

DIAS-Kommentare

Nr. 10 Oktober 2003

Dr. Bastian Giegerich

Mugged by Reality? Ger- man Defense in Light of the 2003 Policy Guidelines

www.dias-online.org

Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik e.V.
c/o Juristische Fakultät der Heinrich-Heine-Universität
Universitätsstr. 1 D-40225 Düsseldorf

Herausgeber
Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik e.V.
c/o Juristische Fakultät der Heinrich-Heine-Universität
Universitätsstraße 1 D-40225 Düsseldorf

www.dias-online.org

© 2010, Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (DIAS)

ISBN:

Mugged by Reality? German Defense in Light of the 2003 Policy Guidelines

Since the end of the Cold War, German defense policy has played catch-up with the evolving international situation. Germany went from a frontline state of the East-West confrontation to a country no longer facing a threat to its survival. As the 1994 government White Paper on Defence argued, “the danger of a massive attack threatening the existence [of Germany] has passed.” After unification expectations of Germany’s new role abounded, both domestically and internationally, as is demonstrated by the dissatisfied responses to the almost purely financial contributions the country made during the 1991 Gulf War. Germany had to learn “that the authority which it can bring to bear depends largely on the extent to which it participates in security actions.”

Germany is key to European security and to the success of the EU European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) because of the potential assets and capabilities it could bring to the table. ESDP without a major contribution from the EU’s biggest member state is simply not credible. A transformation of the Bundeswehr from a defensive into a power projection force would add significant capabilities to the European pool. One should, therefore, expect that “because of ESDP, the German military is under pressure to become, once again, an interventionist force.” These forces, stemming from changes in the international environment, brought up the question of what the military is for after the end of the Cold War. Germany’s answer up to now suffered from two fundamental problems. First, the lack of adequate resources and, second, a conceptual disconnect between the analysis of the strategic context and the prioritization of tasks the military is to perform. Minister of Defense Peter Struck published new Defense Policy Guidelines in May 2003 apparently determined to tackle the latter predicament. The simple question is: did he succeed?

Reform of the Armed Forces

In a sense the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, has been in constant transformation since the end of the Cold War. Absorbing the NVA (the armed forces of the GDR) after unification, assisting the Soviet withdrawal from former GDR territory and beginning to deploy on UN peacekeeping missions is a formidable list of challenges. The formal review process that set into motion the ongoing reform of the Bundeswehr, however, was initiated by the incoming SPD-Greens coalition after their victory in the September 1998 elections.

In May and June of 2000, three reform proposals were published. The first by an expert commission headed by the former Federal President von Weizsäcker, the second by then Chief of Defense von Kirchbach and the third by then Minister of Defense Scharping. The Scharping report was adopted by the cabinet in June 2000 as the guideline for reform to be completed by 2006. Scharping's proposals echoed the 1994 White Paper in arguing that Germany's strategic situation had significantly improved. The main risks characterizing the international environment were regional instability stemming from intrastate struggles at Europe's periphery and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Scharping further argued that because of the nature of these risks, a state could not guarantee peace and security on its own but was dependent on international cooperation. Furthermore, since intrastate crises can spill over and thus affect German security directly, they need to be defused or limited quickly.

The Conceptual Disconnect

When laying out the tasks the Bundeswehr was to perform, Scharping argued that a continuum of forces was needed capable of territorial defense, collective defense, and crisis management missions. However, the prioritization within this continuum does not follow the logic of the strategic analysis presented earlier in the report. The 1994 White Paper argued that territorial defense, as one of the core functions of the state and its armed forces, had to remain unaffected by the changes in the strategic environment. Scharping similarly maintained that "above all the, size and structure of the Bundeswehr is based on territorial and collective defence."

The commitment to Germany's allies and territorial defense is thus emphasized and Bündnisfähigkeit – the capacity to participate in alliances in a fashion adequate for a country of Germany's size – becomes the main aim of reform. The political advantage of Bündnisfähigkeit is that it casts the Bundeswehr still as a defensive force while at the same time stressing Germany's international responsibility in a way that is not a clear break with German cautious attitudes towards military force thereby reinforcing the two principles driving post-World-War-II security policy in Germany: multilateralism and abstention of the use of military force.

