing and the historical monuments in Nanjing. Equally important, Chinese President Xi Jinping should visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in remembrance of those who died and suffered.

¹ Baker, Gerard and Nishiyama, George (2013). 'Abe Says Japan Ready to Counter China's Power', *The Wall Street Journal*, October 26, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304799404579157210861675436#printMode>, accessed on November 9, 2013. Jonathan Tepperman's conversation with Shinzo Abe, 'Japan is back', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print>, accessed on May 25, 2013.

Second, in their respective diplomacies to cultivate good relations with Asian countries, Japan and China should be inclusive to each other. Since taking office, Abe on several occasions spoke about the coming back of Japan and its renewed leadership in Asia to guard against China's potential use of force. In an interview with the *Wall Street Journal*, Abe asserted that 'he envisions a resurgent Japan taking a more assertive leadership role in Asia to counter China's power, seeking to place Tokyo at the helm of countries in the region nervous about Beijing's military build-up amid fears of an American pullback.'¹ This new line of thinking was made public as the prospect of incidental military clashes between China and Japan increased.

Sound relations with regional countries have been the new focus in China's security strategy as well. In September and October 2013, President Xi and Premier Li Keqiang respectively visited Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in central Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, and Vietnam, and attended the East Asia Summit in Brunei and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Bali. During a meeting on neighbouring diplomacy on October 24–25, 2013, Xi Jinping put forth four notions of closeness, honesty, benefit, and tolerance as the basic principle in handling neighbouring nation-states. Xi stated that good relations with neighbours form the basis for efforts to create a sound regional environment for prosperity and mutual development. Developing a sense of community and shared identity in the Asia Pacific is seen as crucial to easing tensions between China and some of its Asian neighbours.

International pressure against military conflict makes it imperative that China and Japan should not forget that they too are Asian neighbours, and that repairing their own relations will gain them political capital and boost their own credibility on the global stage.

Third, nationalism is not the sole driver in diplomacy and international politics. Despite the strong influence of the geopolitical factor in the early 1970s, cosmopolitan diplomacy had helped China and Japan reconcile the memories of the past, and forged formal diplomatic relations under the leadership of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. In place of the disputes over the uninhabited Sengaku/the Diaoyu Islands and the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), China and Japan should focus on their long shared languages, ideas, institutions, religions, and cultures that aims to improve mutual perceptions and people-to-people bonds. Both Japan and China have been furthering their participation in multilateral and bilateral economic and security forums and frameworks. On the other hand, the two countries, together with South Korea, should capitalize on their trilateral trade and investment interdependency and

play a more active role towards East and Southeast Asian regional integration and common security for a bright future.

The powerful politics of remorse and mourning epitomized by German Chancellor Willy Brandt in Warsaw in 1970 and Germany's sensitive and demure reinstatement of Berlin as the capital of a united Germany may serve as an inspiration to East Asian politicians.

VI Transitional Justice

Justice and Memory in a Global World

Jaroslava Gajdošová



Jaroslava Gajdošová, Ph.D., is Lecturer at the Department of Sociology at the New York University in Prague, Czech Republic. She stayed with the Centre for Global Cooperation Research for one year as a Fellow. Gajdošová's research project studied phenomenon of justice in a period of post-communist transition in Czech and East German. It focused on lapses in memory, misinterpretations of past events and misconceptions of recent injustices and on how they have produced distorted images of totalitarian past and misinformed its political and cultural reiterations.

The fall of autocratic regime is usually followed by the aim to build a better society. While this is a largely consensual goal, the path toward it is hardly unanimous since it brings forth a dilemma whether past wrongs should be remembered and punished or whether they should be forgotten. The project of the building of a better regime thus connects three domains in a transitioning society – its justice, its memory, and its future identity – and puts forth questions such as whether a call for justice will facilitate or hinder democratic consolidation, whether it will (de)escalate violence and, subsequently, whether for the sake of stable and prosperous future it is not better to silence a difficult past.

After the collapse of communism, former communist countries were facing the dilemma of justice and memory and were seeking consensus on which wrongs they should punish, which they should forgive, and how they should remember a regime that lasted over four decades. For those who lived in communism it was difficult to reclaim their lives as free and fulfilled subjects because it was almost impossible to look back at their own pasts and the society they lived in without embarrassment or shame. Even dissidents like Havel or Michnik found themselves being complicit with communist regime and tainted by it. Such a traumatic experience called for future compensations and at that moment, the dealings with communist past became conciliatory and forward looking projects that were aimed at the building of a society that would be worth remembering. The main goal of democratic transition was the decommunization of society, which was supported by post-communist constitutions and legislative instruments such as Lustration (screening) Law. Even if new legislation prevented former collaborators with the regime from holding public office,

it could not prevent them from entering power networks via private sector where they could build up and bolster their economic and social capital.

Transition to democracy was marked by lapses in memory, misinterpretations of past events and misconceptions of recent injustices that have produced distorted images of totalitarianism and its misconceptions that have informed political culture of post-communist societies. There is a link between lapses in justice and collective memories of post-communist societies that have been reluctant to name the wrongs of past regimes and its detrimental effects on the construction of communist subject that was depoliticized and deprived of its own autonomy and of free socialization. It is rather staggering to see how a failure to address magnitude and aftermaths of communist repression has given rise to the appeasing collective consciousness. There has not been a lasting public debate on social and psychological consequences of communist state's infringement on personal freedom, subjugation of individual autonomy, suspension of independent thinking and of individual responsibility for one's life. Notwithstanding their consensus that communism was a detrimental regime, post-communist societies experienced its fall as a collective trauma and such experience has made commemoration of the demise of communism increasingly difficult. By losing communism, societies lost real experience that was undesired yet familiar and such loss raises a question: how does society commemorate a trauma?

The shortfalls in reflective dealing with communist past were conducive to some paradoxical and alarming developments. For instance, Czech and Slovak societies that had the longest period of transitional justice ended their democratic transitions by the sanctioning of the impunity; Hungarian, Ukrainian and Russian societies have fostered a revival of radical nationalism, and countries like former Yugoslavia engaged in the building of ethnocracy instead of democracy, which resulted in a weak civil society, resurgence of socialism and nationalism, and in subsequent civil wars. Another consequence of evasive dealing with the legacy of communism is a yearning for the past whether it comes in a form of post-GDR nostalgia or longing for the restoration of Soviet empire in Russia, East Ukraine and in former Soviet Republics of Central Asia. It seems like within the time span of a single post-communist generation, Kundera's dictum about the struggle of memory against forgetting has faded away and the forty years of communist dictatorship, which once ruled over numerous peoples of Europe and Asia, were forgotten without ever having been understood.

This outcome is to be attributed also to the cooperation between the elites in post-communist East and neo-liberal West as both actors from a former geo-political divide failed to

take a stance on past wrongs and on resurgences of violence that has resulted from them. Equivocal attitudes of some EU countries, including Germany and Czech Republic, toward recent conflict in Ukraine and its altercation with Russia are but manifestations of unaddressed legacy of communism in post-communist Europe. The end of communism brought much euphoria to the West and to the East side of a former geopolitical divide but it also reinforced its hierarchies, the cultural and geo-political superiority of the West and indelible need of the East to 'westernize' itself. Communist past has a peculiar place in collective memories of post-communist societies; it is simultaneously recent and remote, its content is difficult to narrate and its loss is impossible to commemorate and if it is remembered, such recollections are personal and distorted or ostensibly heroic and vague. Building of a better society – the one that will be worth remembering and that will cultivate social bond and belonging that will be worth preserving for future generations – is still an unaccomplished project.

International Security, Global Cooperation, and Transitional Justice

Birgit Schwelling



Dr Birgit Schwelling was Visiting Professor at the Department of Cultural Sociology at the University of Konstanz, Germany. For the one-year fellowship at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research she conducted research on 'The Global Regime of Transitional Justice'. The project investigated the role of international non-governmental organizations in processes of coping with human rights violations and mass atrocities, now commonly referred to as transitional justice, and asked for the potential for the globalization of norms of transitional justice.

Transitional justice in its broadest definition refers to concepts, mechanisms, and instruments that societies, emerging from war or dictatorship apply, in dealing with the legacies of conflict, human rights violations, and/or mass atrocities. They range from trials and tribunals to the creation of memorials, museums, and days of mourning, from apologies and healing circles to tackling the distributional inequities that underlie conflict. Transitional justice becomes a key issue after national or international security has been disturbed, violated, or suspended. It is a resource for re-establishing security by prosecuting and punishing perpetrators, restoring the dignity of the victims of atrocities, and 'repairing' the injuries suffered by them as well as part of a broader international commitment to human security.

Attempts at coping with the legacies of conflict and the violation of security are not new. They can be traced back as far as to the Reconciliation Agreement of 403/404 B.C. in Athens in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War. But transitional justice in its contemporary relevance and understanding certainly gained new momentum in the wake of the Second World War and the Holocaust. The establishment of international criminal courts, the invention of truth commissions as either an alternative or concomitant instrument to retributive justice, and the construction of national and international days of remembrance and mourning are only some of the measures and instruments noteworthy in this regard.

There are more recent developments in the field of transitional justice that make it a particularly interesting case in the

context of global cooperation. As Susan Dwyer has pointed out, 'there seems to be a global frenzy to balance moral ledgers. Talk of apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation is everywhere'.¹ There are, in other words, remarkable global flows and transfers of transitional justice concepts, mechanism, instruments, and experiences that point to questions of a generally growing connectivity and to the interplay between local, national and international levels that are also of relevance in other fields. Nevertheless, the questions transitional justice faces are rather specific insofar as highly sensitive issues are at its core. We are talking about attempts at re-establishing order and rebuilding societies after mass murder, genocide, disappearances, and other mass scale human rights violations. This poses considerable challenges for any form of cooperation.

