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Still a “Civilian Power”?

The changing approach in German Security Policy after 1990

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Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik e.V.
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1. Introduction

"Germany is defended at the Hindu Kush" (Peter Struck)¹

1.1 Working definition and objectives

This quotation from former German Minister of Defence, Peter Struck, implies a fundamental shift in the German security orientation after 1990. Since the unification, Bundeswehr activity has been constantly expanding around the globe. 1992 in Somalia, 1995 in Bosnia, 1999 the Kosovo-war or 2001 Afghanistan²; whether fighting, observing or reconstructing: it seems the ambit of German military engagement is now unlimited. In 2008, nearly 7,000 German soldiers are participating in several out-of-area military operations.³



Current out-of-area missions with German participation

(http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd443DgoESYGZASH6kTCxoJRUFV-P_NxUfW_9AP2C3IhyR0dFRQD-G0VU/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82X0NfNDJE, 29.02.2008)

¹ Peter Struck in a speech on 11.03.2004, see also interview.

² See interviews with Prof. Sandschneider and Parliamentary State Secretary of Defence Kossendey.

³ For detailed and exact numbers of soldiers deployed, see

http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd443DgoESYGZASH6kTCxoJRUFV-P_NxUfW_9AP2C3IhyR0dFRQD-G0VU/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82X0NfNDJE (29.02.2008)

Nevertheless, according to scientific literature, Germany's "role concept"⁴ in foreign affairs is that of a "civilian power"⁵ that holds multilateralism, supranational integration and pacifism as core concepts. Until 1990, the foreign policy of the *Bundesrepublik* was purely civilian, based on cooperation and rejection of the use of force. However with the end of the Cold War and unification of Germany, the global security environment and especially Germany's role in the international system has changed fundamentally:

"With unification, however, and with the emergence of new security threats in the aftermath of the Cold War, Germany has progressively accepted the necessity of German participation in military operations around the globe."⁶

Although there has been constant increase of German military engagement, the prevailing opinion concerning Germany's foreign policy, as expressed by Hans W. Maull, claims that there has been no change of paradigm. Germany will "continue to be guided by its old principles"⁷, thus remaining a "civilian power"⁸. Is this opinion still valid? Can a "civilian" actor have an active security policy and deploy 7,000 soldiers around the globe, some of whom are in combat under debatable legal authority?

This thesis analyses Germany's evolution from a pacifist "chequebook diplomacy"⁹ à la Helmut Kohl to the self-confident and engaged "Berlin Republic"¹⁰ in 2007. It investigates if "civilian power" in its original connotation is still valid regarding the German security policy in 2007. Therefore, the scientific theory will be compared with actual current developments. The academic aim is to reach a precise classification of Germany's foreign policy identity.

⁴ For an in-depth description and analysis of this term, see: Walker 1987, Kirste/Maull 1996.

⁵ See chapter 2.3.

⁶ Breuer 2006, p. 207.

⁷ Maull 1999, p. 34.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Schöllgen 2000, p.7.

¹⁰ This term is used to describe the changed nature of Germany after unification and the transfer of its capital from Bonn to Berlin. For a detailed overview and description see for example Dettke (ed.) 2003.

1.2 Course of investigation

This thesis draws on personal interviews with decision makers and leading scientists as well as published scholarly works. First, the theoretical framework will be clarified. Essential definitions, theories as well as the historical background of the Federal Republic of Germany need to be identified. The third chapter explores the underlying causes for Germany's stronger engagement in security and military issues. The first steps towards a different self-perception and a change in concept will be analyzed in the fourth chapter.

Subsequently, the fifth chapter identifies the successive stages of development in Germany's foreign strategy and its military transformation. Concluding, the sixth chapter will assess if Germany has adapted a different role-concept since 1990.

2. Conceptual demarcation

2.1 Definitions and parameters

2.1.1 Foreign, Security and Defence Policy

Foreign Policy according to realist Helga Haftendorn is the policy of States towards other States. It is shaped by internal necessities as well as the necessities imposed on it by the international system. A Nation State tries to pursue its goals and interests, its values and priorities in competition or in coordination with other nation states.¹¹

Security Policy, classically understood, encloses the measures which a state seizes to protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty against menaces from outside. A modern concept refers to human security.¹² The broad definition of human security considers many policy fields connected to the protection of the lives and well-being of the people against various direct and indirect risks, including for example environmental security. This paper follows the narrow definition of human security according to Johannes Varwick. He defines security policy as the aspect of foreign policy that aims specifically to provide security politically and militarily. Many different instruments are available to provide security, of which military means are only a small part while economic and political measures are much more important.¹³

¹¹ See Haftendorn 2001, p. 13.


