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## Focused District Development

Turning Point for Police Building in  
Afghanistan?

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## 1 Introduction

"[T]he essence of stateness is enforcement: the ability, ultimately, to send someone with a uniform and a gun to force people to comply with the state's laws"<sup>1</sup> - these are the words with which Fukuyama describes the state's ability to assert as basis of its statehood, in Jellinek's three elements theory there is the ability to effectively execute governmental powers a constituting part of statehood beside the state's people and the state's territory<sup>2</sup>. Senghaas sees the state's monopoly on the use of force as a key factor as well<sup>3</sup>, making it one corner in his civilizational hexagon:

„Without the previous constitution of the monopoly on the use of force the democratic rule of law is beyond all imagination. The rule of law itself, when established, becomes the epitome of control of the state's monopoly on the use of force. The monopoly on the use of force becomes juridified in turn."<sup>4</sup>

So the rule of law and the state's monopoly on the use of force are two necessary and interrelated conditions for statehood, together they form, consistently and effectively implemented and



**Figure 1 - Safe and Secure Environment** (source: Cole *et al.* 2009: 37)

enforced, a safe and secure environment, which stands for such an environment in which the population in everyday life need not have fear of politically motivated, continuing or large-scale violence (see Figure 1). This means a far-most end of hostilities, public order, constitutional control of security forces, freedom of movement of citizens and the protection of society and the infrastructure from illegitimate violence. This state is a precondition for a sustainable economic, political and social development, as if this does

<sup>1</sup> Fukuyama (2004: 21)

<sup>2</sup> Jellinek (1914: 394–434)

<sup>3</sup> Senghaas (1995: 3–4)

<sup>4</sup> Senghaas (1995: 5): "Ohne die vorgängige Konstitution des Gewaltmonopols ist der demokratische Rechtsstaat gar nicht vorstellbar. Der Rechtsstaat selbst wird aber, wo ausgebildet, zum Inbegriff der Kontrolle des Gewaltmonopols. Das Gewaltmonopol seinerseits wird verrechtlicht"; translation by author.

not happen, people will be afraid to send their children to school, to open their shops, to visit the markets or to vote in elections<sup>5</sup>. For the purposes of this analysis security is defined as the provisioning of such an environment.

Security is essential for states' stability, it is a code in nine of the eleven renowned indices for state fragility<sup>6</sup>. Therefore, the Security Sector Reform (SSR) was one of the most important elements of the agreements for state-building in Afghanistan in 2002<sup>7</sup>. The reform envisaged to rebuild the basic sectors for the restoration of security in Afghanistan from scratch<sup>8</sup>. To this end, the five pillars of the SSR in Afghanistan - building up the Afghan National Army (ANA), development of the Afghan National Police (ANP), fighting drugs, construction of the judiciary and the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) - were identified, and each assigned with a lead nation<sup>9</sup>, which were renamed into Key Partners later<sup>10</sup>. The SSR, however, proved to be much uncoordinated. In all preceded comparable international projects an international organization such as the UN took the leadership that was missing in Afghanistan and is still missing, yet. The fragmentation of the security sector resulted in a barely coherent action by the international community in the SSR<sup>11</sup>. Overall, SSR set demanding goals for any of its pillars, which were not met by the efforts of the contributing nations<sup>12</sup>.

Germany was made Key Partner for the police building and kept this role until it was handed over to the EU in 2007. The police building has a key role in Afghanistan<sup>13</sup>, because if the police can guarantee the protection of the population, this will set the foundation for confidence into the new system, as only then one of the basic functions of state is guaranteed<sup>14</sup>. A state failing to provide judiciary and security undermines its reputation in the population and promotes the development of non-state security actors<sup>15</sup>.

The recent efforts to rebuild the police force, as well as the state of the ANP itself, are reported as insufficient and inadequate<sup>16</sup>. In the light of the previously mentioned importance of police forces to provide security and the resulting effects for the legitimacy of the government and the

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<sup>5</sup> Cole *et al.* (2009: 38)

<sup>6</sup> Mata and Sebastian Ziaja (2009: 26)

<sup>7</sup> Feichtinger and Jurekovi'c (2006: 203)

<sup>8</sup> Brast (2009: 27–28)

<sup>9</sup> Feichtinger and Jurekovi'c (2006: 203)

<sup>10</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 6)

<sup>11</sup> Jones (2005: 70)

<sup>12</sup> Daase and Friesendorf (2010: 89)

<sup>13</sup> Council of the European Union (2007: 10)

<sup>14</sup> Brast (2009: 3–13)

<sup>15</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 45)

<sup>16</sup> Brast (2009: 36); Cook (2009); Cordesman (2009: iii); Fair and Jones (2009: 13); Feichtinger and Jurekovi'c (2006: 225); Hippler (2008: 5)

reconstruction efforts, this is worrying. With the Focused District Development (FDD) starting in 2007, there is a complementary and not substitutive approach added<sup>17</sup>, whose participants include Germany in its bilateral cooperation, in addition to its commitment through EUPOL<sup>18</sup>.