The reasons for transitional justice becoming a global concern and for what Elazar Barkan has referred to as the 'tidal wave of apologies, truth commissions, reparations, and investigations of historical crimes'² are certainly many, but among them surely is the establishment of a network of experts, international foundations, and non-governmental organizations such as the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR). By formulating 'best practices' of transitional justice and by advising countries and societies around the globe in how to deal with past atrocities, these global experts are new voices in transitional justice processes and they add new elements to them.

Among the many challenges that are posed by the establishment of global expert cultures one is of particular interest for the study of global cooperation: the tensions between the global and the local and the complexities of the global/local interface. Global experts not only formulate standards of transitional justice but are often involved in these processes as third parties and some kind of mediators. Against this backdrop, there is a growing scepticism toward instruments and concepts being externally imposed and distant from the standpoint of conflict-affected societies, while, at the same time, neglecting alternative and more locally driven initiatives and mechanisms. For instance instead of concentrating on large-scale retributive measures such as the International Criminal Court or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, critics argue in favour of paying closer attention to alternative concepts developed on the local level such as the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda.³ Moreover, attention is drawn to the question of 'justice in the vernacular', namely the ways in which transitional justice concepts are transmitted and translated into local idioms.⁴ Other critics argue that the complexities of the global/local interface are too often overlooked due to an unquestioned acceptance of liberal normative concepts, in particular the rule of law and human rights. As Alexander Laban Hinton notes, the term transitional justice in itself

¹ Dwyer, Susan (1999). 'Reconciliation for Realists', *Ethics and International Affairs* 13: 81–98, here: 81.

² Barkan, Elazar (2009). 'Introduction: Historians and Historical Reconciliation. AHR Forum Truth and Reconciliation in History', *American Historical Review* 114: 899–913, here: 901.

³ See for example Clark, Phil (2010). *The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁴ Merry, Sally Engle (2006). *Human Rights and Gender Violence. Translating International Law into Local Justice*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

'suggests a hierarchy and a teleology, with an implicitly more "backward" or "barbaric" society using the tools of liberalism to "develop" into a more modern, "civilized", liberal, democratic state'.⁵ These voices clearly indicate that alongside acknowledging the undoubted positive effects of global diffusion in the field of transitional justice, there is an awareness of the resilience of localized traditions and the normative underpinnings of globalization. However, future research will have to investigate in more detail the adaptability of transitional justice tools in local settings and the tensions and conflicts that arise when global norms meet local contexts.

⁵ Hinton, Alexander Laban (2009). 'Introduction: Toward an Anthropology of Transitional Justice', in: Alexander Laban Hinton (ed.), *Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities*, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1–22, here: 6.

VII Kenya

Does Accountability Prevent Violence or Cause Insecurity? Global Cooperation and Security in Kenya

Stephen Brown



Stephen Brown, Ph.D., is Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa, Canada. Reflecting his expertise in foreign aid and development-policy, his research as a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research focused on the cooperation among donor countries. The goal is to contribute to explaining policy coherence and incoherence and the hierarchy of policies in the development-policy.

In the violence that followed Kenya's bitterly contested December 2007 elections, well over 1,000 people were killed. Hundreds of thousands more were displaced, of whom many have yet to return. The international community – mainly Western donor countries and the African Union – helped resolve the political impasse and stop the violence. All sides agreed that accountability for crimes committed would be a key element of prevent future outbreaks of violence.

More than six years later, no serious attempt has been made in Kenya to prosecute those responsible for the atrocities committed in 2007–08. Some domestic trials have taken place, targeting very low-level offenders, primarily those who attacked police officers – which is hardly representative of the nature of the crimes that took place. (Police officers themselves, in fact, committed one-third of the killings.) Despite oft-repeated commitments to do so, the government made no serious attempt to create a hybrid nation/international special tribunal to try those responsible for the post-election violence. It still promises to create a special division of the High Court, but the Director of Public Prosecutions has stated that there is not enough evidence to bring any new cases to trial. To date only the International Criminal Court (ICC) has charged anyone with serious crimes.

The ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, initiated cases against six Kenyans considered among those most responsible, but charges of crimes against humanity are proceeding against only three. The indictees include Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, who were elected President and Deputy President of Kenya in March 2013 (though these results were again highly contested). Their trials in The Hague are underway, but may collapse for lack of evidence. The court has already postponed Kenyatta's trial indefinitely, while the prosecution tries to gather more evidence. Many witnesses have refused to testify, recanted or disappeared, amid claims of intimidation. The ICC has actually issued an arrest warrant for journalist Walter Barasa, accused of offering bribes to witnesses, but he remains at large. On multiple fronts, the ICC appears increasingly ineffectual.

Initially, Kenyan opinion polls indicated very high levels of support for ICC trials. During the 2012-13 election campaign, however, the Kenyatta/Ruto team repeatedly framed the prospect of international justice as interference into internal affairs, posing a threat to the peace and reconciliation that their cross-ethnic alliance represented. They portrayed the ICC as a tool of Western imperialism, anti-African and biased – and made themselves out to be victims, rather than accused perpetrators. Moreover, they recast charges against them as individuals into accusations against their entire ethnic groups. Popular support for ICC trials plummeted, further waning as the three remaining cases unravel.

Critics pointed to clever manipulation by political elites that had the most to lose from international justice. By steadily framing accountability as a threat to security, Kenyatta and his allies made it one. Their actions ensured that the trials and especially any eventual convictions will be interpreted as an international attack on Kenyan sovereignty and specific ethnic groups, rather than holding individuals to account for their crimes. Convictions, especially if not 'balanced' across ethnic communities, will also, no doubt, inflame tensions.

Does this mean that global cooperation in the area of criminal justice creates insecurity? One can certainly argue that in the short term it does. However, in the long term, international cooperation is more likely to prevent violence. Observers often forget that similar instances of electoral violence occurred in Kenya in 1991–92 and in 1997–98. Both times, the Kenyan government, which – along with senior members of the ruling party – was responsible for instigating most of the violence, did nothing to hold accountable those responsible for grave crimes. The high-level officials' identities were well documented, but the government ensured their impunity, with the acquiescence of the international community, which feared destabilization. The lesson learnt was that one could kill, rape and pillage to drive out or punish political opponents – and get away with it.

Greater global cooperation for accountability for Kenyan political violence in the 1990s would have caused tension between the Kenyan government and the international community, but the precedent could have gone a long way to prevent the recurrence of violence in 2007–08. Had potential perpetrators understood that crimes would not go unpunished, they would have been far less likely to attempt them. The prospect of ICC trials and the knowledge that 'the world was watching' contributed to relatively violence-free elections in 2013.

As the current situation in Kenya plays out, it is crucial to remember that it is not accountability per se, but rather *resistance* to accountability that can cause insecurity – and only temporarily. When national actors are unable or unwilling to ensure that crimes against humanity do not go unpunished, global cooperation – as complicated as it might prove to be – is the best means to press for justice, thereby helping to prevent further conflict.

An Alter-Perspective on Democratic Elections as Truth Revelation among Kenyan Luo

Mario Schmidt



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The General Election 2013 in Kenya is perceived of as a milestone in the country's transition to a functioning democracy. International observers, aid organizations as well as other countries applaud Kenya for handling the electoral procedure and the implementation of the new constitution, voted for by referendum in 2010, sovereignly. While I was doing fieldwork close to the small market town Kadongo, situated between Western Kenya's capital Kisumu and the provincial capital Kisii, a different picture of the Election emerged. Almost all of my friends and informants, mostly belonging to the ethnic group of the Luo, Kenya's third largest ethnic group, questioned the legitimacy of the results. Hence many were seeing violent demonstration and the upturning of daily life as legitimate ways to secure the accomplishments of the new constitution. They perceived violence as democratic.

Scholars in general understand electoral violence as either related to elite manipulation of ethnic feelings, instrumental ways of exploiting an unstable situation to gain economic advantages or as the culmination of real or imaginary historical inequalities, in short: as a-democratic and based upon individual rationality. They hence circumvent the explanations and perceptions of common people. This is the point where extensive ethnographic fieldwork can step in, complement and challenge the investigations of historians and political scientists: What if the political ontology of Luo does not perceive of elections

and democracy in the way Western political science does? Regarding the interpretational conflicts the concept of 'democracy' succumbed to our own history of ideas, it should indeed surprise us if our concept of democracy is shared by people who have not been entangled into the intricate relationship between economic liberalization, juridical subjectivities and democratic individualization as citizens in countries such as France, Germany and the United States have been.

As I was able to witness during my fieldwork, the voting process, more than ever after its upgrade to include Biometrical Voter Registration, was not perceived as a means to receive an arithmetical representation of the will of the people. It is not interpreted as being based upon the aggregation of individual dispositions which add up – magically one is inclined to say – to a representation of the general will, but as a result of truth revealing mechanisms which have their foundation in Luo lived world, i.e. outside the political sphere. To clarify this I will shortly sketch out Luo's conceptualization of personhood and sociality. This will enable me to show that the promising enhancement of methodological individualism to include concepts such as 'we-identity', 'team rationality' etc. is a futile exercise in circumstances where the meaning of 'we', 'identity' and 'I' differ fundamentally.

After studying societies in Melanesia where each person is conceptualized as an individual with a male and female part constituted by a myriad of exchange relations, anthropologist have proposed to conceptualize sociality as analytically independent of the Western division between the individual and the society. Indeed, the presupposition that cooperation is an action in which two autonomous individuals engage falls short of Luo ontology in which sociality as well as personhood is not constituted by exchange or reciprocity – an assumption which would reanimate the transactional paradigm of the construction of social reality – , but by enacting processes of eating (*chamo*) and feeding (*pidho*), i.e. by corporating and de-corporating with each other. Luo sociality is hence neither based on the exchange of goods (Melanesia) nor on the restriction and opening of flows of substance between bodies (Amazonia) rather on the recursive maintenance of corporal entities. That is by controlling flows inside of bodies instead of between them, by 'intra-being' instead of 'inter-being', by 'co-presence' instead of 'participation', by 'identity' instead of 'relationality'. *Chamo* and *pidho* designate all activities which stabilize or destabilize corporal entities in Luo socio-cultural order (be it the individual body or the lineage, family or even all Luo). Consequently the basic social unit among Luo is the one of 'feeder-eater': the feater. E.g., the individual body is conceptualized as being inhabited by worms who fed on what the person eats and a family father as feating his wife. Together they form the feeding part in the corporate body with their children and influential politicians such as the presidential candidate Raila Odinga feat

all Luo. These corporate bodies are analytically prior to each person participating in it.