Germany's aversion to the use of force and its embrace of multilateralism is a reaction to the country's past. As one of Germany's eminent scholars on the subject argued, the "first lesson drawn from the Nazi period was a widespread, instinctive pacifism, a rejection of anything military and of any use of force." Along the same lines, multilateral cooperation was lifted from a means to an end in itself. The close integration into a framework of Western institutions within the process of European integration and NATO reassured Germany's neighbors – and as some might argue Germany itself.

The prioritization of military tasks did not logically follow from the analysis of the strategic concept depicted in Scharping's and earlier proposals. This represented the fundamental conceptual dilemma German defense policy faced. As Meiers has pointed out, the task that was seen as the most important one (territorial defense) was no longer the most likely one for the Bundeswehr to take on (crisis management). In a 2001 paper outlining future equipment needs of the Bundeswehr, the German Chief of Defense evaluated the three main tasks of the armed forces against two criteria: impact on German security and probability of occurrence (see figure 1). The response to the developing disconnect reflected the tension between international requirements and expectations for an adequate German contribution to military missions and domestic concerns on the other side. By emphasising the unlikely but politically acceptable tasks of territorial and collective defense, the German government prioritised domestic preferences over those expressed both in NATO's DCI and the EU's Headline Goal. As analysts concluded, the MOD's reform has the right goals but is trapped within the aforementioned conceptual mistake.

[Figure 1: Prioritisation of Bundeswehr Tasks](#)

Getting it Right?

In the spring of 2002 the first signs emerged that the government was addressing the problem. An in-house assessment of the MoD's reform efforts argued that crisis management had become the most likely task for the German armed forces and that missions could not be restricted to the Euro-Atlantic space. Furthermore, the paper suggested that the foundations of military planning should not be based on the nature of any acute threat Germany is facing, but rather on the requirements needed to ensure that the armed forces could be effectively used as an instrument of foreign policy. This gradual shift opens the door for a more active use of the Bundeswehr by characterizing the armed forces as means towards foreign policy goals rather than a means of deterrence only.

This path has been vigorously pursued by Scharping's successor, Peter Struck, who took over in the summer of 2002. Struck has stressed the reality of deployments of German troops on crisis management operations while boldly trying to link these with German security in an attempt to address the disconnect between the importance and probability of the armed forces' tasks.

Over the course of the last ten years, Germany has gradually expanded its role in crisis management missions. In 2002, German troops were deployed in the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan forming one of the largest national contributions in terms of manpower.

The center-left coalition government of Socialdemocrats and Greens sent German troops into their first post-World-War-II combat mission in Kosovo, risked its political existence by turning a vote in parliament over deploying the Bundeswehr on a NATO mission to Macedonia into a vote of confidence, and sent about 100 special forces soldiers on a terrorist hunt in the remote caves of Afghanistan, where Germany, until recently, was also leading the Kabul-based International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The reality is thus that the Bundeswehr is gradually transforming into an interventionist force despite the government's careful rhetoric of reform.

[Table 1: Deployment Germany on UN and Peacekeeping Missions 1999–2002](#)

Defense Minister Struck has been very outspoken about this transformation. In an interview with the German daily *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in February 2003, Struck presented his mantra when stating that “Germany is no longer being defended on our Eastern borders, but is being defended around the world as the Bundeswehr, together with other states and organizations, helps prevent that countries turn into bases for terrorist attacks.” Struck furthermore started to argue that the structure and equipment of the armed forces has to be based on the most likely missions to be performed. In a named article Struck made the case that Germany has “...to be ready to deal with the consequences of the fact that territorial defence has become an unlikely option. We have to ask ourselves in what scope the Bundeswehr has to prepare itself in structural and material terms against a conventional attack against German territory.”

The 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines

In May 2003, Struck, after discussions with the cabinet, introduced the new Defense Policy Guidelines (DPG), which are the binding conceptual bases for German defense policy. In the history of the Federal Republic, this document has only been written three times (1972, 1979 and 1992) and was thought to have a sell-by date of 10 to 15 years. However, the new DPG will break with this tradition and will be updated regularly depending on international developments. Aside from laying out the guiding overall principles of German defense policy, the DPG explicitly undertake to “prioritize tasks and determine parameters for the capabilities of the armed forces.” To set the stage for the reprioritization of tasks and adaptation of the necessary capabilities to fulfill those tasks, the DPG make two crucial statements. The first is that, defense is no longer understood in its territorial context as being defined by geographic boundaries.