This analysis is to assess, whether and in which way the FDD addresses and is suitable to approach the problems of the ANP. In order to do this, at first the state and the known problems of the ANP as well as the recent police building efforts are to be analyzed. Especially Cordesman, Fair & Jones, Foxley and the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies together with the Foreign Policy Research Institute conducted research and published their results in this field in the recent years<sup>19</sup>. Based on the analysis of condition and problems there is to be shown by the presentation of key challenges, whether the FDD is designed to tackle them successfully. The author will also make use of experience from other police reconstruction missions as well as initial findings from the districts that have gone through the FDD.

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<sup>17</sup> Cordesman (2009: 44)

<sup>18</sup> Auswärtiges Amt (2009: 1); EUPOL describes in this context the European police mission in Afghanistan.

<sup>19</sup> Cordesman (2009); Fair and Jones (2009); Foxley (2009); Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009)

## 2 The Afghan Police Forces, Their Building and Structure

"The constant state of war in Afghanistan beginning in the late 1970s meant that Afghan police had little training and a weak Ministry of Interior. After the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban regime, a legitimate police and judicial system had to be established de novo."<sup>20</sup>

The police building in Afghanistan was thus no reform of existing forces, but a complete build up from scratch<sup>21</sup>. So, the reconstruction efforts are in a causal relationship to the state and the problems of the ANP. These efforts<sup>22</sup>, initially excluding the FDD, which is beginning to impact during the authoring of this analysis and has its own chapter later in the work in hand, are described below, followed by a presentation of the Afghan police forces and their problematic weaknesses.

### 2.1 Germany as Key Partner until 2007

Germany already trained Afghan police forces at the Kabul Police Academy before the Soviet-Afghan war<sup>23</sup>, the acceptance of responsibility for police training as part of the SSR was so out of a certain tradition - and continued this tradition with the reopening of the Kabul Police Academy in August 2002<sup>24</sup>. This is the central facility for the training of the ANP leaders with a three-year program for officers and an initial one-year, later nine-month program for non-commissioned officers. The first year of post-war officers, 251 police officers, concluded therefore their training in 2005<sup>25</sup>.

By May 2007, the academy had produced some 3500 graduates<sup>26</sup>, Germany concentrated his energies on building a solid backbone of intensively trained leaders<sup>27</sup> as well as on training of trainers, which would later serve as multipliers<sup>28</sup>, but Germany failed to establish a training program for ordinary policemen or to arrange such a program in its role as Key Partner in cooperation with other nations engaged in Afghanistan<sup>29</sup>. The emphasis made in the training programs, such as the focus on domestic violence against women and girls, with the goal of the

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<sup>20</sup> Fair and Jones (2009: 10)

<sup>21</sup> Cordesman (2009: 65)

<sup>22</sup> In Afghanistan there is a great number of tiny and tiniest bilateral commitments in police building (Fair and Jones 2009: 12), in the work in hand the author has to concentrate on the three main players Germany, the USA and the EU (Gross 2009: 26).

<sup>23</sup> Gutschker (2008: 100)

<sup>24</sup> Feichtinger and Jurekovi'c (2006: 224–225)

<sup>25</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 6–7)

<sup>26</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 11)

<sup>27</sup> Brast (2009: 37)

<sup>28</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 93)

<sup>29</sup> Fair and Jones (2009: 10–11)

creation of a police force similar to those in the liberal western peace societies<sup>30</sup>, neglected, however, the provision of the necessary survival skills in a counterinsurgency (COIN) scenario<sup>31</sup>. Conventional civil police operate in a safe and secure environment, it requires a certain level of security and stability to meet the tasks crime control and prevention, which simply does not exist in Afghanistan. Afghan police forces must be equipped and trained for the fight as well<sup>32</sup>, despite the undeniable need for civilian police training and its focus on the security needs of the population<sup>33</sup>. This applies even more as the ANP is a preferred target of the insurgents<sup>34</sup> and is frequently involved in combat<sup>35</sup>.

The low quantitative input in Afghanistan is partly responsible for the slow progress with the development of the ANP<sup>36</sup>. Germany invested about 70 million € for the police reform until 2007, which is about three percent of what the United States (see chapter 2.4) invested in the same period, and deployed up to 40 police officers<sup>37</sup>, of which were twelve at the Kabul Police Academy. Taking into account the existence of experiences from the state building in the Balkans, it seems that this is not a lack of the necessary knowledge of the appropriate resources approach, but rather due to the lack of political will<sup>38</sup>. The Kosovo, which is smaller as well by territory as by population, lacked own security institutions as well in 1999, but when the central Kosovo Police Service School was opened in 2000, there were about 200 international police trainers used. This effort led to a speedy and successful development of Kosovar police force<sup>39</sup>.