This has consequences on how democracy and elections are conceptualized. While in Western democratic understandings a democracy is believed to be composed of many independent elements which somehow have to stick their heads together to form a one or to be represented by the one, Luo believe that democracy is composed of parts which are structurally similar to the whole and partake in that whole simultaneously. The electoral decision is consequently not understood as an act of individual freedom, but as resulting from the participation in multiple feating relations. Without going further into detail, what should be clear by now is that it is not an individual who votes but a part of a corporate body and as one's decision is already the one of a multitude of others, it is not that all votes form the one will, but the one will forms all votes. Luo hence come very close to the etymological meaning of the Latin term *vovere*, which, among other things, means 'to devote to a deity'. Luo in fact do not elect, i.e. choose, but (de)vote by religious calling. Hence the election is not conceptualized as a process arithmetically leading to a quantitative number which then can be represented in government, but as a representation of truth itself. This enables a dangerous temporal inversion: The election is not understood as a medium to determine truth, but as a causal result of a truth established before. If the electoral process brings about a result contrary to one's own vote, it is logically inferred that the election was stolen and manipulated. In such a case, violent reactions are viewed upon as measures safeguarding democracy from a back-flip into authoritarian rule. It fits into this picture that the peace after the General Election 2013 was mainly achieved by the enforcement of an a-democratic policy which included the banning of strikes, demonstrations and political assemblies as well as high police and army presence. Furthermore misunderstandings about the new constitution which many interpret as a first step towards the split of Kenya into autonomous nations (named Luo or Kikuyu Nation) and the fresh memories of the loss of neighbours, friends and kin during the Post-Election Violence in 2007/08 played a role in preventing the recurrence of a catastrophe.

All this seems to allude to a rather pessimistic view on the potential of global cooperation. This nevertheless is misleading. Exploring other people's conceptualization of cooperation is indeed one of the greatest potential cultural anthropologists can exploit and use to criticize our own biased opinions about human behaviour. Analysing 'alter-concepts' rigorously nevertheless has to be the starting point of any quantitative research as otherwise the way to misunderstanding and failed cooperation is predetermined. What should make us optimistic nevertheless is that such an exercise already involves a lot of humility and hence co-operational spirit.

VIII Perception & Construction

Security and Cooperation: An Insight to International Dilemmas in Mali

Isaline Bergamaschi



Dr Isaline Bergamaschi is Assistant Professor at the Department of Politics of the Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia. She joined the Centre for Global Cooperation Research as a Fellow. The research project she pursued was entitled 'International Intervention in Mali: Transformation and Legitimacy'. Her research sought to inform about the changes in international intervention after Mali's political crisis in 2012, to trace the processes of their legitimization and acceptance amongst the population and account for their political effects.

International intervention in Mali has not started with the French military operation Serval (since January 2013) or the establishment of a United Nations Integrated Mission for the stabilisation of Mali (Minusma). However, the priorities and modalities of intervention have changed dramatically since 2012, and created dilemmas for an increasingly fragmented international community.

Since the country's democratic transition in the early 1990s, development assistance – 'coopération' in French – was aimed at supporting poverty reduction (i.e. access to basic social services in health and education), decentralization, growth and hoped to reinforce state capacities ranging from public finance management system to the justice system. In the 2000s, aid agencies and donors were providing development assistance geared towards the Millennium Development Goals. In conformity with the post-Washington consensus, Mali adopted three *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers* between 2011 and 2012. Development actors were committed to the Paris agenda of aid harmonization and efficiency edited by the OECD/Development Assistance Committee since 2005. As a consequence, donor agencies at the country had established mechanisms for aid coordination and 'political dialogue' with the Malian government.

The crisis that burst with a coup d'état in March 2012 took donors largely by surprise. Although aid workers and diplomats were increasingly critical of Amadou Toumani Touré's regime in the past years, Mali was still considered and marketed internationally as a model of democracy and stability in West

Africa, and treated as a 'donor darling'. The multi-dimensional crisis in Mali triggered a temporary crisis amongst aid donors, too. Throughout the years 2012 and 2013, most aid disbursements were suspended. Some donor representatives were eager to think about how aid may have contributed to creating the country's conditions of fragility and willing to stop doing 'business as usual'. However, the window of opportunity for a critical assessment and reform of aid was closed by institutional constraints and routines, political pressure coming from headquarters to 'do something', the organization of the conference for the recovery of Mali in Brussels in May 2013 and the return to democratic politics with the presidential and legislative elections. Aid has almost fully started to flow again and some aid representatives are trying (individually or institutionally) to incorporate the lessons of the crisis into their new strategy for Mali. Nevertheless, an impression that things went 'back to normal', and of a great continuity with previous interventions prevails.

In parallel, aid practices, objectives and professionals have been challenged by the massive involvement of emergency actors, i.e. United Nations specialized agencies as well as non-governmental organisations (the majority of which are big, international organisations) active to relieve population in the face of a humanitarian crisis that had started in 2011 (i.e. the case of hunger), only to be aggravated by the socio-political crisis in 2012/13. Linking up development and humanitarian actions and actors has not been easy. While all actors agree that Mali needs both development *and* humanitarian, there is no consensus on when the emergency phase should end to let a development logics take over. Geographically speaking, humanitarian assistance is clearly directed at the country's most-affected Northern areas; and aid donors prefer to think 'Mali', and implement programmes with a national outreach. If such a North-South division of labour was about to emerge, it could have important consequences for the conflict dynamics in the middle-term.

NGOs and donors' ability to act depend on security conditions in the North. As a result of the *de facto* occupation of two thirds of Mali's territory by armed groups for about a year between spring 2012 and 2013, security is still at threat. Jihadist fighters have attacked leaders of the Tuareg *Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad* and several Northern cities. Most attacks are clearly targeted at international actors (Serval, UN and relief convoys) but populations are the main victims of violence. In the absence of global peace agreements between the State and rebel movements, inter-community tensions and daily conflicts between peasants and shepherds over access to land and resources are on the rise. Individuals who collaborated with the jihadists or the French are threatened in their communities or by State officials.

Crime and narco-trafficking have started again. The presence of bandits on roads during market days is a major impediment to trade activities.

Whereas the government insists that security and the return of the State and public administrations are a pre-requisite to sustainable peace, development and anything else, the *forces armées du Mali* remain unable to fulfil their defensive and protective mission. A reform of the Malian army and of the security sector is underway. Four army battalions have been trained in the context of the European Union Training Mission in what looks like a confidence-building and basic disciplining exercise. They are now patrolling with Blue helmets; but targeted attacks against armed groups, especially islamists – which are believed to be training, re-organising and preparing for new actions – are still strategically and materially conducted by Serval.

In theory, Minusma is supposed to have taken over the French in July 2013. In practice however, the mission lacks the technical (e.g. helicopters) and human means to fully 'stabilize' the regions of Timbuctu, Gao and Kidal, especially outside of urban centres. While internally displaced people and refugees continue to return slowly, the most remote areas and villages cannot be reached by neither public services (police and *gendarmerie*, school, health centres), Minusma or NGOs. UN staff based at the mission's headquarters in the capital city, Bamako, is perceived to grow at a pace superior to their staff in the North, some hundreds of kilometres away. This creates misunderstanding and frustrations amongst Malian authorities and populations alike. Minusma relies on little more than 6.000 men instead of the announced 12.000 and it is unclear whether future member country contributions will allow the mission to function at full power. Many are preoccupied as Serval announced it will leave Bamako to limit French presence to 1.000 soldiers based in Gao as of the end of May 2014. Parallel to that, a small-sized French military base is being set up in Tessalit.

In conclusion, international interventions in Mali are shifting from development and poverty reduction objectives towards humanitarian, military and security resolution priorities. How this multi-faced intervention is going to be deployed and coordinated – despite often diverging interests between actors – will be key in shaping the country's post-crisis environment. It is important to note that in such complex contexts, external actors can be part of the problem as much as they can bring solutions.

Global Cooperation and Local Irony: The West African Locust Plague of 2004

Christian Meyer



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In August 2004, the global media reported about huge locust swarms that were about to destroy crops in West Africa. The event was represented in the global media as a typical sudden natural disaster, not incomparable to hurricane Katrina and the tsunami in the Indian Ocean shortly before. On July 9, 2004, the French newspaper *Le Monde* published an article titled 'Locusts launch attack on Sahel'. The English-speaking world reacted later: On September 2, 2004, the British *Telegraph* headlined 'West Africa in terror of locust plague'. The situation was characterized as an incident that stroke unprepared and helpless people and that came completely unexpected. It was not long until words like 'disaster' and 'catastrophe' came up ('Catastrophe', *Libération*, July 26, 2004; 'The locust disaster', *Le Monde*, September 1, 2004). Because of its force, references to the biblical quality and apocalyptic magnitude were soon made. 'Plague' and 'A deluge of locusts lunges out at Africa' were headlines of the French *Libération* (July 26, 2004), the *New York Times* titled 'Plague of Locusts Threatens West African Crops' (September 5, 2004), and the British *Independent* found the headline 'Plague of locusts casts shadow over Africa' (August 20, 2004). As the plague extended via North Africa to countries in Southern Europe as well as in the Near and Middle East, the global dimension of the crisis was emphasized. Media in China and India also began to report about it.