A much wider definition of defense if advanced, in which defense has to contribute to “safeguarding [German] security wherever it is in jeopardy.” Second, the new guidelines straightforwardly assert that in the foreseeable future no conventional threat to the German territory exists and that capabilities “that had been kept available solely for [the purpose of national defense against a conventional attack] are no longer required.”

Instead, the risks to German security are topped by what is called the asymmetric threats of religious extremism and international terrorism of global reach. The proliferation and development of weapons of mass destruction are seen as threatening Europe and forces deployed on operations abroad. This risk is exacerbated by attempts of terrorist groups to acquire those weapons and delivery systems as the DPG acknowledge. Ethnically and nationalistically driven instability on Europe’s southern and southeastern periphery is still a risk, potentially fueled by international terrorism, organized crime or migratory movements. Finally, vulnerable information and communication systems as well as transportation routes complete the list of risks to German security. In terms of the threat analysis, the DPG logically continues the trend found in previous documents. When it comes to the tasks the Bundeswehr is to perform, the true shift occurs. International conflict prevention and crisis management are listed as the most likely tasks. What is new is that, for the first time, the DPG declare that these tasks “are the major determinants of the capabilities [of the armed forces]...They do in fact determine the structure of the Bundeswehr.” The support of allies in a collective defense context and the protection of Germany and its citizens (divided into various subtasks) are defined as the remaining crucial responsibilities of the Bundeswehr but are seen as less likely. The DPG, therefore, introduce the principle that the most likely missions should determine the structure and capabilities of the German armed forces – a major revision of policy.

In operational terms, this reprioritization of tasks calls for a Bundeswehr that can participate in operations “anywhere in the world and at short notice and...across the entire mission spectrum down to high-intensity operations.” Although the high-end spectrum of missions remains undefined, it is clear that it goes beyond peacekeeping and includes combat operations since it is acknowledged that there is no clear division between those missions and that rapid escalation of mission intensity is a distinct possibility. The DPG, in other words, call for a globally deployable, high-readiness force that can engage in high-intensity missions.

Conclusion: One Down, One to Go?

German defense policy has been plagued by an ad-hoc adaptation to evolving international pressures. The 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines mark an important stage of catching up with this reality as the Bundeswehr takes on an increasing number of operations. Ideally, the DPG could serve as a starting point for a larger strategic debate in Germany about the purpose of the armed forces in the 21st century. Unfortunately, so far, there are no clear signs of this overdue debate taking place.

While the main conceptual weakness of German defense policy is starting to be corrected, the second major problem, that of finances, still looms large. There is consensus among analysts that the Bundeswehr is under-funded as a result of the steady erosion of the defense budget during the 1990s. Given the current government's overriding priority in federal budget consolidation by 2006, there is little evidence that suggests any growth in financial resources dedicated to defense in the near future. The lack of adequate funding continues to contradict the reform agenda.

As experience from other countries demonstrates, military reform costs money before it can generate efficiency savings, on which the feasibility of the reform at current funding levels is based. In order to save by closing bases or outsourcing certain activities one has to spend first. The savings produced by such restructuring are unlikely to materialize quickly. The German experience seems to follow exactly in this path. Financial restraints also constrain Germany's ability to equip its armed forces with the necessary capabilities as they transform into a modernized force. The difficulties are magnified by the fact that these items are being produced and procured on a multinational basis, which means that Germany's European partners are also directly affected by German budgetary decisions as they risk facing higher costs per unit.

Germany's approach to defense policy has clearly been driven by domestic considerations both in terms of defining the role of the military after the end of the Cold War and in terms of resources made available for the military to adapt to the new circumstances. Europe and ESDP are important reference points in this debate in Germany, but it seems that Europe is used as a cover for domestically unpopular decisions. The relative vagueness of ESDP and the lacking definition of its strategic purpose helped the German government avoid making explicit the rationale underpinning the use of the Bundeswehr. The developments of 2002 and early 2003, however, suggest that the gradual redefinition of the role of the military has reached a tipping point. If this trend continues it would go a long way in bridging the conceptual disconnect between German security and the missions the armed forces perform.