¹² See UN Human Development Report 1994 (<http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/>, 29.02.2008).

¹³ See Varwick 2004, p.204.

Defence policy refers to the military dimension of the foreign security policy. It encloses deterrence to prevent conflict as well as the utilisation of military force against attacks. This paper looks specifically at Germany's security policy between 1990 and 2007.

2.1.2 Basic parameters, factors and general objectives in foreign and security policy

In general, the persual of national interests against other countries in the international system is the general purpose of foreign policy. Foreign policy compasses international contracts and alliances, cooperation in international organisations and foreign trade and tourism policy. The German *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law) does not specifically define the purpose of foreign policy. In several points, some normative postulates are given: the protection of peace, the ban on war of aggression, the promotion of human rights and international cooperation are major purposes in German perception.¹⁴ The following purposes and basic conditions are essential in German foreign affairs:



The particular implementation of the different purposes is highly influenced by very different policy factors. The Legislator and Chancellor particularly affect domestic policy.¹⁵ Regard-

¹⁴ See Bierling 1999, p. 9 ff.

¹⁵ For a good overview of the special position of the chancellor, see Nicolauß 2004, p.17 ff.

ing foreign factors, points like the degree of sovereignty, integration in multinational organisations, the security environment and military strength, as well as historical connections, influence the particular implementation of different foreign affairs strategies. There are also economic factors like national resource- or export-dependence which can influence the national foreign policy course as well as social matters like educational level.

2.2 The foreign and security policy of the Federal Republic of Germany until 1990

The foreign and security policy of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1949 until 1990 was highly influenced and characterized by the post-war situation, the circumstances of state-foundation and the dominant political characters in this period.

After the Second World War, the initial political position of the Federal Republic of Germany was extremely problematic. Affected by the most comprehensive defeat in history, Germany was widely devastated. The political elite was no longer accepted, the national territory completely occupied and the whole nationalistic leadership had unconditionally capitulated. According to this, "the post-war founding of the *Bundesrepublik* and the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law) were deeply marked by the atrocities committed under the 'Third Reich'"¹⁶ and also dependent of the guidelines given by the allied powers. Shortly after the end of World War II, it was clear that "the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany will be dependent like no other comparable country on geo-political basic conditions".¹⁷

The first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, who was appointed in 1949,¹⁸ is considered one of the most distinctive actors in German foreign policy.^{19 20} He was willing to accept the division of the German territory, the necessity of international political subordination and unreserved capitulation. For achieving sovereignty profits from the allied powers and for establishing the *Bundesrepublik* as a dependable partner, Adenauer tried to attain the trust of the occupying powers through one-sided payments and the full acceptance of partly discriminating regulations.²¹

In foreign affairs Adenauer pursued three higher purposes: Freedom (sovereignty), peace (security) and unity (nation). Until reunification, these maxims kept their central meaning, especially

¹⁶ Breuer 2006, p. 207.

¹⁷ Schöllgen 1999, p. 7, My translation.

¹⁸ Regarding Adenauer's appointment, see Schöllgen 1999, p. 18 ff.

¹⁹ He was also Head of the Ministry of foreign affairs.

²⁰ For an overview of Adenauer's distinctive role in German history, see Bierling 1999, Haftendorn 2001, Hanrieder 1989.

²¹ See Bierling 1999, p. 108.

the last one. His concept of *Westbindung*, a strong pro-western and pro-democratic course leading to a deep integration into the western economical and political system, has characterized German foreign policy for decades. Also after Adenauer, the foreign policy course was continued by the following administrations, not at least because of the geopolitical situation and Germany's geographical position.

Due to its constant, moderate and trustable political behaviour, Germany gained more political scope of action²² that allowed a carefully handled foreign policy emancipation, especially regarding the Eastern block states.²³ Hitherto, political initiative was not possible or desired. The newly reached self-confidence in foreign affairs did not lead to well-known nationalistic tensions or positions. In contrary, the German political and economical integration into western, especially European, structures improved and a deeply rooted pacifistic orientation became visible in German society.²⁴ The politically initiated process of German reunification and the attendant negotiations enforced this course.²⁵

2.3 The "Civilian Power" Concept

2.3.1 In General

The term "civilian power" is based on studies and inquiries of Norbert Elias²⁶ who analyzed the process of increasing pacification of European societies from the Middle Ages to modernity.²⁷ It contains six interdependent dimensions of the pacification-process:

- The De-Privatization of violence
- Public monopoly on the legitimate use of force and the development towards rule of law
- The creation of interdependent relations and checks and balances
- Forms of democratic participation
- Social equity
- Constructive political approach in dissension²⁸

²² See Bierling 1999, p. 152 ff.