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<sup>30</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 91–93)

<sup>31</sup> Cordesman (2009: 65–66)

<sup>32</sup> Cordesman (2009: 16)

<sup>33</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 53–54)

<sup>34</sup> Auswärtiges Amt *et al.* (2008a: 26)

<sup>35</sup> Gutschker (2008: 98)

<sup>36</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 100–101)

<sup>37</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 7)

<sup>38</sup> Brast (2009: 37)

<sup>39</sup> Jones (2005: 35–58)



## 2.2 German Contribution after the Transfer of Key Partner's Function to EUPOL

After the EU replaced with their EUPOL mission in mid-2007 Germany as key partner for the police training, Germany continued its bilateral commitment reinforced and also participated in EUPOL. Goal in 2009 were about 100 bilateral trainers and consultants, and about 50 experts to EUPOL<sup>40</sup>. In February of 2009, Germany employed 42 police officers in their bilateral commitment as well as 37 police officers in EUPOL Afghanistan<sup>41</sup>, in the third quarter of 2009 112 respectively 30 German police officers<sup>42</sup>, on 14/01/2010 there were 130 respectively 30 policemen<sup>43</sup>, 45 Feldjäger<sup>44</sup> have to be added to each period<sup>45</sup>. The German bilateral commitment is focused on training, since 2009 mainly as part of the FDD, and advice both in Kabul and in the German area of responsibility in the north-eastern Afghanistan<sup>46</sup>.

## 2.3 The European Police Mission to Afghanistan

On 17/06/2007 EUPOL took over the role of Key Partner for the Afghan police reform from Germany with an initially planned target of 160 police<sup>47</sup>. EUPOL continues the German approach in policing<sup>48</sup> in order to:

"[to contribute to] establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements under Afghan ownership and in accordance with international standards. More particularly, the mission monitors, mentors and advises at the level of the Afghan Ministry of Interior and other central Afghan administrations, regions and provinces."<sup>49</sup>

This approach lies beyond that of the German Key Partnership as well in respect of the deployment in the regions and provinces as it puts all existing bilateral commitments regarding the police building (except for the U.S.) under the auspices of EUPOL<sup>50</sup>. EUPOL is, as illustrated

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<sup>40</sup> Bundesministerium des Innern Referat B 4 (2009: 1)

<sup>41</sup> Deutscher Bundestag (2009a: 1)

<sup>42</sup> Deutscher Bundestag (2009b: 2)

<sup>43</sup> Aye (2010)

<sup>44</sup> Feldjäger are the military police of the German armed forces. As the military police forces of western states in general Feldjäger have undergone a police training, which is sufficient for police training in weak states (Brast 2009: 19).

<sup>45</sup> Deutscher Bundestag (2009a: 4)

<sup>46</sup> Deutscher Bundestag (2009b: 2–11)

<sup>47</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 8)


<sup>48</sup> Fair and Jones (2009: 12)

<sup>49</sup> Glière (2009: 142)

<sup>50</sup> Gutschker (2008: 103)

in Figure 2, deployed in 16 of the 34 Afghan provinces<sup>51</sup>, an extension to eastern Afghanistan is intended<sup>52</sup>. It is planned to deploy, in addition to about 70 consultants and trainers in Kabul, teams of four to eight consultants to each of the five regional commands and further 100 consultants at the provincial level, especially to the non-U.S.-PRTs<sup>53</sup>.

EUPOL, in continuation of the German involvement, puts the emphasis on training and consulting in ordinary policing<sup>54</sup>, especially at the strategic level<sup>55</sup>. Coordination with the U.S.



**Figure 2 - Deployment of EUPOL Afghanistan (source: European Union 2009: 2)**

effort has been improved, a division of tasks were agreed with EUPOL responsible for the long-term training, planning, strategy and vision development, while the U.S. continues to concentrate on the short-term training of basic patrol officers and the FDD<sup>56</sup>. The International Police Coordination

Board (IPCB), established in the end of 2006,

previously insignificant because having no effect, is to win in importance through its restructuring in late 2008 for the coordination of international efforts to rebuild the police force<sup>57</sup>. Unlike other coordination bodies, it has a permanent secretariat to coordinate the activities of relevant actors. For this purpose EUPOL, Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) the Afghan Ministry of Interior deploy personnel, which is authorized to take decisions<sup>58</sup>.

<sup>51</sup> European Union (2009: 1)

<sup>52</sup> Council of the European Union (2009: 7)

<sup>53</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 8)

<sup>54</sup> Fair and Jones (2009: 12)

<sup>55</sup> Glière (2009: 142)

<sup>56</sup> Gross (2009: 32)

<sup>57</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 95)

<sup>58</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 9)

The EU's approach regarding the personnel deployed in Afghanistan is generally considered as too low<sup>59</sup>, as EUPOL did not mean a significant growth in personnel quantity, because the existing personnel body was simply rededicated<sup>60</sup>. The plan to increase the authorized strength of EUPOL training personnel from 200 to 400 police officers did not make an impact as the former authorized strength was far from being achieved<sup>61</sup>. This is due to recruitment problems for the mission in Afghanistan, while there are about 6000 police officers reported available nominally to the EU for those missions by member states, the real deployed personnel is far from those numbers<sup>62</sup>, the German government had to admit recruitment problems for EUPOL towards the German Bundestag<sup>63</sup>.