Massive emergency programs were eventually established and the 'battle' (*Daily Mail*, September 2, 2004) and 'war on locusts' (Abdoulaye Wade, Senegalese President at that time) was declared as an international task, led by countries such as Algeria, Libya, Morocco and France. To the great delight of international institutions, the measures finally beard success and against all premonitions, the locust plague did not extend into 2005. At the end of 2004, a kind of aestheticization of the disaster in the global media followed, when a picture of children chasing locusts in Dakar made by Reuters' photographer Pierre Holtz was awarded the second prize of the world press photo award in the category 'nature'. The *Telegraph* of September 2, 2004, who printed the photo, missed precisely the ambivalence of children laughing while playing with locusts as it commented in a sensationalist manner: 'Children fled in terror as swarms of ravenous locusts invaded Senegal's capital, Dakar, yesterday, devouring every patch of greenery in their path.'



Photo by Pierre Holtz. The picture won second prize in the Nature Singles category of the 2004 World Press Photo Awards. (c) Pierre Holtz/Reuters/Corbis.

Likewise, the image of the disaster as an unforeseeable and natural disaster was misplaced. In fact, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) – whose president, Jacques Diouf, is a Senegalese himself – had published locust warnings as early as in September 2003 and asked for 9 Mio US\$ to start an early preventive fight. Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade had launched another call for help in March 2004 in the French newspapers *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde*. None of these calls were responded, and at the end the crisis had cost international donors more than 300 Mio US\$, not only to fight the adult locust swarms, but also to fight the famine triggered by the plague.

Furthermore, the crisis was anthropogeneous rather than merely natural. For one, obviously, the warning systems had failed, since there was no institutional response to the discovery that locusts were about to develop into a plague. Since the early 1960s the warning systems had functioned so well, that there had occurred only one plague in 1988 to 1989 while between 1940 and 1963 there had been swarms every one year. The disaster of 2004 thus hadn't been a problem of risk recognition, but a problem of inadequate reaction. In addition, measures of structural adjustment required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had worsened the situation. Experts of the international institutions thought that only a free corn market was able to balance out losses of drought and therefore forbade the governments to stabilize corn prices. Therefore, in 2005, when the first famines broke out, the rich southern neighbors of the infested countries – like Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire – were able to buy the scarce harvests in the whole region. As a consequence, even in regions that hadn't been hit by locusts, corn became scarce and the people had to be supported by NGO's.

Another factor that had supported the development of the plague was that locusts are particularly eager to form swarms when their food is scarce, so that overgrazing and soil exhaustion in general contribute to the probability of locust development. As soon as the ground is treated with fertilizers, for example, locusts encounter less advantageous breeding conditions. This connection might gain more importance in the future in the course of global warming.

By way of contrast, in the Senegalese villages that were affected, the assessments and evaluations of the people were largely disconnected to the global self-assuring and phrase-mongering mentioned above. Given their defenselessness against the locusts, the villagers' most pervasive rhetorical strategies, when talking about them, were irony and derision. Here is an example of a conversation in a village in Northwestern Senegal where I conducted ethnographic fieldwork at that time:

2005, June 20

- 001 Tapha Yibba Géey said that he nearly sowed today. But he said that then he tied his sack up again. He said: 'Alas! With these guys sitting on the trees and beguilingly rolling their eyes will our plants grow or won't they?'
- 002 Ablaay Well, what I know is that everybody has to sow when he still doesn't know what God will do.
- 005 Tapha No field owner ever knows that. (Laughs).
- 006 Ablaay But if you don't sow, because you know that they are roaming around. If you won't sow today, you will never sow, because they stay here and keep roaming around.
- 007 Tapha Yibba Géey said: 'These guys sit on the trees and roll their eyes beguilingly while they are coupling.'
- 008 Ablaay If God would only dispel them from here and they would go away.

Tapha refers to a friend of his who stopped sowing when he saw the hoppers still present in 2005. He quotes Yibba Géey's formulation of the 'guys ... beguilingly rolling their eyes' (*gaa yi ... regeju*) with an ironic and funny attitude. The expression *regeju* refers to the beauty ideal of showing the white sclera, which is done by young women with the intention to seduce. It, however, also alludes to the caste differentiation of Wolof society in which the caste of the griots (bards), in contrast to the caste of the nobles, is allowed more freedom of showing emotions and social activity. Rolling the eyes beguilingly is thus a low caste activity – locusts are classified low-caste by Tapha. Ablaay, in 006, with his expression 'roaming around' (*wendée-lu*) supports this perspective, as this expression is often used for the (originally Fulani) caste of woodcutters (*lawbé*). At the same time, with his sexual allusion, Tapha refers to the enormous ability of reproduction of these beasts, which, in fact, is the biggest danger for the farmers.

Still, as a matter of fact, the villagers were also aware of the international politics, as the following conversation shows:

2005, June 28

- 032 Tapha The Algerian president has said that they will do something about it.
 033 Amat Hum, may God help us so that there will be no need to do anything about it.
 034 Samba Amen!
 035 Tapha He has said that he will do something about it. I don't remember anymore who and who.
 036 Amat That's what I hope for, Taph-, Samba.
 037 Tapha The mountains where they hatch out.
 038 Amat There he said that seven countries should unite to think out a joint strategy. To find them where they hatch. They will find a solution that will bring us peace.
 039 Samba You are right. Just these mountains. If they went there and blocked the entries or powdered them inside, sprayed them.
 040 Amat Yes.

However, they did not confine in them. As a Wolof proverb says: *Yálla, Yálla, bey sa tool. Ndimbal, na cay fekk loxool bo-room.* That is: 'Believe in God, but cultivate your field. You can pray to God about your field, but you will still have to plow and plant.' Or expressed more generally: 'Support yourself and heaven will help you.' This is precisely what the villagers did: Traditionally, the Wolof are farmers. However, some of the villagers now began to invest money in livestock instead of putting it into seeds. They therefore discussed the possibility of grazing animals on their fallow land. Thinking of fallow land, they moved on to an agreement that the villagers had made about a portion of their common land that they intended to sell to another village and that they agreed to let lie fallow by then. The agreement had been breached by

the son of the village chief who had started to cultivate this area, and by others of the more wealthy villagers who had let their livestock graze on it without consent. Some animals had entered into neighboring crop fields and damaged them. The villagers began to criticize the patrilineal constitution and clan structure in the village, creating great social turbulence in the sequel.

Thus, an important strategy in dealing with risk appears to be that fields of action that are open for intervention become relevant, while other areas – in our case the disaster itself – might not be considered in much depth. Instead, the – from the perspective of the farmers – unalterable situation of disaster is used to raise topics such as social inequalities, problems and conflicts that are open for change. Thus, risks that are generated by external factors appear to be domesticated by dealing with connected or loosely associated local variables that are possible to manipulate, and that are culturally available for modification.

In contrast to the global discourses mentioned above that mainly dealt with either the scientific and technological aspects or the moral implications and meanings of the disaster under the perspective of a modernist narrative of human ascent, the Wolof farmers tried to find paths that were susceptible to their manipulation and influence. In putting social inequalities into the center of their action, they appeared no less modernist than the Western global discourse. This demonstrates that world risk society is a society of not only one kind of risk, but of plural risks and risk ideologies. We therefore shouldn't only speak of 'multiple modernities', but equally of a multiple world risk society that offers plural pathways towards the completion of the (apparently still unfinished) project of modernity.

Fear of the Dark: The Construction of 'Insecurity' and its Political Consequences

Mathieu Rousselin



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«They who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.»
Benjamin Franklin, *Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives*, 1755–1756.

«Il est bien peu de monstres qui méritent la peur que nous en avons.»
(Very few monsters truly warrant the fear we have of them)
André Gide, *Les Nouvelles Nourritures*, 1935.

Despite the abundant amount of regional organizations and global institutions dedicated to ensuring the 'collective security' of their members, there still remains a puzzling lack of consensus within the scholarly community on a satisfactory definition of what 'security' just is. One possible explanation for this rather surprising shortcoming is the view that security is first and foremost emotionally felt by individuals rather than statistically measured by bureaucracies. Stated otherwise, 'security' and its semantic opposite 'insecurity' could well be word constructs used to label individual feelings and emotions rather than an actual state of affairs that could be objectively measured on the basis of aggregated indicators (typically, crime rates).

According to this line of thinking, the emotional perception of security and of insecurity by individuals is not necessarily

coupled with the statistical 'reality' of criminality: inhabitants of a virtually crime-free neighbourhood may well feel less safe or less secure than inhabitants of a crime-prone neighbourhood. This can be explained by the fact that the emotional perception of security and of insecurity by individuals is heavily influenced and partly shaped by public discourses and media narratives about internal and external threats to security such as criminality and terrorism.

Such discourses and narratives mould the perceptions of citizens and, hence, affect their expectations as voters. In return, this influences the political offer by exercising a pressure on political parties to go in for one-upmanship in addressing 'insecurity problems' in their manifestos and platforms. This situation has perverted consequences on policy-making, to the extent that political parties elected are then caught in their own programmes and forced to dedicate massive state expenditure to 'protect' citizens from risks which are, statistically speaking, neither the most likely to materialise nor necessarily the most dangerous when materialised.

Terrorism and the construction of external insecurity in the United States

The effort to instil fear in the hearts of American voters is a longstanding feature of American politics. In order to do so, both Republican and Democrat politicians routinely use such bogeymen as 'jihadists, a near-nuclear Iran, a turbulent Middle East, an unstable Pakistan, a delusional North Korea, an assertive Russia, and an emerging global power called China' (speech by Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney, August 2011) or invoke a variety of dangers ranging 'from terrorism to nuclear proliferation; from rogue states to cyber-attacks; from revolutions in the Middle East [sic], to economic crisis in Europe, to the rise of new powers such as China and India' (public lecture by Democrat Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta, October 2011).