DIAS-Kommentare

- 1 Alexander Alvaro
Der globalisierte Terror 29. April 2003
- 2 Michaela Hertkorn
Why do German-US Relations matter to the Transatlantic Relationship 17. Juni 2003
- 3 Henricke Paepcke
Die Rolle der UNO im Nachkriegs-Irak 17. Juni 2003
- 4 Panagiota Bogris
Von Demokratie und Bildung im Irak nach Saddam Hussein 18. Juli 2003
- 5 Ulf Gartzke
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Eine Partnerschaft ohne Alternative 19. Juli 2003
- 6 Lars Mammen
Herausforderung für den Rechtsstaat – Gerichtsprozesse gegen den Terroristen 11. September 2003
- 7 Ulf Gartzke
Von der Wirtschaft lernen heißt voran zu kommen 21. September 2003
- 8 Daniel J. Klocke
Das Deutsche Völkerstrafgesetzbuch – Chance oder Farce 21. September 2003
- 9 Elizabeth G. Book
US Guidelines a Barrier to German-American Armaments Cooperation 10. Oktober 2003
- 10 Dr. Bastian Giegerich
Mugged by Reality? German Defense in Light of the 2003 Policy Guidelines 12. Oktober 2003
- 11 Barthélemy Courtment
Understanding the deep origins of the transatlantic rift 22. Oktober 2003
- 12 Rolf Schwarz
Old Wine, New Bottle: The Arab Middle East after September 11th 09. November 2003
- 13 Ulf Gartzke
Irrelevant or Indispensable? – The United Nations after the Iraq War 15. November 2003
- 14 Daniel J. Klocke
Das Ende der Straflosigkeit von Völkerrechtsverbrechern? 15. November 2003
- 15 Panagiota Bogris
Erziehung im Irak – Ein Gewinn von Bedeutung 21. November 2003
- 16 Jessica Duda
Why the US counter – terrorism and reconstruction policy change? 21. November 2003
- 17 Elizabeth G. Book
Creating a Transatlantic Army: Does the NATO Response Force subvert the European Union? 29. November 2003
- 18 Holger Teske
Der blinde Rechtsstaat und das dreischneidige Schwert der Terrorismusbekämpfung 29. November 2003
- 19 Niels-Jakob Küttner
Spanische Momentaufnahme: 25 Jahre Verfassung 11. Dezember 2003

20	Unbekannt Der große europäische Teppich	11. Dezember 2003
21	Unbekannt Die Reform des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen und ihre Auswirkungen auf das System Internationaler Friedenssicherung	14. Januar 2004
22	Dimitrios Argirakos Marx reloaded – einige Gedanken zum 155. jährigen Jubiläum des kommunistischen Manifestes	08. März 2004
23	Ulf Gartzke Regime Change à la El Kaida	20. März 2004
24	R. Alexander Lorz Zur Ablehnung des Annan-Plans durch die griechischen Zyperer	27. April 2004
25	Alexander Siedschlag Europäische Entscheidungsstrukturen im Rahmen der ESVP: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Harmonisierung	02. Mai 2004
26	Niels-Jakob Küttner Mission stabiler Euro: Eine Reform des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes ist dringend notwendig	17. Juni 2004
27	Karim Zourgui Die innere Selbstbestimmung der Völker im Spannungsverhältnis von Souveränität und Entwicklung	02. Juli 2004
28	Dimitrios Argirakos Rückkehr zum Nationalismus und Abschied von der Globalisierung	02. Juli 2004
29	Alexander Alvaro Man zäumt ein Pferd nicht von hinten auf – Biometrische Daten in Ausweisdokumenten	14. Januar 2005
30	R. Alexander Lorz Zurück zu den "Vereinigten Staaten" von Europa	14. Januar 2005
31	Harpriye A. Juneja The Emergence of Russia as Potential Energy Superpower and Implications for U. S. Energy Security in the 21st Century	22. Januar 2005
32	Joshua Stern NATO Collective Security or Defense: The Future of NATO in Light of Expansion and 9/11	22. Januar 2005
33	Caroline Oke The New Transatlantic Agenda: Does it have a future in the 21st Century?	22. Januar 2005
34	Dustin Dehez Globalisierte Geopolitik und ihre regionale Dimension. Konsequenzen für Staat und Gesellschaft	01. Februar 2005
35	Marwan Abou-Taam Psychologie des Terrors - Gewalt als Identitätsmerkmal in der arabisch-islamischen Gesellschaft	01. Februar 2005
36	Dimitrios Argirakos Die Entente der Halbstarke, die neue Weltordnung und Deutschlands Rolle in Europa	10. Februar 2005