## 2.4 Police Building by the U.S.

In 2003 the United States noticed that the German approach provided no training for the ordinary patrol officers. To bridge this gap, the U.S.-led CSTC-A, which was originally set up to train the ANA, established the Central Training Center (CTC) and seven Regional Training Centers (RTC)<sup>64</sup>. At these eight training institutions for any cop, who has not attended the police academy in Kabul, an initial training is provided, known as the Initial Entry Training (IET). But the training capacity of these facilities are not sufficient for this purpose, so many police officers still do their service without proper training<sup>65</sup>. The IET is designed for short training periods and has a predominantly paramilitary orientation<sup>66</sup>. It is carried out by U.S. soldiers and the civilian service provider DynCorp<sup>67</sup>. From 2005 onwards the U.S. was much more involved in the police building than the key partner Germany<sup>68</sup>.

After three weeks of IET the Afghan police are sent into missions immediately in order to fill gaps between the too few international troops and the not finally set up ANA<sup>69</sup>. This is worrying

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<sup>59</sup> Foxley (2009: 4); Riecke (2009: 41); Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 87)

<sup>60</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 8)

<sup>61</sup> Foxley (2009: 4); Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 87)

<sup>62</sup> Rummel (2005: 11)

<sup>63</sup> Deutscher Bundestag (2009a: 2)

<sup>64</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 7)

<sup>65</sup> U.S. Department of Defense (2009: 44)

<sup>66</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 96)

<sup>67</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 7–8)

<sup>68</sup> Foxley (2009: 3)

<sup>69</sup> Brast (2009: 30–37)

in so far as an uniform and the ability to operate a weapon does not make a proper police force<sup>70</sup>, while the ANP are for the CSTC-A simply units for the Hold-Phase of their COIN strategy<sup>71</sup>:

"We have built the police into a less well-armed, less well-trained version of the Army and launched them into operations against the insurgents. Meanwhile, nobody is doing the job of actual policing-rule of law, keeping the population safe, civil and criminal law enforcement."<sup>72</sup>

With the resulting consequences: The use of poorly trained police officers, who also became entangled in corruption and crime, harmed the reputation of the ANP, the Afghan government and international forces even more than the previous undisturbed operations of the insurgents<sup>73</sup>.

The provision of funding and personnel for the training of the ANP by the U.S. clearly exceeds that of all other actors. From 2002 to 2006 the U.S. invested 2.1 billion U.S. dollars, while they employed up to 600 trainers and mentors for the Afghan police force<sup>74</sup>, through 2008 there were another 3.8 billion U.S. dollars invested<sup>75</sup>.

## 2.5 The ANP – Structure, Problems, Weaknesses

The ANP is subdivided as the following:

- Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) with the usual police tasks,
- Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), which is used for riot control as well as for the fight against hostage taking and looting,
- Afghan Border Police (ABP),
- Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA),
- Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and
- Counter Terrorism Police (CTP) to fight insurgents and terrorists.

In addition to the list above there are the Afghan Customs Police (ACP), which is under the Ministry of Finance, and the Afghanistan National Fire Department (ANFD)<sup>76</sup>. In November 2005 the Afghan government authorized target strength of the ANP of 62000, including 50000 in

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<sup>70</sup> Mechlenborg (2009: 1)

<sup>71</sup> Gross (2009: 28); The COIN strategy currently followed consists of the phases Shape-Clear-Hold-Build. First, sites are selected together with local stakeholders (Shape), then cleared by the ANA and international military (Clear), then held by forces (Hold), so there (re)construction can take place (build) (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada 2009: 8). Further reading for the COIN-Thematic: Gompert and Gordon (2008).

<sup>72</sup> Kilcullen, David quoted from Foxley (2009: 1)

<sup>73</sup> Brast (2009: 37)

<sup>74</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 7)

<sup>75</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office (2008: 5)

<sup>76</sup> Lee (2009: 6)

the area of the AUP. This authorized strength was increased several times, numbered 82000 in April 2007 and eventually 86600 in 2009<sup>77</sup>. In view of the deteriorating security situation<sup>78</sup> there was almost a doubling of the authorized strength of the ANP decided in the end of 2009 now being 160000 police officers<sup>79</sup>. According of its objective, the analysis in hand puts the emphasis on the AUP, which is the object of the FDD.

Uniformed police force are the "local face of the government"<sup>80</sup>, often they are the only government representatives on site, their quality in the provision of security also influences the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the population<sup>81</sup> as well as the conduct of the police force<sup>82</sup> – a uniform does not form a police officer<sup>83</sup>. Against this background, it is alarming that the ANP so far, due to their involvement in corruption and crime, their links with local rulers and their lack of effectiveness, was not able to win trust and support of the population<sup>84</sup>. "Afghanistan's citizens often view the police more as a source of fear than of security"<sup>85</sup>.

Corruption is widespread in Afghanistan, within the ANP it is particularly strong<sup>86</sup>, it manifests itself particularly in everyday scenes of public bribery<sup>87</sup>, with which the police supplement their meager salary and worse their standing in the population even further<sup>88</sup>.