The dominant narrative of a 'complex and dangerous world' comes with two tragic consequences for policy-making in the United States. The first consequence is a massive over-militarisation, which, due to the absence of counter-narratives emphasising the fact that Americans enjoy an unrivalled level of both safety and security, still finds a broad acceptance within the country. The nations' military budget reaches 625 billion dollar as of 2013, representing 18 per cent of total federal spending and consistently over three per cent of GDP since 2002 (and even over four per cent of GDP since 2007).

For the sake of international comparison, the USA alone account for around 40 per cent of global military expenditure, whereas the United Kingdom and France dedicate around

2,5 per cent of their GDP to military spending and Germany around 1,3 per cent.

www.globalissues.org

Global Distribution of Military Expenditure in 2012



Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2013, <http://milexdata.sipri.org>

Figure 1

The second and even more tragic consequence of the 'culture of fear' that prevails in the United States is the increasing gap between rationality and the definition of political priorities. As convincingly argued by the analysts Micah Zenko and Michael Cohen:

[t]he most lamentable cost of unceasing threat exaggeration and a focus on military force is that the main global challenges facing the United States today are poorly resourced and given far less attention than "sexier" problems, such as war and terrorism. These include climate change, pandemic diseases, global economic instability, and transnational criminal networks -- all of which could serve as catalysts to severe and direct challenges to U.S. security interests. But these concerns are less visceral than alleged threats from terrorism and rogue nuclear states.

This gap is also a major hindrance to successful international cooperation, to the extent that there is virtually no domestic demand from the American electorate to engage with the aforementioned issues in multilateral fora.

¹ On this episode, which is said to have played a role in the unexpected victory of far-right candidate Le Pen over Socialist candidate Lionel Jospin and subsequent appearance in the runoff election against Jacques Chirac, see the documentary movie by Simon and Arthur Guibert (2006), *Paul Voise, fait-divers, politique et insécurité*.

² For selected examples, see Mucchielli, Laurent (2001). *Violences et insécurité : fantasmes et réalités dans le débat français*, Paris: La Découverte; and Mucchielli, Laurent (2012). *Vous avez dit sécurité*, Nîmes: Champ social éditions; and Bonelli, Laurent (2010). *La France a peur. Une histoire sociale de l'insécurité*, Paris: La Découverte; and Bonelli, Laurent (2011). 'De l'usage de la violence en politique', *Cultures & Conflits* 1 (81-82): 7-16.


³ See for instance Portelli, Serge (2007). *Nicolas Sarkozy : une République sous haute surveillance*, Paris: L'Harmattan.

⁴ On this point, see for instance Sagant, Valérie, Hurel, Benoist, and Plouvier, Eric (2011). *L'imposture. Dix années de politique de sécurité de Nicolas Sarkozy*, Projet 2012, Contribution 19; and Sire-Martin, Evelyne (2004). *A quoi servent les lois sécuritaires ?*, Fondation Copernic, May.

Criminality and the construction of internal insecurity in France

In a similar fashion, the narrative of criminality as an internal threat to security has been continuously employed by French politicians and Interior Ministers (especially Nicolas Sarkozy and Manuel Valls) since 2002, when the swollen face and tears of 72-year old Paul Voise, a pensioner brutally assaulted by two crooks, were repeatedly shown on private television channel TF1 (and subsequently on all channels, including public ones) a few days before the French presidential election of April/May 2002 was to take place¹.

Despite general trends pointing to the decrease in most criminal offenses in developed countries, the computation and publication of crime-related statistics in France remains a major bone of contention between political parties. The construction, via the media, of a 'climate of insecurity' in France has been traced and analysed in multiple scientific publications² – as has been the ruthless talent of Nicolas Sarkozy in exploiting these fears for his own political purposes³.



Source: Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Crime_trends_in_detail

* Due to inconsistencies in time series and unavailability of data, the EU figures do not include all 27 Member States:

- Violent crime: Estonia, Spain, Cyprus and Finland excluded
- Robbery: Ireland, Spain and Finland excluded
- Domestic burglary: Spain and Finland excluded
- Motor vehicle theft: Spain and Finland excluded
- Drug trafficking: Spain, Hungary and Finland excluded

Figure 2: Recorded crime trends across EU Member States, 2007 – 2010

Here again, the climate of insecurity generated a 'demand for security' which created a series of perverse incentives, such as for instance the use of particularly morbid crimes for the personal communication strategy of politicians or the inflation of legislative activity to the detriment of the rapid

ADDITIONAL SOURCES

⁵ See for instance Lagrange, Hugues (2003). *Demandes de sécurité. France, Europe, Etats-Unis*, Paris: Le Seuil; and Wacquant, Loïc (2009). *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

⁶ On the use of terrorism to impose repressive laws for individual freedoms, see among others Grayling, A.C. (2010). *Liberty in the Age of Terror: A Defence of Civil Liberties and Enlightenment Values*, Bloomsbury Publishing; and Romero, Anthony and Temple-Raston, Dina (2009). *In Defense of Our America: The Fight for Civil Liberties in the Age of Terror*, Harper Collins. See also the often-cited Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, *Assessing Damage, Urging Action* (2009).

⁷ For descriptions of the 'business of fear', see for instance Rigouste, Mathieu (2013). *Les marchands de peur*, Libertalia; Delapierre, François (2013). *Délinquance, les coupables sont à l'intérieur*, Bruno Leprince; Brochen, Philippe (2013). 'La peur, une valeur sûre', *Libération*, 12 May; or Buisson, Alexis (2011). 'Le business de la peur', *Politis*, 8 September.

⁸ On the number of fire arms in circulation, see Karp, Aaron (2007). 'Completing the Count: Civilian Firearms', in E. Berman et al., *Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

implementation and careful assessment of the existing legislation. Particularly during the decade Nicolas Sarkozy spent at the Interior Ministry and at the French Presidency, an astounding number of new securitization laws was adopted without significant impact on the statistical reality of crime in France⁴. However, the focus on communication strategies, on the legislative output and on simple indicators (such as incarceration numbers) came at the expense of more comprehensive policies involving not only increased police presence and judiciary sanctions (including deprivation of liberty) but also targeted measures in the fields of education, employment and social protection. However, research has shown the existence of a strong correlation between high incarceration rates on the one hand and underdeveloped social protection systems as well as neoliberal reform waves on the other hand⁵.

Repressive laws and the business of fear

In addition to the 'assault on reason' they entailed for the development of policies, the propagation of the 'culture of fear' and of the 'climate of insecurity' had two adverse effects on liberal democracies. First, they served as motives to curb civil liberties and individual freedoms. In the United States, the 'War on Terror' provided an opportune legitimation for legislative texts and illegal programmes such as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the Protect America Act of 2007 or PRISM, the worldwide electronic surveillance programme of the NSA⁶. In France, the 'fight against crime' has been used by mayors from right-wing parties (Patrick Balkany in Levallois-Perret) and left-wing parties alike (Gérard Collomb in Lyon) to impose the presence of CCTV equipment in public spaces, thereby instituting new forms of social control.

Second, both the 'culture of fear' and 'the climate of insecurity' generated a 'protection neurosis' which paved the way for the booming and lucrative business of private security firms⁷. A multi-billion dollar industry now prospers on individual and corporate fears, selling all matters of insurance and vaccination schemes, antitheft devices, digital codes, electronic locks and alarm systems, antispyware and antivirus software, geo-location and real-time intelligence services – not to mention the 650 million firearms held by civilians worldwide (270 million of which are held by American civilians)⁸.

Books

Gore, Al (2008). *The Assault on Reason*, Penguin Books.

Moisi, Dominique (2011). *The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation and Hope are Reshaping the World*, Random House UK.

Gardner, Dan (2009). *Risk: The Science and Politics of Fear*, Virgin Books

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Linke, Uli and Smith, Danielle Taana (eds.) (2009). *Cultures of Fear: A Critical Reader*, Pluto Press.

Documentary movies

Curtis, Adam (2004). *The Power of Nightmares – the rise of the politics of fear*, BBC.

Moore, Michael (2002). *Bowling for Columbine*, United Artists.

Greenwald, Robert (2004). *Outfoxed: Rupert Murdoch's War on Journalism*, Brave New Films.

Christman, Carl (2009). *Culture of Fear*, Guide Media.

Other sources

Curtis, Adam (2013). *Everything is Going According to Plan*, Massive Attack vs. Adam Curtis, Ruhr Triennale.

Thievery Corporation (2011). *Culture of Fear*, Eighteenth Street Lounge Music.

ANNEX 1: Comparative statistics on death causes

Number of fatalities from terrorist attacks (2012): 11.098

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/210017.htm>

Number of deaths by tobacco use (yearly): 5,4 million

World Health Organisation, http://www.who.int/tobacco/mpower/tobacco_facts/en/

Number of road traffic fatalities (2010): 1,24 million

World Health Organisation, http://www.who.int/gho/road_safety/mortality/en/



Number of deaths by drowning (2004): 388.000

World Health Organisation, <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs347/en/>

Number of lightning fatalities (2008): 24.000

Ronald L. Holle, *Annual rates of lightning fatalities by country*, Paper presented at the International Lightning Detection Conference, 21–23 April 2008, Tucson, Arizona, USA.

ANNEX 2: Leading causes of death in the world per income countries (2011)



IX Hunger & Climate

Source: World Health Organisation,
<http://who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs310/en/>

Hunger a Threat to Global Security?

Margret Thalwitz



Margret Thalwitz has gained extensive experience in positions as country economist, and project and sector manager at the World Bank. She was the first Director of the World Bank's Global Programs and Partnerships Department. Being Senior Expert Fellow at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research, Thalwitz conducted research on 'The Golden Rice Project and the Global Governance of Food'. She analysed the development and use of this special type of rice from a global governance perspective and drew lessons from the cooperation between private and public actors in this context.