- 37 Jessica Heun 17. Februar 2005
Die geplante Reform der Vereinten Nationen umfasst weit mehr als die
Diskussion um einen deutschen Sitz im Sicherheitsrat wiedergibt...
- 38 Dustin Dehez 01. März 2005
Umfassender Schutz für Truppe und Heimat?
- 39 Dimitrios Argirakos 02. Mai 2005
Über das Wesen der Außenpolitik
- 40 Babak Khalatbari 02. Mai 2005
Die vergessene Agenda- Umweltverschmutzung in Nah- und Mittelost
- 41 Panagiota Bogris 09. Mai 2005
Die Überwindung von Grenzen – Toleranz kann man nicht verordnen
- 42 Jessica Heun 17. Mai 2005
Quo vadis Roma?
- 43 Patricia Stelzer 27. Mai 2005
Politische Verrenkungen - Schröders Wunsch nach Neuwahlen trifft auf
Weimarer Spuren im Grundgesetz
- 44 Daniel-Philippe Lüdemann 02. Juni 2005
Von der Notwendigkeit der Zusammenarbeit von Non-governmental
Organisations
- 45 Dr. Michaela Hertkorn 03. Juni 2005
France saying 'Non' to the EU Constitution and Federal Elections in Germany:
The likely Impact on Intra – European Dynamics and Transatlantic Relations
- 46 Babak Khalatbari 04. Juni 2005
Freihandel versus Demokratisierung: Die euromediterrane Partnerschaft wird 10
Jahre alt
- 47 Edward Roby 13. Juni 2005
A hollow economy
- 48 Patricia Stelzer 02. Juli 2005
Operation Murambatsvina - Mugabes „Abfallbeseitigung“ in Simbabwe
steuert auf eine humanitäre Katastrophe hinzu
- 49 Lars Mammen 08. Juli 2005
Terroranschläge in London – Herausforderungen für die Anti-Terrorismus-
politik der internationalen Gemeinschaft und Europäischen Union
- 50 Daniel Pahl 19. Juli 2005
Die internationale Ratlosigkeit im Fall Iran
- 51 Michaela Hertkorn 22. Juli 2005
An Outlook on Transatlantic Relations – after the 'no-votes' on the EU
constitution and the terror attacks in London
- 52 Dustin Dehez 24. Juli 2005
Der Iran nach der Präsidentschaftswahl – Zuspitzung im Atomstreit?
- 53 Edward Roby 29. Juli 2005
Who 'll stop the winds?
- 54 Patricia Stelzer 01. August 2005
Lost in global indifference