To build up the ANP armed forces were partly incorporated in the lower and middle levels of the police force, especially militia commanders, who are now police chiefs at the provincial or district level, and then transferred their militias into the police. This is a consequence of the continuing reluctance over years of the international community to extend their security presence beyond Kabul<sup>89</sup>. So it is little wondering that the judicial sector, the second major player in the provision of rule of law, perceives the ANP not as partners in this area, but rather as "thugs and non-professionals"<sup>90</sup>, an assessment that is common among the population in general<sup>91</sup>. The loyalties

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<sup>77</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 97)

<sup>78</sup> Feichtinger and Jureković (2006: 220)

<sup>79</sup> Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (2009: 4)

<sup>80</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 48)

<sup>81</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 16)

<sup>82</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 1)

<sup>83</sup> Mechlenborg (2009: 1)

<sup>84</sup> Cordesman (2009: vii)

<sup>85</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: i)

<sup>86</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 9)

<sup>87</sup> Cordesman (2009: 41)

<sup>88</sup> Kursawe (2006: 5)

<sup>89</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 5)


<sup>90</sup> Cordesman (2009: 42)

<sup>91</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 1)

of many ANP units are far more equal to those of private militias than to those of law enforcement units<sup>92</sup>.

With the use of ANP as light infantry, it is committed and so not available for original police work<sup>93</sup>, especially if it is abused because of their poor training and equipment as cannon fodder<sup>94</sup>. But not only the ANP is misused for military purposes, the ANA is in turn used for police tasks, the distinction between military and police is blurred<sup>95</sup>, which is not intended in SSR<sup>96</sup>. This fact obstructs the building of an urgently needed civil police based on the rule of law<sup>97</sup> in so far as in the population the memory of the use of organized paramilitary police forces as an instrument of oppression is still very vivid<sup>98</sup>.

The ANP fails to tackle crime and in the provision of security, this is due to a poor training and inefficiencies in the recruitment, particularly the high number of illiterates cripple quite simple



**Figure 3 - Capability Milestones of the ANP; black CM 1, green CM 2, yellow CM3, red CM4; from 2009 on forecast (source: U.S. Department of Defense 2009: 48)**

police work, as they are even unable to perform tasks such as taking testimony or the reading and writing of reports<sup>99</sup>. The already low recruitment standards for the ANP were not consistently observed, particularly regarding education and literacy. In light of the parlous state of the Afghan educational system and

the related level of education in the population, that fact must be well-tolerated, it is only acceptable if the necessary reading and writing skills will be taught in police training. Not

<sup>92</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 9)

<sup>93</sup> Foxley (2009: 1)

<sup>94</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 114)

<sup>95</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 15)

<sup>96</sup> Daase and Friesendorf (2010: 41)

<sup>97</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: i)

<sup>98</sup> Gross (2009: 25)

<sup>99</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 11–15)

acceptable because not repairable by training, however, is the inclusion of anti-government forces, criminals and drug users in the police service, a deficiency that is highly detrimental towards the reputation of the ANP and its functionality<sup>100</sup>.

While according to official figures in 2008 with 7,000 police officers 85 percent<sup>101</sup> and in May 2009 with more than 81 000 police officers over 99 percent of the target size were achieved<sup>102</sup>, estimates are, however, much lower, particularly because the official statistics do not take into account the high rates of unauthorized absence<sup>103</sup>. This purely quantitative approach might be cause for joy, if there had not been recorded a significant deterioration of security situation at the same time<sup>104</sup>. Furthermore, the quality of the Afghan police force is simply inadequate<sup>105</sup>. Measured by so-called Capacity Milestones (CM), with CM 1 being the ability to operate independently and thus the highest level, while CM 4, however, means a unit was set up, but is not yet operational and CM 2 and CM 3 being appropriate steps according to the dependence of international support needed in operations between those extremes<sup>106</sup>, the qualitative building of the ANP is simply too slow. In November 2008 "18 [ANP Units] were at CM1, 16 at CM2, and 22 at CM3. Although progress is undoubtedly being made, it is painfully slow with a staggering 317 still languishing at CM4"<sup>107</sup>. The development of CM of the ANP including a forecast is shown in Figure 3.

Overall, the ANP is "a largely untrained force with high rates of corruption and absenteeism"<sup>108</sup>.

## 2.6 The Key Challenges for the Police Building

From the author's point of view there emerge a number of key challenges from chapters **Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.** and 0 for the police building in Afghanistan. These key challenges are presented in the following, while in chapter 0 there will be assessed, whether the FDD addresses these challenges in a way promising success.

EUPOL trains at the Kabul Police Academy police leaders in civilian police activities intensively, while the bulk of the Afghan police force undergoes an IET in the RTCs and the CTC focusing

<sup>100</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 104–106)

<sup>101</sup> Auswärtiges Amt *et al.* (2008a: 26)

<sup>102</sup> Livingston *et al.* (2009: 13)

<sup>103</sup> Auswärtiges Amt *et al.* (2008b: 26)

<sup>104</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 101); Feichtinger and Jurekovi'c (2006: 220)

<sup>105</sup> Brast (2009: 36).