²³ The second phase of development in the foreign affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany (*Ostverträge*). For an overview see Harnisch 2000, p. 1.

²⁴ For example the peace movement against rearmament.

²⁵ Exemplary the "Two plus Four" Treaty.

²⁶ Norbert Elias (June 22, 1897 — August 1, 1990) was a German sociologist of Jewish descent, who later became a British citizen.

²⁷ See Elias 1976.

²⁸ See Senghaas 1997, p. 20 ff.

In contemporary foreign affairs, the "role-concept" of a "civilian power" means a basic orientation aiming to civilize politics in general and international relations especially.²⁹ This aim implies specific attitudes, strategies and instruments for enforcement which are the main characteristics of this foreign policy identity³⁰:

"Civilian power is understood in terms of restraint from the use of force in international systems, control over the unilateral use of force through international organisations and multilateralism, and the use of diplomatic and economic means to overcome international conflicts."³¹ That means not only "a reluctance to use military means, but also strengthening international law,...preserving...human rights, acting multilaterally and...having the power and willingness to act globally to help implement these principles."³²

2.3.2 Germany

Before 1989, the term of a so-called "civilian power" concept played no important role in foreign affairs, neither in theory nor in policy. Originally, this concept was used as a description for the role of widening and deepening European Community in international relations.³³ In 1989, for the first time, Hans Maull³⁴ applied this term to the German foreign policy identity.³⁵ However, that does not mean that the described characteristics of a "civilian power" were not valid before for the German "role concept". On the contrary:

"All Germany's governments [sic] and a huge majority of the population opted for a pro-Western and pro-democratic course based on striving for international cooperation, integration and the transfer of sovereignty to supranational organisations."³⁶ "During the post-war period, (West) German foreign policy settled into the mould of a *civilian power*...".³⁷ But due to the Cold War, the global bi-polarity and the permanent military threat, an in-depth analysis of civil aspects in foreign affairs was not entirely interesting to scholars nor was it possible. Since foundation in 1949 and under the strong advice of Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic of Germany was acting as a pure "civilian power" partly perforce, partly self-chosen, but mostly out of historical

²⁹ See Maull 2006, p. 2.

³⁰ For an excellent analysis of these characteristics, see Maull 1990/1991.

³¹ Breuer 2006, p. 207.

³² Philippi 2001, p. 64.

³³ See Duchene 1973.

³⁴ Major parts of these ideas are affected by his studies.

³⁵ See Maull 1990, p. 182 ff.

³⁶ Breuer 2006, p. 207.

³⁷ Maull 1999, p. 1.

responsibility: "Germany became a civilian power by force of circumstance, but also by choice of its new elites."³⁸

An insightful analysis by Hans Maull summarizes the four key norms in postwar German foreign affairs:

1. "Never again" (pacifism, moralism, democracy)
2. "Never alone" (integration, multilateralism, democratisation)
3. "politics, not force" (preference for political solutions)
4. "norms define interests"³⁹

In the context of Cold War circumstances and with the role as a subordinated and defence-needing partner this course was absolutely maintainable. But with the end of East-West confrontation and reunification, Germany's role and responsibilities in international politics, as well as the whole international environment, changed radically.

3. Reunified Germany

"We are finding our national identity through our successful experience with European integration." (Helmut Kohl)⁴⁰

3.1 New role

3.1.1 Regained Sovereignty

No state in Europe has profited as much as Germany from the changes in the international system in the early 90s. After 45 years of division, subordination and occupation, Germany finally unified on the 3rd October 1990, "a political event of historical rank".⁴¹ In the negotiations between both German states plus the victorious powers of World War II – USA, SU, GB, France – which were finalized and signed on 12th September 1990, Germany received "full and unlimited sovereignty", free alliance choice and the promise that the Soviet troops would withdraw from the GDR. In response, Germany officially accepted the Oder-Neiße-Line as the Polish-German border and promised the reduction of combined armed forces of both German states⁴² to

³⁸ Maull 1999, p.4.

³⁹ Maull 1999, p.4 ff.

⁴⁰ Helmut Kohl in: *The Economist*, 27.07.1991, see Harnisch 2000.

⁴¹ Görtemaker 2002, p. 379, My translation.

⁴² The Bundeswehr of West-Germany and the Nationale Volksarmee of Eastern Germany.