Amidst plenty, food crises and hunger prevail. Close to 1 billion people suffer from under-nutrition, and children are most at risk. Poor nutrition still accounts for high mortality rates among young children, and those who survive often suffer from poor health and low productivity, condemned to poverty forever. Hunger and malnutrition have long been the stepchildren of the global development agenda, even though they figure prominently among the Millennium Development Goals. Nonetheless, it needed a financial and food price crisis in 2007/08 to move food and nutrition security centre stage and just in time to act to enable 9.5 billion people to survive on an adequate diet by 2050.

Under-nutrition is a result of deep poverty, and people are most at risks where population growth exceeds increases in agricultural productivity. Agricultural land is lost to urban expansion; farming practices have depleted soils of essential minerals; infrastructure is lacking to supply farmers with essential inputs and to get agricultural products to markets; storage capacities are inadequate causing vast losses often up to 30 per cent of harvests, and price volatility exacerbates farmers' vulnerability further reducing risk taking. Food aid helps alleviate the worst shortages but cannot compensate for lagging domestic production and less than efficient trade in food products.

Resource constraints and implicit taxes imposed on farmers have been long standing challenges for agricultural policies, heightened by population growth and climate change. Today, the world has to come to terms with falling growth rates in yields of essential staple crops (maize, wheat, rice); with increasingly scarce water resources as average temperatures rise (particularly in dry areas) and raise the risk of natural

disasters; with the search for new energy sources that may compete for scarce land to grow food crops. Overcoming these constraints is a matter of policy choice but the voice of the poor in need of food and adequate nutrition may not be heard loudly enough.

Food security is a global challenge. The success of meeting this challenge, however, is mainly visible at very local levels, on small farms, in small villages and in vast urban slums. Numerous studies confirm that small farmers have substantial productivity and efficiency reserves but for the reasons above may find it difficult to mobilize these reserves for the benefit of stable incomes and less hunger.

Unsurprisingly, scientists and economists agree that the food security problem of today can be solved over time. Hunger is not an inherent consequence of higher prices and changing supply/demand functions, but business as usual might not get us to feeding the world adequately and achieve food security for all.

What is needed is an international consensus on the key priorities to stimulate local production while reforming the international trade and finance regime to support global food security for all. Five critical policy areas come to mind that might help set the stage:

- (i) Accelerated agricultural research, at national and international level, to enhance innovation and technological transformation
- (ii) Investment in physical and social rural infrastructure to build on the linkages and leverage potential for multiplier effects
- (iii) Development of an efficient rural finance system
- (iv) Strengthening extension services and training in new technology use
- (v) A fair global agricultural trade system based on comparative advantage and open market access

Developing countries need national and international finance to deliver on points (ii) to (iv). This is the prerogative of national policy. Goals need to be quantified, policies developed and investments reflected in multi-year programming exercises and annual budgets. Points (i) and (v), in contrast, demand a coordinated, international effort to achieve the intended objectives.

Agricultural research for development has become an international effort spanning national research institutions, universities, international organizations and increasingly the private sector. Among those, national institutions in poor countries are often poorly endowed with resources and knowledge depending on international institutions for support. Outcomes depend to a considerable degree on access to the resources, knowledge and data of local farmers and institutions. Foreign

institutions, whether private or public rely on this access and in turn should provide the suppliers of inputs with open access to new research findings and support their adaptation to local conditions. Much more could be done in this respect.

Trade in agricultural commodities and food puts high demands on the willingness to cooperate on a global scale. Despite considerable improvements in the past 20 years, recent research shows that the terms of trade are still largely negative for farmers in developing countries. Many of these countries and particularly those with highest population growth rates will be net importers of food for a long time to come. Recent estimates assume that Sub-Saharan Africa in 2050 may only be able to feed 13 per cent of its people from own production, relying on international markets to fill the gap.

98 per cent of the world's hungry live in developing countries, in cities and rural areas and their governments are challenged to feed them all. Some countries have made impressive advances in the past 20 years among them China and Brazil. But it is not only a national challenge; international cooperation will play a major role in providing the public good of security in food and nutrition for all. Failure to deliver on this precious good could lead to unintended consequences. Uncontrollable price fluctuations, water shortages, natural disasters, a steep rise in migration, they are all likely outcomes of failed policy potentially threatening stability and security far beyond the boundaries of countries that may suffer most from hunger and malnutrition. It is time to act.

Can Global Cooperation Avert the Threat of Climate Change?

Gianluca Grimalda



Dr Gianluca Grimalda is Researcher at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Germany, and Lecturer at the University Jaume I of Castelló de la Plana, Spain. He joined the Centre for Global Cooperation Research as a Fellow. With his research project 'Experimental Analysis of the Behavioural Foundations of Global Co-operation' Grimalda tackled the topic of global cooperation from the perspective of experimental economics. His research fed into a final work reflecting on how to address the failures of global cooperation.

David King, a UK government's chief scientist, famously classified climate change as carrying a more serious threat to the world than terrorism. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014) 5th Assessment Report (Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability), if no action is taken hundreds of millions of people will be displaced by the end of this century as an effect of climate change, thus increasing the risk of violent conflict, as well as reducing global GDP between 5 per cent and 20 per cent (Stern Review 2006). An increase in temperatures around 2°C (compared to pre-industrial levels) would cause large-scale and historically unprecedented social and political changes due to radical alterations in many ecosystems, such as the Atlantic thermohaline circulation, the dieback of the Amazon rainforest, and the decay of the Greenland ice sheet. A 2°C temperature rise is equivalent to the change in average temperatures from the last ice age to today (Stern Review 2006). According to the fifth IPCC Assessment Report (The Physical Science Basis) (IPCC 2013), temperatures could overcome the 2°C threshold as early as 2050, and reach a 4°C increase by the end of the century. However, it has been estimated that averting this temperature rise would entail a relatively modest reduction in yearly global GDP of 0.12 per cent by 2050, were the adjustment to start immediately (IPCC 2013). Delay in adjustment would obviously increase the costs later on.

What has been the response of the global community to such a challenge? Since 1992 the Framework Convention on Climate Change monitors Greenhouse Gases Emissions (GGE),

and in 1997 the Kyoto Protocol (KP) set GGE binding targets for 38 countries. Stabilising temperatures would require reducing GGE between 50 per cent and 85 per cent by 2050 in comparison with 2000 levels (IPCC 2013). But GGE grew at an average annual rate of 2.7 per cent over the last decade (Oliver et al. 2013). The reasons are various. First, some of the countries with the highest level of emissions did not commit to reduce GGE in the KP, either because they were exempted under the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” (China and India), or because they did not ratify the agreement (US, Australia). Second, the targets set by the protocol were extremely modest. Third, although most countries that have ratified the agreement are on course to meet their targets, this has per se *not* reduced global emissions (Aichele and Felbermayr 2012). The reason is that such targets have been formulated in terms of domestic emissions, but this does not take into account the ‘carbon footprint’ of imported goods through international trade.

The negotiations over the second phase of the Kyoto protocol have thus far failed to make a breakthrough. So why has global governance been so ineffective?

At a first level, the answer is that this is exactly what one should expect. In public economic theory, GGE are the quint-essential *public bad*. They are *non-excludable*: (once GGE are in the air, no country can be excluded from the climatic consequences they bring about). They are *non-rival* (the amount of GGE produced by a country does not limit the amount of GGE that another country can produce). This causes the country-level costs of GGE to be lower than the global costs. Assuming that the actors are only concerned with their material individual rewards, standard game-theoretic analysis predicts a ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968). Each agent persists with the individually ‘rational’ strategy of high GGE, although this leads in the end to catastrophic consequences.

At a deeper level of analysis, nevertheless, we can say that lack of cooperation is not a foregone conclusion. The hope may be given by Nature itself. Since Aristotle many scientists have believed that ‘*Natura non facit saltus*’, meaning that natural phenomena do not suffer abrupt changes. They were wrong. Many eco-systems are indeed characterized by what scientists call ‘tipping points’ – namely, ‘*critical threshold at which a tiny perturbation can qualitatively alter the state or development of a system*’ (Lenton et al. 2008: 1786). For instance, scientists predict that a temperature increase around 3°C (above pre-industrial) will cause Greenland Ice Sheet to shrink radically or eventually disappear. This shift alone may trigger a rise in sea levels around 2m (Lenton et al. 2008: 1789). What is interesting for global governance is that tipping points change the strategic nature of the interaction from a pure cooperation problem into a coordination problem, thus massively

increasing the chances of effective collective action. Why is that? Suppose that to avert temperatures from rising by 2°C, it is necessary to keep GGE to a concentration of less than 350 ppm. Let us suppose that countries have managed to find an agreement to share the costs of reducing GGE such that the total concentration is 349.9 ppm. Then, a country that wanted to defect on this agreement would be aware that even a small deviation would cause a catastrophe to happen, making costs for itself, as well as for others, immensely higher than the benefits. The problem of co-ordinating on a fair sharing of the costs will still loom. But experimental evidence and past experiences of negotiations show that this is not an insurmountable task (Barrett 2007: chapter 4; Milinski et al. 2006).

Indeed, this reasoning is behind the explicit insertion in the Kyoto protocol of the overarching objective of keeping temperature rises to less than 2°C. But why then the Kyoto Protocol has failed so spectacularly to reduce GGE? Are policy-makers blind in seeing the medium-term consequences of failing to meet this target?

One answer to this question may simply be that this is indeed the case. As Jeffrey Sachs (2014) put it, the lack of awareness by top policy-makers around the world about the consequences of exceeding the 2°C threshold is ‘terrifying’. Moreover, policy-makers, as well as many individuals, may simply be disinterested in the welfare of future generations, or they may have an unbreakable conviction that some technological innovation will in the end come to humanity’s rescue.