<sup>106</sup> Livingston *et al.* (2009: 13)

<sup>107</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 13)

<sup>108</sup> Cook (2009)

on paramilitary elements – or is to go through, because, as shown before, the capacity of the RTCs and CTC is insufficient. The need to exercise original police tasks, while remaining valiant towards the threatful environment, is not met this way, as the leaders lack the ability to lead their subordinates in combat, while the ordinary police men lack any training in police tasks<sup>109</sup>. The harmonization of the capabilities of leaders and subordinates is a significant challenge.

Corruption, abuse of power, venality of office and false loyalties of the police forces cripple the police and harm the reputation of the ANP and the government in the population. These four phenomena are closely intertwined, they point to the internal state and the professional understanding of police forces<sup>110</sup>. As another key challenge they are to be removed, but at least fought.

Closely connected with the last mentioned issue is the confidence of the people in the ANP. This trust is important to act preventively, as well as the people's confidence in the government also depends, as already explained, in large part on that of the ANP<sup>111</sup>. Winning the trust of the Afghans in the police forces is also key challenges.

The qualitative state of the ANP is simply insufficient, it disappoints the Afghans and the international community. The ANP is not in a position to fulfill its mission, which is reflected not only in the security situation but also in the lack of people's confidence in the ANP and the government<sup>112</sup>. Thus, the qualitative improvement of the ANP is one of the key challenges, too.

Finally there is the lack of staff and funding provided by the donors to be stated<sup>113</sup>, but this is an external condition for the development itself, it is rather a framework, as it is not changeable by the reform itself. The consequent key challenges are, however, to focus the limited resources and to define the time frame in accordance with these issues, the latter in particular, in order to do not arouse unrealistic expectations.

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<sup>109</sup> Gross (2009: 28); Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 96)

<sup>110</sup> Cordesman (2009: 41)

<sup>111</sup> Cordesman (2009: 5)

<sup>112</sup> Cordesman (2009: 45)


<sup>113</sup> Cordesman (2009: 6)



### 3 Focused District Development

#### 3.1 Survey

The FDD is a training program for the ANP established at the end of 2007<sup>114</sup> and it was founded in January 2008. In it the whole AUP of a district is relieved and undergoes two months of



**Figure 4 - FDD-Cycle (source: Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Special Plans & Operations - Department of Defense Office of Inspector General 2009: 126)**

training together, during their training units of the ANCOP overtake their tasks in the district<sup>115</sup>. FDD consists of six phases (see Figure 4), in the first one there are the police forces in the district assessed<sup>116</sup>. During this two-month evaluation phase there can also be recruited to complete the staff at full strength under monitored conditions. Additionally the logistical and organizational arrangements are made for relieving the AUP by ANCOP units. The latter assume the police duties in the district, while the former are trained at the RTC or the CTC. Parallel to the training, the equipment of the AUP is updated and the police infrastructure, mainly police stations, is renovated. After the two-month training the district's police forces retake the responsibility from the ANCOP and are closely monitored and trained by the Police Mentoring Team (PMT) for two months. After that follows an at least six-month period of monitoring to by the responsible Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), in which the local police force is repeatedly re-evaluated and where necessary receives complement training. In addition, personnel are obtained through supervised recruitment<sup>117</sup>.

<sup>114</sup> Cordesman (2009: 78)

<sup>115</sup> Coulson (2009: 1)

<sup>116</sup> Cordesman (2009: 44)

<sup>117</sup> Meyer (2009: 3-7)

## 3.2 Harmonization of Capabilities

As explained in chapter 0, the harmonization of capabilities of the groups of personnel having undergone different training courses is one of the key challenges. FDD starts with an extensive evaluation phase, in which the respective training needs of ANP units are assessed, so that during the training phase the identified shortcomings can be actively addressed<sup>118</sup>. As all of the police officers of a district are trained as a whole, common standards are developed and professional relationships established<sup>119</sup>, the training consists of joint and separate training periods for officers, sergeants and simple policemen<sup>120</sup>. The ratio of paramilitary and police contents is five to two weeks<sup>121</sup>, in the phase of close monitoring by the PMTs the cooperation of the officers, noncommissioned officers and patrolmen is intensified under the condition of on-the-job-training<sup>122</sup>. In this way the FDD has a focus on police tasks as well as paramilitary survival skills in a dangerous environment and the ability to take on tasks as part of COIN<sup>123</sup>. It offers some kind of convergence of the approaches of Europe and the U.S<sup>124</sup>.