370,000 in four years. The feeling that Germany, after centuries, had reached a stable and appropriate position in Europe dominated in intellectual and official circles; Germany had unified with a democratic system, and was neither a threat nor threatened.⁴³

3.1.2 Heightened latitude and growing world responsibilities

For the first time in history Germany was an equal, stable, and, particularly, democratic partner of its allies. Until the end of the Cold War, Germany had been surrounded by neighbours with whom it was connected by treaties of friendship. Suddenly, it regained a position as a giant in the international system; with a population of 82 Million inhabitants, and became the third biggest economy in the world. German unification, precisely for this reason, was not supported by all of its neighbours;⁴⁴ its eastern neighbours were especially concerned because of the lack of a comparable counter power in this region and fear regarding possible German revisionism.⁴⁵ German officials made a point of pre-emptively promising that there would not be a German "Sonderweg" or a "restless empire" any more.⁴⁶

With this new latitude as a political and economical giant, Germany's responsibilities grew exponentially. Not only for geographical reasons, Germany played a key-role in integrating the former-soviet and highly troubled eastern European countries into the European Trade area.⁴⁷ Germany's importance in international organizations increased and it transformed into the most influential supporter for European integration and finalization.

3.2 New Challenges

3.2.1 Operation Desert Storm

Together with the profits gained from attaining sovereignty, and with the increasing importance of unified Germany in the international system, new security and military challenges arose. At the

⁴³ See Federal President von Weizäcker, speech 30th April 1992, in: Bulletin 49 (09.05.1992), p. 470.

⁴⁴ For example the French President Mitterand, he was temporary opposing. Probably for fear of the French position in Europe.

⁴⁵ See Woyke 1997, p.12.

⁴⁶ See for example: Helmut Kohl in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 02.10.1990.

⁴⁷ Especially in the first years distrustfully watched by France.

same time as the end of the Cold War and German unification, the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein attacked and annexed Iraq's neighbouring oil emirate Kuwait.⁴⁸ Suddenly, the world was confronted with a military threat in one of the world's most important resource-areas. On the one hand, Germany was not directly affected, but on the other hand its allies demanded strong support against this aggression. This situation manifested the radical change in Germany's geopolitical position.⁴⁹ In January 1991, an allied coalition from 33 Nations under the USA's lead started "Operation Desert Storm", a military operation targeting at liberating Kuwait.

But Germany did not want to and could not support this operation with armed forces: the German *Bundeswehr* was equipped solely for defensive operations and drilled⁵⁰ with no logistical ability for long-distance interventions. On the other hand, the deep rooted German self-perception in post-war foreign affairs did not allow an immediate, active and offensive security policy. Meanwhile, the Kohl-administration's allies pressured it to fulfill their expectations regarding an active security policy.⁵¹ This situation led to two fields of tension: first between the Kohl-administration and its partners. Germany's allies demanded strong physical support through armed forces, and when the German government hesitated it was strongly criticized. The second tension lay between the German government and its own people. While the government was willed to fulfill its new responsibilities⁵², German society, due to more than 40 years of strong pacifism, did not accept any active security policy.⁵³

With payments of approximately 17 Billion DM and a secretly delegated minesweeper battalion to the Persian Gulf⁵⁴ - which showed the deep uncertainty concerning military engagement⁵⁵ - the administration tried to solve the problem of new strategic and military responsibilities in the context of its pacifistic self-perception and insufficiently equipped armed forces. "Operation Desert Storm" obviated an essential conceptual crisis regarding *Bundeswehr* and German strategic self-perception: "The Gulf War made clear that the new security environment could lead to clashes between the Germany culture of restraint in the use of military force and the value of multilateralism and solidarity with its allies."⁵⁶

⁴⁸ 2nd August 1990.

⁴⁹ See Schöllgen 2000, p. 7.

⁵⁰ Due to the conflict-scenarios in Cold War.

⁵¹ Kohl-administration: 01.10.1982 – 26.10.1998.

⁵² For a detailed analysis of the evolution of Germany's security policy, see: Longhurst 2004.

⁵³ See Kirste 1998, p. 135 and p. 202 ff.

⁵⁴ This delegation took place very secretly, without any consensus in the German society.

⁵⁵ See Schöllgen 2000, p. 7.

⁵⁶ Breuer 2006, p. 208.

3.2.2 The Balkans Conflict

Shortly after this dramatic experience in inadequacy in foreign affairs, Germany was confronted with another decisive situation. The multiethnic and socialist state of Yugoslavia was directly affected and destabilized by the implosion of the Soviet Union. Together with the fall of the iron curtain, ethnically motivated secession-movements gained power and searched for independence. A violent desintegration was very probable. Still in shock due to the Gulf War experience, Germany tried to show leadership with this crisis which threatened the whole European security system.