- 55 Dustin Dehéz 04. August 2005
Der Friedensprozess im Südsudan nach dem Tod John Garangs
- 56 Dr. Dimitrios Argirakos 12. August 2005
Die diplomatische Lösung im Fall Iran
- 57 Jessica Heun 23. August 2005
Entsteht mitten in Europa eine neue Mauer?
- 58 Wilko Wiesner 31. August 2005
Terror zwischen Okzident und Orient – neue Kriege ohne Grenzen?
- 59 Edward Roby 04. September 2005
Where do Jobs come from?
- 60 Lars Mammen 11. September 2005
Remembering the 4th Anniversary of 9-11
- 61 Ulf Gartzke 16. September 2005
The Case for Regime Change in Berlin And Why It Should Matter to the U.S
- 62 Sascha Arnautovic 27. September 2005
Auge um Auge, Zahn um Zahn: Im Irak dreht sich die Spirale der Gewalt unaufhörlich weiter
- 63 Dustin Dehéz 25. Oktober 2005
Ballots, Bombs and Bullets – Tehran's stirrings in Southern Iraq
- 64 Michaela Hertkorn 07. November 2005
Security Challenges for Transatlantic Alliance: an Initial Assessment after German Elections
- 65 R. Alexander Lorz 07. November 2005
The Eternal Life of Eternal Peace
- 66 R. Alexander Lorz 08. November 2005
International Constraints on Constitution - Making
- 67 Unbekannt 15. November 2005
The NATO Response Force – A 2006 Deliverable?
- 68 Jessica Heun 15. November 2005
10 Jahre nach Dayton – Selbstblockade statt Entwicklung
- 69 Hendrik Schulten 02. Dezember 2005
Wie ist die Feindlage? Umwälzungen im Bereich des Militärischen Nachrichtenswesens der Bundeswehr
- 70 Edward Roby 12. Dezember 2005
Transatlantic financial market: integration or confrontation?
- 71 Dustin Dehéz 25. Dezember 2005
Terrorism and Piracy – the Threat Underestimated at the Horn of Africa
- 72 Franz Halas/Cornelia Frank 16. Januar 2006
Friedenskonsolidierung mit polizeilichen Mitteln? Die Polizeimission EUPOL-PROXIMA auf dem Prüfstand
- 73 Mark Glasow 07. Februar 2006
Neue strategische Überlegungen zur Rolle des Terrorismus` auf der internationalen Bühne

- | | | |
|----|---|------------------|
| 74 | Ulf Gartzke
What Canada's Prime Minister can learn from the German Chancellor | 09. Februar 2006 |
| 75 | Edward Roby
Control of oil is dollar strategy | 13. Februar 2006 |
| 76 | Dr. Lars Mammen
Erster Prozess zum 11. September 2001 in den USA – Beginn der richterlichen Aufarbeitung? | 10. März 2006 |
| 77 | Edward Roby
New asset class for cosmopolitan high rollers | 18. März 2006 |
| 78 | Daniel Pahl
Thoughts about the military balance the PRC and the USA | 18. März 2006 |
| 79 | Dustin Dehéz
Deutsche Soldaten ins Herz der Finsternis? Zur Debatte um die Entsendung deutscher Truppen in die Demokratische Republik Kongo | 18. März 2006 |
| 80 | Lars Mammen
Zum aktuellen Stand der Debatte in der Generalversammlung um eine Umfassende Konvention gegen den internationalen Terrorismus | 26. März 2006 |
| 81 | Edward Roby
Clocking the speed of capital flight | 17. April 2006 |
| 82 | Ulf Gartzke
Turkey's Dark Past and Uncertain Future | 17. April 2006 |
| 83 | Lars Mammen
Urteil im Prozess um die Anschläge vom 11. September 2001 – Lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe für Moussaoui | 04. Mai 2006 |
| 84 | Jessica Heun
See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil... sometimes do evil | 23. Mai 2006 |
| 85 | Tiffany Wheeler
Challenges for a Transatlantic Cohesion: An Assessment | 23. Mai 2006 |
| 86 | Dustin Dehéz
Obstacles on the way to international recognition for Somaliland | 29. Mai 2006 |
| 87 | Dustin Dehéz
Islamismus und Terrorismus in Afrika – Gefahr für die transatlantischen Interessen? | 01. Juni 2006 |
| 88 | Samuel D. Hernandez
Latin America's Crucial Role as Transatlantic Player | 21. Juni 2006 |
| 89 | Sarabeth K. Trujillo
The Franco – American Alliance: The Steel Tariffs, Why the Iraq War Is Not A Deal – Breaker, & Why the Alliance Still Matters | 21. Juni 2006 |
| 90 | Matthew Omolesky
Polish – American Security Cooperation: Idealism, Geopolitics and Quid Pro Quo | 26. Juni 2006 |
| 91 | Eckhart von Wildenradt
A delicate Relationship: Explaining the Origin of Contemporary German and French Relations under U.S. Hegemony 1945 - 1954 | 26. Juni 2006 |