## 3.3 Fighting Corruption

The fight against corruption, buying offices and patronage as well as against false loyalties within the ANP requires intensive training and mentoring, rigid and independent evaluation procedures, and strengthening the leadership skills<sup>125</sup>. The FDD provides an independent assessment of both the individual police officers and the ANP units including the ability to remove personnel from the police force. This possibility has been made use of in the case of about five percent of police officers who went through the FDD. Due to the intense and above all else joint training of the police, which is usually spread all over the district, an esprit de corps is able to be build, which can enable the police to resist temptations and influence from the outside. The intensive mentoring in the months after training prevents a relapse into old behaviors<sup>126</sup>. "Sustained mentoring of recently trained police in Kosovo and East Timor has been utilised to great

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<sup>118</sup> Meyer (2009: 3)

<sup>119</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 108)

<sup>120</sup> Gutschker (2008: 101–102)

<sup>121</sup> Mechlenborg (2009: 3)

<sup>122</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 109)

<sup>123</sup> de Vasconcelos (2009: 333)

<sup>124</sup> Fair and Jones (2009: 13)

<sup>125</sup> Cordesman (2009: vii)

<sup>126</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 105–109)

effect"<sup>127</sup>. However, it must not be forgotten that the judicial sector as an important complementary element to the police here plays a big role, as a corrupt judiciary can nullify even the best police work<sup>128</sup>.

"The ANP's problems with corruption also cannot be corrected unless the criminal justice system is seen as less corrupt and subject to political influence. Fixing these problems reflects one of the most urgent demands of the Afghan people. An integrated approach to ANP development and improved popular justice is mission critical and may need substantially more resources on the justice side of the equation."<sup>129</sup>

Police reform, therefore, cannot alone cope with this key challenge<sup>130</sup>. The justice reform has to progress as well to handle this problem, but from all the parts of the SSR its progress is the slowest and the allocated resources are by no mean up to the challenge<sup>131</sup>.

### 3.4 Building trust

The bad image of the ANP in the population<sup>132</sup> is paralyzing the police in carrying out their tasks<sup>133</sup>, despite the negative perception there is a strong desire of the population towards the ANP showing presence in the communities. "The less frequently Afghans see the police, the less they like them"<sup>134</sup>. To improve the image of the ANP, the FDD goes along with social measures, hoping that helps reinforcing the confidence of the Afghans in their own police forces<sup>135</sup>. As indicated in chapter 0, corruption is of a strong negative impact on the perception and the trust of the population in the ANP, the fight against corruption mentioned in chapter 0 thus has a direct impact on the key challenge addressed here.

The FDD shows the Afghan people, that something is happening in the ANP, especially the repair and construction of police stations and the provision of uniforms and equipment in the FDD set signs for change<sup>136</sup>. This is perceived in a positive way and the trained police receive a bonus in form of anticipatory trust<sup>137</sup>. In order not to squander this trust, it is necessary to

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<sup>127</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 55)

<sup>128</sup> Brast (2009: 14)

<sup>129</sup> Cordesman (2009: 42)

<sup>130</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 29)

<sup>131</sup> Feichtinger and Jurekovi'c (2006: 207)

<sup>132</sup> Foxley (2009: 1)

<sup>133</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 2)

<sup>134</sup> Mechlenborg (2009: 1)

<sup>135</sup> Meyer (2009: 6)


<sup>136</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 48)

<sup>137</sup> Meyer (2009: 9)

develop a service-oriented professional code of conduct in the ANP<sup>138</sup>. The police are to be orientated on the security needs of the population<sup>139</sup>.

### 3.5 Improving the quality of the ANP

A civilian police along the lines of Western European police forces is unable to meet the requirements in an insecure environment such as that in Afghanistan<sup>140</sup>, nor will a purely paramilitary trained auxiliary army meet the needs of the Afghan population for a police force



**Figure 5 – Civilian casualties in districts of the FDD-cycles one to three (source: U.S. Department of Defense 2009: 46)**

conducting common police tasks<sup>141</sup>. The qualitative improvement of the ANP has therefore to include the high vulnerability of the police to attacks of anti-government forces<sup>142</sup> and their lack of ability to protect the population<sup>143</sup> as well as their inability of conducting regular police services<sup>144</sup>.

This provides the FDD, by giving room to both military and civilian police capabilities in the training program<sup>145</sup> in the ration five to one<sup>146</sup>. The ability of ANP to protect the local population seems to have improved significantly, "[c]asualty data for local Afghans has recorded a decrease of 60 to 85 percent in reformed districts"<sup>147</sup>. For selected districts of the FDD cycle one to three this is shown in Figure 5.

If police forces have to be completely rebuilt, a basic training of personnel is an important element, such as take notes, record interviews, protocol witness statements etc. Examples are the

<sup>138</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: i)

<sup>139</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 53)

<sup>140</sup> Cordesman (2009: 65)

<sup>141</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: i)

<sup>142</sup> International Crisis Group (2007: 14)

<sup>143</sup> Cordesman (2009: 16)

<sup>144</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 11)

<sup>145</sup> de Vasconcelos (2009: 333)

<sup>146</sup> Mechlenborg (2009: 3)

<sup>147</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 108)

police reforms in the Kosovo and Sierra Leone<sup>148</sup>. Literacy is essential for these tasks<sup>149</sup>, the police reform in Sierra Leone revealed that illiterate police are ineffective<sup>150</sup>, in states with a fractured education system, such as Afghanistan, however, the recruitment of illiterates is inevitable<sup>151</sup>, therefore, the FDD, in addition to basic skills courses for police<sup>152</sup>, includes literacy classes also<sup>153</sup>. The FDD addressed thus the most urgent training needs of the ANP, and led no doubt also to short-term improvements, whether it has also long-term effects remains to be seen<sup>154</sup>.