In a political offensive and previously impossible manoeuvre, Germany unilaterally recognised the newly founded States Slovenia and Croatia without the support of its European or transatlantic allies.⁵⁷ One of the reasons that Germany wished to ease this political situation was that at the time, approximately 750,000 expatriate Yugoslavians lived in Germany. But this diplomatic act unintentionally led to the years-long conflagration of civil war in the whole region.⁵⁸ This civil war, centrally located in Europe just south of Austria, was a traumatic experience for Germany and all of Europe. It became obvious that neither Germany nor its European allies had the strategic and military capacities for an intervention. The whole European community had to watch the ethnic clashes during the years of war in the Balkans. Only with the United States' strong military support and leadership was it possible to end the genocide on Muslim Bosnians in 1995. After this embarrassing and dangerous situation, strategic and armed forces transformation became a priority in German policy.

3.3 New threats

The post-Cold War hope of decreasing global military conflicts was short-lived. In the aftermath of East-West confrontation and with the end of a bipolar international system, new security threats arose. Without the East-West confrontation and the decades long political support this confrontation generated from the USA or Soviet Union, an increasing number of countries lost their stability and sunk down in civil wars or devolved to un-ruleable areas.⁵⁹ These so-called

⁵⁷ 23rd December 1991.

⁵⁸ From Slovenia and Croatia (1991) over Bosnia (1992-1995) to Kosovo (1999).

⁵⁹ For example Somalia.

"failing states" developed into permanent threats for international security due to their violent, uncontrolled and dangerous character.⁶⁰

Together with this so-called "failing states" phenomenon and with the international development from inter-state (hot) conventional war to an inner-state or inner-regional "low intensity conflict"⁶¹, a trend towards a re-privatization of military power and war was recognizable. In regions without national order or central power, private actors, most of them with commercial interests, filled this lack, for example, "warlords" in Somalia.⁶² Concurrently, as the result of increasing globalization, private mercenaries re-entered the global battle fields in sizable numbers, creating a new form of economic outsourcing.⁶³ These monetarily motivated actors in worldwide conflicts are not bound to laws, especially in regions without any central power, and are a constant risk to human rights and peace-keeping ambitions.

Due to state failure, the constant state of sub-state wars, environmental, demographic and economic reasons, world wide migration is rapidly increasing, especially in the south-north direction. Uncontrolled massive migration started to destabilize whole economies and societies. At the same time, civil war-rooted mass migration became one of the greatest humanitarian challenges, especially in Africa. In areas without any central power and support, refugees would die in thousands if no external power intervened.

With the implosion of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction, so-called ABC-proliferation, became a strong issue in security policy. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, thousands of chemical, biological and atomic weapons lay more or less uncontrolled in an area more than twice as big as Europe; the world was afraid that these weapons would land in the wrong hands.

Another, even more complex and asymmetrical threat arose with international – mostly religious and especially Islamic – terrorism. With the end of the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, most of the foreign Arab fighters, called Mujaheddin, returned to their home countries. Some of them began, for various reasons, to fight against their own governments and/or

⁶⁰ See also Trotha 2000, Schweers 2006, Kaldor 2000, p. 26-30.

⁶¹ For an excellent overview about these developments, see: Crevelde 1998.

⁶² For a detailed definition of the term „warlord“, see Riekenberg 1999.

⁶³ Private Mercenary-Enterprises, so-called Private Military Companies, are the second biggest foreign troop supplier in the ongoing Iraqconflict

the whole industrialized world, personified as "the West". These fighters became the foundation of one of the major threats of our time: international Islamic terrorism.⁶⁴

3.4 Conclusion

With unification, Germany's role, position and situation changed fundamentally. Together with the end of Cold war and the following conflicts, namely the Gulf war and the Balkan conflict, a strong need for new strategy and armed forces transformation became necessary. The role-concept of post-war West-Germany was expired. New military and strategic responsibilities made a change and development in foreign affairs identity and behaviour inescapable.

⁶⁴ Regarding the special meaning of these new threats, see: Interviews with Peter Struck and Karl von Wogau.

4. Conceptual Change – On the way to "Berlin Republic"

"United Germany is number one in Europe. [...] Naturally the others [the other European states, P.S.] accept that we need the biggest flat." (Helmut Kohl)⁶⁵

4.1 New military tasks

4.1.1 Somalia 1992

As a result of these decisive experiences, Germany's strategic guidelines and principles started to change and develop. Due to a strong need and pressure from abroad, its negative policy concerning out-of-area military operations slowly changed. The deployment of a minesweeping unit to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm was the first hesitant attempt. But it eventually became obvious that the traditional German restraint against the use of armed forces could no longer be maintained in the context of the changing strategic environment.