- | | | |
|-----|---|--------------------|
| 92 | Gesine Wolf-Zimper
Zuckerbrot und Peitsche - zielgerichtete Sanktionen als effektives Mittel der Terrorbekämpfung? | 01. Juli 2006 |
| 93 | Edward Roby
The geopolitics of gasoline | 10. Juli 2006 |
| 94 | Michaela Hertkorn
Gedanken zu einer Friedenstruppe im Südlibanon | 01. August 2006 |
| 95 | Edward Roby
Germany's 2% boom | 11. September 2006 |
| 96 | Lars Mammen
Die Bekämpfung des Internationalen Terrorismus fünf Jahre nach den Anschlägen vom 11. September 2001 | 12. September 2006 |
| 97 | Dustin Dehéz
Running out of Options – Reassessing Western Strategic Opportunities in Somalia | 28. September 2006 |
| 98 | Edward Roby
Asian energy quest roils worldwide petroleum market | 02. Oktober 2006 |
| 99 | Christopher Radler
Ägypten nach den Parlamentswahlen | 11. Oktober 2006 |
| 100 | Michaela Hertkorn
Out-of-Area Nation – Building Stabilization: Germany as a Player within the NATO- EU Framework | 16. November 2006 |
| 101 | Raphael L'Hoest
Thailändische Energiepolitik – Erneuerbare Energien: Enormes Potenzial für Deutsche Umwelttechnologie | 10. Januar 2007 |
| 102 | Klaus Bender
The Mystery of the Supernotes | 11. Januar 2007 |
| 103 | Dustin Dehéz
Jahrhundert der Ölkriege? | 11. Januar 2007 |
| 104 | Edward Roby
A Nutcracker for Europe's energy fantasies | 14. Januar 2007 |
| 105 | C. Eduardo Vargas Toro
Turkey' s Prospects of Accession to the European Union | 25. Januar 2007 |
| 106 | Unbekannt
Davos revives Doha: Liberalized world trade trumps bilateral talk | 30. Januar 2007 |
| 107 | Edward Roby
Healthy market correction or prelude to a perfect storm? | 19. März 2007 |
| 108 | Edward Roby
Upswing from nowhere | 25. Mai 2007 |
| 109 | Daniel Pahl
Restraint in interstate – violence | 29. Juni 2007 |
| 110 | Michaela Hertkorn
Deutsche Europapolitik im Zeichen des Wandels: Die Deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft aus der Transatlantischen Perspektive | 02. Juli 2007 |

- | | | |
|-----|--|-------------------|
| 111 | Tatsiana Lintouskaya
Die politische Ausgangslage in der Ukraine vor der Wahl | 10. August 2007 |
| 112 | Edward Roby
Western credit crunch tests irreversibility of globalization | 10. August 2007 |
| 113 | Holger Teske
Freiheit, Gleichheit, Brüderlichkeit: Der Niedergang der fünften Republik? | 31. August 2007 |
| 114 | Edward Roby
Euro shares reserve burden of wilting dollar | 22. Oktober 2007 |
| 115 | Peter Lundin
The Current Status of the Transatlantic Relationship – 4 Points of Consideration | 07. November 2007 |
| 116 | Michaela Hertkorn
Challenge of Successful Post – War Stabilization: More Questions than Answers for the NATO-EU Framework | 01. Dezember 2007 |
| 117 | Dimitrios Argirakos
Merkels Außenpolitik ist gefährlich | 07. Dezember 2007 |
| 118 | Edward Roby
Crisis tests paradigm of global capital – a European perspective | 07. Dezember 2007 |
| 119 | Dr. Christian Wipperfürth
Afghanistan – Ansatzpunkt für eine Zusammenarbeit Russlands mit dem Westen | 05. Januar 2008 |
| 120 | Dustin Dehéz
Somalia – Krieg an der zweiten Front? | 06. Februar 2008 |
| 121 | Edward Roby
Can Europe help repair the broken bubble? | 10. Februar 2008 |
| 122 | Dr. Christian Wipperfürth
Bevölkerungsentwicklung in langer Schicht: Mittel und langfristige Konsequenzen | 18. März 2008 |
| 123 | Philipp Schweers
Jemen vor dem Kollaps? | 18. März 2008 |
| 124 | Philipp Schweers
Pakistan – Eine „neue Ära wahrer Politik“ nach der Wahl? | 01. April 2008 |
| 125 | Christian Rieck
Zur Zukunft des Völkerrechts nach dem 11.September – Implikationen der Irakintervention | 02. April 2008 |
| 126 | Christian Rieck
Iran and Venezuela: A nuclear "Rogue Axis" ? | 02. April 2008 |
| 127 | Philipp Schweers
Towards a " New Middle East" ? | 09. April 2008 |
| 128 | Christian Rieck
Ein Versuch über die Freiheit - Nur die Freiheit von heute ist die Sicherheit von morgen | 02. Mai 2008 |
| 129 | Christopher Radler
Islamischer Fundamentalismus und Geopolitik – vom europäischen Kolonialismus bis zum Globalen Dschihad | 06. Mai 2008 |