### 3.6 Provisioning of Ressources

The development the ANP will still take years<sup>155</sup>, to meet the standard of an "effective, well organized, multi-ethnic and professional police force that provides the people of Afghanistan a stable rule of law"<sup>156</sup>. A much more faster conclusion is particularly opposed by a lack of international trainers for the RTCs, and particularly for the PMTs<sup>157</sup>, a withdrawal from Afghanistan without successful completion of the reconstruction effort is thought to be inconceivable<sup>158</sup>. This keeps the alternatives of a long-term, but smaller or a shorter, but more intensive involvement. The international donor community has in the past disadvantaged the police force at a mean of resource allocation and inhibited the development process by this<sup>159</sup>. Especially plans of the states of the EU to increase ressources for the police building remain largely ineffective as the efforts of these states suffer from a lack of meeting the nominal strength for the deployed personnel scheduled<sup>160</sup>. The lack of forces also hampered the further intensification of the FDD, an improvement of the situation is not foreseeable<sup>161</sup>.

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<sup>148</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 52–53)

<sup>149</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 49–50)

<sup>150</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 48)

<sup>151</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 49)

<sup>152</sup> Mechlenborg (2009: 3)

<sup>153</sup> Cordesman (2009: 37)

<sup>154</sup> Cordesman (2009: 44)

<sup>155</sup> Noetzel and Schreer (2008: 4)

<sup>156</sup> NTM-A/CSTC-A Public Affairs (2009: 1)

<sup>157</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 108)

<sup>158</sup> von Bredow (2009: 56–57)

<sup>159</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 100–101)

<sup>160</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 87)

<sup>161</sup> Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009: 86)

## 4 Conclusion

The police building in Afghanistan has been a long co-existence of multiple actors with sometimes incompatible approaches. Lack of allocation of resources led to a weak and ill-trained ANP, neither a serious opponent for the anti-government forces nor a civilian police with the ability to enforce law and order.

Public confidence in the ANP is shattered due to their involvement in crime and corruption and their poor quality, considering the important role of the police for the perception of the government and its legitimacy, this is of great concern and in view of the objective to empower Afghanistan to care themselves for a secure and stable environment counter-productive.

Afghanistan needs a police force that ensures the security of the citizens, prevails the state's monopoly of force, fights the everyday crime and is a trustworthy institution. This objective was just barely met by the efforts to the police building so far. The new approach of FDD introduced in late 2007 addresses the most pressing problems of the ANP. It merges the different approaches of the main players in the police building by harmonizing as a complementary element the different training levels and orientations and provides as a team training for the entire police force of a district common standard procedures and practices.

The FDD also has a promising chance to increase the quality of the ANP forces in terms of their survival skills in dealing with anti-government forces as well as of their ability to protect the population. By literacy classes and training on basic skills in police work, it also addresses the poor quality of conducting ordinary police duties, whether those efforts are successful and sustainable remains to be seen, experience from recent police reforms mark the approach as being effective. The linking of evaluation, training and mentoring offers the opportunity to turn off specific deficits and to prevent a return to earlier undesired practices.

The approach of training the entire police force of a district together creates additional team-building effects, and is the first step towards the creation of a common esprit de corps and a citizen-centered professional ethos. This can, combined with the subsequent, long-term mentoring, supervised recruitment for staff completing and reviewing of the previous incumbent, be a promising approach to fight corruption, patronage and false loyalties, but must be accompanied by appropriate measures in the justice sector in order to not evaporate ineffectively.

The FDD is suited to address the pressing problems of the ANP, but thereby it must not float in empty space but needs also further efforts both in SSR and judicial reform. If the previously observed positive effects prove to be sustainable, the FDD eliminates the problems of the ANP regarding their lack of survivability and the inadequate protection of the population. It will then

help the ANP to gain the trust of the Afghans and to strengthen their trust in institutions. A prognosis of success depends on the allocation of sufficient staff and resources by the international community and the success of the reforms in the adjacent functional areas.

Overall, the FDD is a promising program, taking into account the experience from other police building missions it has a good chance to produce the outcomes expected from it. Whether it actually is able to provide a positive effect on ANP and consequently on security in Afghanistan, is left to future research.

## Abbreviations

ABP	Afghan Border Police
ACP	Afghan Customs Police
AdA	Ausbildung der Ausbilder
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANFD	Afghanistan National Fire Department
ANP	Afghan National Police
AUP	Afghan Uniformed Police
CID	Criminal Investigation Division
CM	Capacity Milestone
CNPA	Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan
CTC	Central Training Center
CTP	Counter Terrorism Police
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
FDD	Focused District Development
IET	Initial Entry Training
IPCB	International Police Coordination Board
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
PMT	Police Mentoring Team
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RTC	Regional Training Center
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan



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