Bit by bit, this insight became implemented in German security policy. In 1992, Germany supported the UN-Mission UNOSOM in Somalia logistically and, later on, the operation Restore Hope, an armed peace building mission to end the civil war in Somalia.

Somalia, a country located at the northeastern tip of Africa, was devastated by civil war in the early 90s, a war so horrible that the international community was alarmed:

*From November 1991, there was heavy fighting in the Somali capital of Mogadishu between armed elements allied to General Mohamed Farah Aaidid, or to Mr. Ali Mohamed Mahdi, the appointed interim President, and yet other factions. In addition to Mogadishu, there was conflict in Kismayo, and in the north-west, local leaders were pushing to create an independent Somaliland. The country as a whole was without any form of central government. Banditry was rife. The fighting that followed, with clans and sub-clans in loose alliances without central control, took place at a time of serious drought. That combination proved disastrous for the population at large.*⁶⁶

These fights affected more than half of the country's population, 2 million people became fugees and approximately 300,000 people died⁶⁷ and "turned the African state into a nightmarish parody of the popular *Mad Max* films."⁶⁸ Against this background, the United Nations decided, based on the adopted resolution 751 (1992), to establish a United Nations Operation in

⁶⁵ Helmut Kohl in: *The Economist*, 09.11.1996, see Harnisch 2000.

⁶⁶ United Nations Department of Public Information 1997, <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm> [29.02.2008].

⁶⁷ *ibid.*

⁶⁸ See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A6110948> [29.02.2008].

Somalia, UNOSOM, for humanitarian support. Germany supported this mission with Transport planes. (Photo)



German military airplane at the Mogadishu-Airport, 9. September 1992

With growing difficulties like “hijacking of vehicles, looting of convoys and warehouses, and detention of expatriate staff”⁶⁹, the Security Council of the UNO under the lead of the USA decided to establish a stronger, military-flanked mission called Operation Restore Hope, in which Germany participated. For the first time in its post war history, Germany delegated armed forces in an out-of-area mission. This was the first step to an active security policy and a transformed strategic concept.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ See <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>.

⁷⁰ See also: Interview with Prof. Sandschneider.

4.1.2 Bosnia 1995

As described in 3.2.2, the situation in South-East Europe escalated in the early 90s with the wars of disintegration in Yugoslavia. The bloodiest and most horrible one was the Bosnian war from April 1992 to December 1995. With the break-up of Yugoslavia, several parts of this multiethnic, socialist state declared their independence, most of based on ethnic background.⁷¹ Directly after Bosnia and Herzegovina's declaration of independence, a multi-ethnic part of the former Yugoslavia, in March 1992, nationalistic and ethnically-motivated tensions between the different groups escalated.⁷² Every entity organized its own armed forces and in the end of April 1992 a civil war began.⁷³ The European Community and Germany were forced to witness devastating ethnic clashes, right next to its territory. It became obvious that the European countries did not have the moral and military ability to end this conflict, not at least due to old, cold war oriented, strategic and military guidelines, perceptions and armed forces.⁷⁴ With time, this conflict transformed to one of the darkest and bloodiest periods in recent European history, including ethnic cleansing, expulsion, concentration camps and mass-murder.

The United Nation Organisation tried to intervene in humanitarian ways, for example establishing a no-fly zone guarded by NATO-troops which were mainly from the U.S. due to the European lack of military ability.⁷⁵ With military pressure including air strikes, the international community pressured the different groups to the negotiation table and the war ended with the so-called Dayton Peace Treatment in 1995. To implement this peace treatment, a strong, armed and long-term oriented multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) was established – as a strong replacement for UNPROFOR - in which Germany participated with a large contingent of armed troops. This mission is still running albeit with some modifications. Several insights resulted from this mission and other conflicts in the early 1990s for Germany:

1. Germany had to accept the necessity of participation in military missions around the globe⁷⁶.
2. Therefore, its traditional pacifism was no longer maintainable.
3. Because of its new responsibilities and new security threats, a transformation of armed forces and strategic guidelines gained high priority⁷⁷.

⁷¹ Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁷² Serbs, Croats, Bosnians (Muslims).

⁷³ For an in-depth analysis of Germany's role in these conflicts, see: Maull 1995/1996.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ UNPROFOR.