But there exists another, more articulated, answer. It has been demonstrated both theoretically (Barrett 2013) and experimentally (Barrett and Dannenberg 2012) that in the presence of uncertainty over the exact level of the tipping point the nature of the strategic interaction may revert from a coordination problem into a pure cooperation problem, thus making defection the individually ‘rational’ strategy. The reason is simple. If a country does not know exactly at which level the tipping point operates, it will never have full certainty that it is indeed pivotal in triggering a catastrophe. If uncertainty is high, then the individually ‘rational’ strategy may be, once again, to stick with high GGE. Indeed the amount of uncertainty surrounding the location of tipping points is very large. For instance, in the case of the Greenland Ice Sheet, the IPCC (2013) puts forward an interval range of [1.9°C-4.6°C].

It seems we are thus back to a doom and gloom scenario. Is there any residual hope for global governance to avert climate catastrophe? There are at least three reasons for hope. First, as science progresses, the amount of uncertainty on tipping points may be reduced, although some degrees of uncertainty in a complex system like the climate are ineliminable. Second, not all countries are necessarily self-interested, or myopic. Citizens of some countries genuinely care more than

citizens of other countries for future generations, or believe that investing in renewable energies is strategic to achieving technological leadership in the future. These countries may 'lead by example', investing in alternatives to GGE, thus reducing other countries' costs in implementing GGE-free technologies. Institutional mechanisms may be used to increase the incentives that other countries have in constraining GGE. It has been suggested that climate change targets may be 'bundled' with trade agreements (Whalley 2011). This would combine a 'stick' (reducing GGE) with a 'carrot' (access to international trade). The third reason for hope is given by the interaction between gradual and catastrophic climate change. The progressive manifestation of gradual climate change may make people more inclined to demand action for the safeguard of the climate. However, surveys suggest that two thirds of Indians ignore that the climate is warming, and half of US citizens believe warming is not the result of human action (Pelham 2009). None can say whether this 'shift of consciousness' will occur quickly enough.

A final hope has to do with technology. Some scholars argue that imposing technological standards may be more effective than global agreements on GGE (Barrett 2007). This may indeed be true, but at the moment we lack a technology portfolio making replacing fossil fuels cost-effective. Perhaps, as technology improves, this may be the case in the future. This leaves geo-engineering as the last possible solution to avoid climate catastrophe. Some contemplate launching gigantic screens in the space to divert sun rays. Others yearn for technologies to reabsorb GGE from the air, and store them underground. This may possibly require the intervention of a handful, perhaps even just one country (Barrett 2007). However, the risks involved with tampering with such a fragile and largely unknown system as the climate make one hope that a cooperative solution is found before reverting to such extreme solutions.

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Climate Change and Global Cooperation: The Ethic of Self-Abolition

Jessica Schmidt



Jessica Schmidt, Ph.D., joined the Centre for Global Cooperation Research for one year with a post-doctoral fellowship. She gained her Ph.D. at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster, UK, where she also was Visiting Lecturer. Her research project at the Centre 'From Artifice to Life: Crisis of Legitimacy and the Rise of Democracy as Social Form' was located at the intersection between political theory and international relations. The overall objective of this project was to explore the changing notion of democracy in discourses and practices of international policy-making.

It is striking that the notion of global cooperation can seemingly only be thought of, if at all, in the concrete context of climate change. Analogously, the question of security, which is implicitly thought of as the threat regime due to its antinomy, appears to become reduced to the question of the survival of mankind.

We could, first of all, ask why it should be so important to secure this survival. What is it in man that legitimizes his claim to continued existence? Is it at all an entitlement to persistence and if so which *Anthropos* is envisioned to lay claim on it? Which value propositions underpin this imperative to survival and to what extent are they commensurable with the problematisations within climate change discourse and its associated understanding of cooperation?

In her essay on the meaning of politics, the influential theorist Hannah Arendt ends with a warning of its loss and the consequences of such loss: without the existence and validity of laws which humans erect for themselves (here the notion of law must be understood in the broadest sense, including complexes of meaning and sense-making as well as regularities) the world resembles a desert.¹ Her concern however is not only with the inhumane environment per se but primarily refers to the possibility that humans begin to feel at home in such a desert. What is meant by this becomes clearer if we add a simple but compelling observation made by the French philosopher Alain Badiou. According to him, the difficulties inherent in thinking are grounded in the world's resistance to thinking. Against the thinking of humans the world is

¹ Cf. Arendt, Hannah (2005). *Introduction to Politics*, New York, NY: Schocken Books.

² Badiou, Alain (2010). *Manifest für die Philosophie*, Wien: Turia+Kant, here: 10 [own translation].

³ World Bank (2010). *World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change*, Washington, D.C., 325.

⁴ Cf. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2011). *Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation*, Special Report, here: 310; available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srex/SREX_Full_Report.pdf.

⁵ Cf. Ibid. p. 310. Contrary to conventional wisdom, insights from social psychology likewise point to intuitively cooperative behaviour of humans in emergencies and extreme situations. See Cocking, Chris, Drury, John, and Reicher, Steve (2009). 'The Psychology of Crowd Behavior in Emergency Evacuations: Results from Two Interview Studies and Implications for the Fire and Rescue Services', *The Irish Journal of Psychology* 30 (1-2): 59-73.

⁶ Messner, Dirk, Guarín, Alejandro, and Haun, Daniel (2013). *The Behavioural Dimensions of International Cooperation*, Global Cooperation Research Papers 1, Duisburg: Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research, here: 21-2; available at: http://www.gcr21.org/fileadmin/website/daten/pdf/Publications/Messner-Guarin-Haun_Behavioural-dimensions_GCRP-1-WEB.pdf.

recalcitrant – it is not consonant with the former. In this sense the world does not welcome man with the open arms of Gaia. As such, the world is inhumane, or better, it is 'un-subject-ive' ('*unsubjekthaft*'). But it is precisely this dissonance, this 'having-to-work-against-the-world' which is the central element of thought – and hence of being human (in Western understandings). Nevertheless, this does not describe any form of determinism. Such dissonance neither compels us nor does it save us: 'our world is a world that exerts great pressure onto thinking and its principle of consistency,' Badiou notes.² There is no guarantee that thinking can withstand this pressure. And nothing is said as to whether we would at all notice if we have been overpowered by the pressure of the world. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that this overpowering would not be experienced as a liberation coup from the never-ending travails of having to think against the world.

It seems that, the problematisations of the human subject at play in climate change discourse and the imperative of global cooperation presented as ineluctable and absolute associated with it, posits this excess pressure of the world precisely as liberation. That it is posited as a normative goal against the autonomy of the human and of being human. Hence core policy reports of leading international organisations criticize decision-making capacities, prioritization and reflective faculties. For instance, the World Bank warns that 'features of human decision-making under uncertainty constrain our natural instinct to adapt'.³ What once was perceived as interested and strategic behaviour is being reworked in climate change discourse to signify a cognitive barrier to understanding which is held to be caused by inadequate perception and appreciation of respective environmental signals. Insufficient perception and appreciation are presented in terms of deficits in attention resulting from other concerns and interests that are erroneously perceived as pressing.⁴ In this context, however, extreme weather phenomena are portrayed as potentially beneficial: individuals and groups are forced to spontaneously interact, thus often necessarily circumventing formal decision-makers and structures through which new norms of an implicitly pre-reflective form of cooperation can emerge.⁵ An actual illusory and unrealisable idea of a global 'we-identity'⁶ as the epitome of global cooperation opens up as a possibility by way of overcoming the rationally thinking and acting, even generally reflective, subject.

Behind these warnings, shifting problematisations and new interpretations, it seems sits an undoubtedly interesting, albeit problematic, displacement of ethics and value projection which is actuated explicitly via climate change discourse: an ethic of self-abolition. The faculty of value conception and moral conduct are intrinsically bound up with the notion of freedom (at least in Western understanding, it preconceives a

⁷ One could speculate about the causal connections: does this problem only appear once climate change has become a paramount concern or does the climate change discourse function as a vehicle through which this new ethic comes into effect?

⁸ This paradox is also reflected in recent post-human theories of democracy which often find their point of departure in environmental and climate concerns. See e.g., Connolly, William (2010). *A World of Becoming*, London: Duke University Press; Bennett, Jane (2010). *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things*, London: Duke University Press; Latour, Bruno (2004). *Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

choice to act this way or another). The ethical-moral capacity for action of the human subject, which drives the discourse on climate change and transmutes within it, is being transferred into a transformatory project whose aim points towards the expenditure of specifically human faculties.⁷ In other words, two genuinely human faculties, ethics and becoming (to rise above oneself), merge into a paradox in which the human subject is inculcated to use what is specific to her, her transformatory potential, in order to abrogate what is uniquely hers. As such, she becomes the founder and active stakeholder in a post-human world.⁸

Logically, this opens and legitimizes the possibility of eclipsing political structures and responsibilities. In this context, for instance, it is remarkable that a focal displacement seems to be taking place away from concrete environmental destruction. That is, the destruction of local life worlds and livelihoods, for instance, through electronic waste dumping in which clear causalities could be established, responsibilities ascribed and respective regulations could be put in place, which certainly would cause palpable cuts for the environmentally-aware Apple user, towards global-abstract climate change, with relatively unclear causalities, responsibilities and parameters for action. In the primacy of climate change a mechanism of rationalization finally opens up through which the issue of concrete environmental destruction can be channelled and modified in a way that purports that the complexity of global climate processes equally holds for the disposal of toxic waste as well as the meaning of 'security' – including a possible entitlement to security – in such concrete and identifiable contexts.

Borne in the immediacy with which climate change concerns and the concomitant idea of global cooperation as universal issue presents itself is a problematisation of the 'anthropocentric human,' whose persistence features in a way that can neither be secured nor legitimated. Whether we have indeed failed in our being with anthropocentrism remains the (ultimately unanswerable) question. That, however, its overcoming almost exigently leads to the impression of complexity and eventually to the fading out of concrete political and economic problems of human life, would – in case of an affirmative answer – have to be accepted.