130	Ulrich Petersohn Möglichkeiten zur Regulierung von Privaten Sicherheitsunternehmen (PSF)	09. Mai 2008
131	Edward Roby Food joins energy in speculative global price spiral	09. Mai 2008
132	Edward Roby Central Banks declare war on resurgent inflation	12. Juni 2008
133	Daniel Werdung Airbus vs. Boeing: Neue Tankerflugzeuge für die US - Luftwaffe	12. Juni 2008
134	Christian Rieck Bemerkung zum europäischen Traum	13. Juni 2008
135	Philipp Schweers Zukunftsbranche Piraterie?	13. Juni 2008
136	Philipp Schweers Yemen: Renewed Houthi - Conflict	19. Juni 2008
137	Philipp Schweers Iran: Zwischen Dialogbereitschaft, äußeren Konflikten und persischem Nationalismus	20. Juni 2008
138	Dustin Dehéz Der Ras Doumeira–Konflikt – ist ein Krieg zwischen Eritrea und Djibouti unausweichlich?	09. Juli 2008
139	Philipp Schweers A new security paradigm for the Persian Gulf	09. Juli 2008
140	Edward Roby Mission Impossible: Quell "stagflation" with monetary policy	27. August 2008
141	Edward Roby Wallstreet on welfare, dollar on Skid Row	25. September 2008
142	Burkhard Theile Bankenkrise und Wissensgesellschaft	21. November 2008
143	Christopher Radler Die Anschläge von Mumbai als Machwerk al- Qa'idás?	30. Dezember 2008
144	Edward Roby Credit crisis starts to level global trade imbalances	14. Januar 2009
145	Daniel Pahl Barack H. Obama – Der amerikanische Präsident	20. Januar 2009
146	Christopher Radler Der Einfluss des Internets auf islamistische Gewaltdiskurse	29. Januar 2009
147	Christian Rieck The Legacy of the Nation – State in East Asia	29. März 2009
148	Edward Roby A recovery on credit	04. September 2009
149	Christopher Radler Anmerkungen zur Medienoffensive Al Qa'idás	28. Oktober 2009

- | | | |
|-----|--|-------------------|
| 150 | Rana Deep Islam
Zehn Jahre nach Helsinki – Die türkisch-europäischen Beziehungen in der Sackgasse | 13. Dezember 2009 |
| 151 | Edward Roby
Devil gas takes blame for death and taxes | 16. Dezember 2009 |
| 152 | Vinzenz Himmighofen
Ägyptens Grenzpolitik – Ein Balanceakt | 15. Januar 2010 |

DIAS ANALYSEN stehen unter <http://www.dias-online.org/31.0.html> zum Download zur Verfügung.

Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik

2003 an der Heinrich-Heine Universität in Düsseldorf gegründet, versteht sich das DIAS als unabhängige, interdisziplinäre und wissenschaftliche Denkfabrik, die strategische Politikberatung für Kunden aus dem öffentlichen und dem privatwirtschaftlichen Sektor anbietet und als Plattform den Dialog und den Ideenaustausch zwischen Nachwuchskräften aus Politik, Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft ermöglicht bzw. moderiert. Das Institut organisiert zu diesem Zweck jährlich die Düsseldorfer Rede sowie weitere Veranstaltungen mit Vertretern verschiedener Anspruchsgruppen und stellt seine Arbeit der breiten Öffentlichkeit im Rahmen verschiedener Publikationsserien zur Verfügung.

© Copyright 2009, Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik,
Universitätsstraße 1 Geb. 24.91, D-40225 Düsseldorf, www.dias-online.org