⁷⁶ Other missions with German participation in that time: the United Nations Transitional Authority Mission to Cambodia (UNTAC) 1992-1993, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Ruanda (UNAMIR) 1994

4. Meanwhile, with the rise of new economic and military powers, in Asia for example, and the weakening of comparably small European countries, an improving of European military integration, pooling of strategic resources and a pan-European security strategy became essential.^{78 79}

4.2 New strategies – The White paper of 1994

With emerging military responsibilities, however, the foundation of German self-perception was shaken. First, German law forbid out-of-area engagement without strong defensive need.⁸⁰ This problem was solved with the statement of Petersberg of the West European Union (WEU) in 1992 and the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994, which allowed Germany to participate in out-of-area military missions conducted by a collective security organisation (WEU, NATO, UNO). Second, after nearly fifty years of reluctance to use armed forces, German society's support for out-of-area missions was absolutely low. Step by step, year by year, the German population got used to an increasing German military engagement in the world, the so-called "salami-tactic".⁸¹ Third, the German armed forces' organisation and its strategic guidelines for security policy were insufficient regarding the changed security situation.

For dealing with this challenge, Germany worked out a strategic White paper on security in 1994. This White Paper, according to the Ministry of Defence, was a central core document of German security policy.⁸² It described the German agenda in security issues, its perception and the situation of its armed forces⁸³. It was intended to prompt German society to engage in active discussion of the country's security policy and thereby securing political and societal support for a mission-oriented rather than defence-oriented Bundeswehr. This White Paper detailed the changes in the international environment, the new security threats and analyzed their potential impacts on Germany. More than half of its contents dealt with the changing strategic circumstances, German interests and political space, meaning, security policy in its theoretical sense.⁸⁴ These security policy issues led to several conclusions. The White Paper argued for a reintegra-

⁷⁷ See next chapter.

⁷⁸ See Interview with Karl von Wogau.

⁷⁹ Regarding a pan-European Security Strategy, see: European Security Strategy 2003.

⁸⁰ See Interview with Paul Schäfer.

⁸¹ See Interviews with Prof. Sandschneider and Paul Schäfer.

⁸² See White Paper 1994.

⁸³ See White Paper 1994.

⁸⁴ See Berndt 2006 in <http://www.miel-berndt.de/MB/Material/20060624/20060624%20Text.htm> (23.02.2008).

tion of military aspects in German security policy and the re-establishment of the German armed forces as an instrument of its foreign and security policy, based on necessity and bounded on multilateralism. It identified the necessity for the armed forces to transform from a defensive to potentially offensive troop structure, and in so doing laid the theoretical framework for actualizing this necessity.⁸⁵

This was an essential step towards an active security policy and towards a "re-militarization" of Germany's foreign policy. For the first time since 1945 Germany's administration legitimated the use of force for more than defensive purposes. The White Paper of 1994, together with the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in the same year, symbolizes a fundamental change in Germany's foreign policy identity and self-perception.⁸⁶

4.3 Conclusion

The conceptual shift towards a new policy paradigm was paved in Germany's foreign affairs identity with its participation in several out-of-area missions in the early 1990's and the White Paper of 1994, formulating a new approach in German foreign and security affairs: "The CDU-led Government's incremental approach of enacting more and more Bundeswehr deployments in the 1990's succeeded in forging a new reality."⁸⁷ Compared to its former approach in foreign affairs, this development was a departure from its former civilian power stance. An interesting point is Maull's stark summarisation: "The use of the Bundeswehr crossed several important political hurdles, notably the willingness to join operations, to accept casualties and to create victims on the opposing side."⁸⁸ The process of transformation at that time aimed mostly at the strategies and instrument of German security policy.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ See Rhe 1995.

⁸⁶ Other important strategy papers in that time: Stoltenberg-paper 1992 and the Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien 1992.

⁸⁷ Longhurst 2004, p. 66.

⁸⁸ Maull 2000, p. 58.

⁸⁹ For an overview, see Harnisch 2000.

5. Changed strategy
- 5.1 Active security policy
- 5.1.1 Kosovo 1999

In 1998, another conflict in the Balkans arose. Fighting between Albanian separatists and Yugoslavian troops in Kosovo, a province with an Albanian majority, flamed up. Serbian troops tried to stop this separatist movement, possibly using ethnic cleansing and other human rights violations as methods to regain control. With bad memories of the previous wars in this region, the UN Security Council prepared a resolution allowing armed NATO-troops to end this conflict with attacks against Serbia. While this resolution was blocked by Russia and China, a wide variety of NATO member-states decided to go ahead. The recently elected new administration in Germany, a Red-Green government which ended 16 years of rule under the Christian Democrat – Liberal coalition, was confronted with a definitive decision. Backed with a great majority in Bundestag the new government decided to participate and support its allies, without a UN-Mandate, breaching international law.