X Complexity

International Cooperation in Negotiations – A Critical View on Applications of Economic Theory

Marlies Ahlert



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International negotiations form an important option and method of global cooperation. Successful negotiations between countries can realize a variety of collective improvements and contribute to a higher level of international security. In contrast, each failure of an international negotiation destroys some possibilities of cooperative surpluses and may even lead to a more insecure international status than before. In this contribution we raise the question under which conditions negotiations may have a higher chance to be successful and under which circumstances they are more probable to fail. We will try to develop some insights from the background of economic theories of negotiations.

Economic theory applies different types of bargaining models to analyse negotiations. We focus on some general bargaining models based on cooperative or non-cooperative game theory. Most of these models use the assumption of common knowledge about the bargaining situation, i.e. the current situation of all players and their possible gains from cooperation are known to all players, and this web of relations is known to all players, and so on. In addition bargaining and decision behaviour of players is modelled under the assumption of homo oeconomicus rationality. While economic theory states conditions for the success of negotiations, we will use criticism of theoretical assumptions to point to some risks why attempts to cooperate via negotiations might still fail.

In the respective bargaining models nations, states, or countries are modelled as players who have an interest to cooperate in order to find an agreement on some issues. The first aspect that is not questioned under this assumption is how the group of participants around the negotiation table is formed. The selection process itself may give rise to certain disagreements. Secondly, it is assumed that each country acts as a monolithic player who has a clear, unanimous interest. This requirement ignores aspects of delegation, representation, or ratification that may lead to problems within a delegation representing a country. In theory a common interest of all negotiating parties is necessary in order to construct a bargaining problem. If this common interest exists bargaining theories predict some successful agreement, different theories may only differ in the concrete agreement derived. Common interest is fulfilled if one can conceive some feasible agreement, that in case the agreement is realized every negotiating party has an advantage in comparison to the state of no cooperation. It seems plausible to assume that each party has her own advantage in mind. However, a problem arises since the assumption of common knowledge does not hold in reality and countries will to some extent be uncertain about the interests of the other parties. Therefore, an important feature of the negotiation process may be to find out whether mutual advantage is feasible at all. This implies that a failure of an ongoing negotiation may arise because it was not foreseen that there is no possibility for a cooperative surplus.

Further elements of bargaining models are the status quo and the option of disagreement. The status quo models the situation of all parties before they enter the negotiation. The features of this situation are assumed to be common knowledge, too. Since the status quo is an important reference point to measure neediness of cooperation and possible success of each party, in reality countries have an interest in not truthfully revealing their current situation when entering the negotiation. One of the institutional rules modelled in economic bargaining theories is that each party has the option to declare her final 'disagreement' at any time. If this happens, theory assumes that the negotiation breaks down. The status representing the situation of all parties in this case is called the disagreement point. In theory it is often assumed that status quo and disagreement point coincide. However, this does not capture monetary or reputational costs of failure that are important in reality. Additionally, one cannot assume that there is only one disagreement point, since the situation after failure may depend on who declared 'disagreement'. Further on, such a failure may imply that a reduced group of parties forms a new negotiation, of course with a new possibility set for a reduced cooperative surplus. The status quo and the situations after disagreement display important aspects of the


power of each party: a status quo or disagreement situation with a better position for some party will in theory lead to a better outcome for this party, i.e. leads to a stronger bargaining position. This theoretical fact implies incentives for each party to manipulate the perception of the own situation by the opponent parties. If these strategies are applied, the risk of failure of a negotiation rises.

The assumption of utility maximizing players made in game theory presupposes that all incentives and goals of negotiating parties are represented by some utility function and that each party tries to achieve a utility level as high as possible. At least two aspects of that preposition are not fulfilled in reality. First, the aggregation of multidimensional issues to a one-dimensional utility-measure does not capture details of conflicts in different dimensions. Second, results from behavioural economics suggest that decisions and actions of agents should be described by theories of bounded rationality, incorporating cognitive, normative and emotional influences. Applying bounded rationality may on the one hand lead to the prediction that the risk of failure of a negotiation increases since the capacity to analyse the positions of others and to find acceptable agreements is limited, negative emotions may lead to disagreements, and a conflict on norms may turn out to be insolvable. On the other hand, some aspects of bounded human rationality, like fairness, trust or reciprocity, if they can be scaled up to an international level, may increase the chances of cooperation and the success of negotiations.

As I have tried to argue from the point of view of economic theory, that the assumptions of common knowledge and homo oeconomicus rationality are crucial for the fact that economic theory can uniquely predict success or failure of negotiations, even if different theories differ in the predicted theoretical agreement. The fact that in reality these assumptions do not hold and that international negotiations take place in contexts with many uncertain dimensions leads to some conjectures, why international negotiations may fail. One important reason is that because of limited knowledge, uncertainty and bounded rationality parties have the option to strategically influence knowledge of others and shape other parties' perceptions of positions and the feasibility of solutions. Such strategies may improve the display of the own position, i.e. enlarge own bargaining power, and may weaken the feasibility of cooperative surplus and thereby limit the chance of a successful agreement. However, some behavioural aspects of bounded rationality induce limitations of strategic behaviour and thereby open a window of cooperative opportunities.

International Security and Cooperation: Taking Complexity into Account

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Life began to be conceived as complex, both in the natural and social sciences, in the 1920s. Since then, classical mechanical understandings have increasingly given way to emphasis on the growth of 'uncertainty': the theorization of the limits to understanding processes of interaction in order to predict outcomes. Linear or reductionist approaches therefore were problematised on the basis that they failed to grasp that which was crucial to understanding the chain of causation: interaction. Whereas chaos theory and deterministic understandings of complexity pose an epistemological critique of the ability to grasp the world on the basis of law-bound determinism, emergent or general complexity approaches promise a radically different ontology of objective unknowability beyond merely epistemic limits. The problematic of a complex emergent order is not that of knowing more, 'filling in the gaps' of knowledge, but an ontological problem, i.e. the problem exists at the level of what is to be known (it is not linear and law-bound) rather than at the level of how we might know the underlying reality.

In this way, three epistemes of knowledge and unknowability emerge in terms of governmental reasoning, which can be heuristically drawn out in the idiom famously used by Donald Rumsfeld, when serving as US Secretary of Defense in 2002. The first, modernist or liberal, episteme understands the 'known knowns' as central to governmental reason, based on linear and universal assumptions of the progressive accumulation of knowledge of laws and regularities of human affairs. The second, neoliberal, episteme regards these 'known

knowns' to be less important, resulting in merely artificial and potentially counterproductive assumptions that ignore the interactive complexity of life. Where policy-outcomes depend more on the inner deterministic causal relations of the object being governed, these knowledge gaps are revealed and necessitate a greater sociological or anthropological awareness of social interaction to enable more effective policy interventions. These crucial knowledge gaps are therefore the 'known unknowns', the hidden, underlying, processes of determination, which we know we do not fully know. For resilience approaches, working on the basis of emergent causality or general complexity there is no deterministic understandings of 'known unknowns', operating underneath or at a deeper level of causation. In the more open interactive ontology of resilience it is the 'unknown unknowns' that have the central role in emergent causation meaning that contingent outcomes only reveal concrete causality after the event and are impossible to know beforehand.

Thus, three regimes of governance emerge, each premised upon a different means of operationalising 'life' as a technology of governance. Complexity theory itself provides a conceptual field in which non-linear causality (the breakdown of modernist linear cause-and-effect assumptions) can be understood to operate at either an epistemological or at a deeper ontological level. At the most simple level, the object of governance can be understood as shaped through determinate but complex causality – often articulated in terms of cultural evolution, endogenous processes of inter-subjective understanding or socio-economic path-dependencies – which then pose a problem for governing policy intervention into these processes. In this deterministic understanding of complexity, there is still a division between the subject (the governing actor) and the object (now understood as complex). There is still a liberal subject external to the problematic – much like a scientist observing complexity in eco-systems or a liberal observer considering how to intervene in a complex social order.

In a more extended understanding of complexity, this divide between subject and object is elided through understanding that the governing/knowning subject is not external to the problematic but always and already 'entangled' or embedded in this relationship. With the crisis of modernist framings, emergent or general complexity thus appears to be the leading contender as an alternative ontological vision of the world – of how life can be alternatively conceived as the object of governance. In this sense, general complexity approaches could be seen as reinforcing the new materialist 'ontological turn' in the social sciences, which highlights how a complex ontology constitutes radical possibilities foreclosed by liberal forms of governance.

Complexity-thinking in the social sciences could thus be understood as on a continuum between a problematic of complexity for policy intervention with instrumental governance goals and complexity understandings which would dispute the possibility of such a subject/object separation. The two ends of this continuum could be heuristically framed in terms of the governing rationalities of actually existing neoliberalism (as a set of regulatory policy practices where the object of intervention is constructed in terms of complexity) and resilience-thinking (where governance is no longer a matter of intervening in an external problematic but of self-reflexive understandings of entanglement). If we are to deal with problems of international security and cooperation effectively, it is therefore vital to clarify our approach to understanding and thereby governing complexity.

Is the world still seen to be amenable to means-ends instrumental understandings on the basis of fixed laws and regularities? If so, then problems could be solved by policy agreement at the level of senior government and international institutional bodies. Are the problems to be addressed produced through plural and differentiated series of path-dependencies and socio-cultural understandings? In which case, we need to delve deeper, in terms of knowledge and understanding, into the complex processes of socio-economic-political-cultural determination and develop ways of intervening where these processes are amenable to such policy-interventions. Or, are the problems of international security and cooperation much less amenable to 'top-down' forms of governmental agency? If so, global cooperation involves much more inclusive forms of self-reflexive and responsive understandings, working on the basis that all of us are potential policy-actors, embedded or entangled in the problems of concern.

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