While threatening Serbia with attacks, NATO tried to pressure them to stop their offensives in Kosovo. After further gruesome massacres NATO started, with strong German support, its air strikes against Serbia in March 1999. For the first time since 1945, Germany participated in an offensive military attack against another country. Worst, there was no legitimate background through international law: "The one significant departure from the civilian power ideal type was, of course, its [Germany's] participation in a war without a UN Security Council mandate and without a clear-cut justification in international law [Kosovo]." ⁹⁰ In this conflict, Germany practiced a new, active approach of security policy while breaking international law. Hitherto, especially before 1990, such a debatable decision would never have been possible: "The government and the leading elites argued that the basic norm of 'never war again' had to be overruled by the higher principle of stopping the ongoing ethnic cleansing." ⁹¹

After the fighting had ended, Germany delegated more than 8,000 soldiers to Kosovo, participating in a long-term stabilization mission (KFOR) and became the second largest troop-supplier in this operation, exceeding the U.S. Combined with the number of troops in what is now called the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, more than 10,000 German soldiers were at

⁹⁰ Maull 1999, p. 29.

⁹¹ Breuer 2006, p. 209.

this time settled in the Balkan region. In just nine years, Germany transformed from the most hesitating to the most active security actor in Europe.

5.1.2 Afghanistan 2001

On 09/11/2001 a horrible and nightmarish incident took place. Islamist terrorists attacked the USA while hijacking four normal passenger-planes and using them as flying bombs, crashing them into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon near Washington⁹². The whole world was shocked. For the first in its existence, NATO activated the defence clause, pledging military assistance to its member states.

Leaders from all over the world, including German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, promised to stand by the U.S. against these terrorists.

Al Qaida, a loose network of fundamental, Islamic terrorist groups suspected to be based in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, took responsibility for these attacks. President Bush, backed by the congress, delivered an ultimatum to the Taliban to surrender all Al Qaida members located in Afghanistan to the US, and to close all terrorist training camps.

After the Taliban rejected these stipulations, the U.S.A., supported by GB, declared a *War on terror* and started air-attacks and, later on, began their ground offensive together with the Taliban-opposed Afghan Northern Alliance. After the fall of the Taliban in December 2001, a strong international stabilization force authorized by the UN (ISAF) was deployed, to which Germany donated 3,000 soldiers.⁹³ At the same time the U.S. started the so-called *Operation Enduring Freedom*, a military operation against terrorist insurgency. German special forces, recently founded *Kommando Spezialkräfte* (KSK), participated in this operation, under debatable circumstances.⁹⁴

An important point about the German participation in ISAF and OEF: since 1990 there was a constant increase in German troop deployment all over the globe. But all of these missions were for peace-building, stabilization or humanitarian purposes. Even the law-breaching participation in Kosovo War had this intention. Instead, the war in Afghanistan was an offensive attack against a country targeted at eliminating the government.

⁹² One attempt failed and crashed into a field in Ohio.

⁹³ Until 2006 the biggest group in ISAF.

⁹⁴ The mandate of the German Bundestag did not allow any German participation in combat missions.

5.1.3 Iraq 2003

“Don't expect Germany to approve a resolution which would give legitimacy to war.” (Gerhard Schroeder)⁹⁵

Meanwhile, America's *War on terror* spread out. The U.S. suspected that Iraq, which, since Operation Desert Storm had become a very uncooperative and anti-American country, owned and was developing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).⁹⁶ Iraq's government under Saddam Hussein refused to cooperate with international institutions like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and rejected observer-groups. Without any substantial evidence for WMD, it was not possible for the U.S. administration to convince the UN member states and the Security Council for any action against Iraq⁹⁷. A month-long discussion between supporters and opponents took place, in which Germany was the greatest opponent of any military action as promoted by the U.S.A. At first Germany was supported by France and Russia in its stance, but as time elapsed, this discussion evolved primarily into political tension between Germany and the U.S.A. For the first time, Germany actively opposed a multilateral discussion without searching for compromise or consensus; this prompted the US to consider Germany a problem which in turn weakened the countries' ties⁹⁸.

The pre-war discussion of the Iraq war and Germany's behaviour in it, as well as the following politicization, showed a decisive and fundamental change in its self-perception and strategic culture. Obviously highly emancipated in foreign affairs, staffed with its own approach to security issues and with a new strategy, it became obvious on an international level that Germany's foreign affairs identity had changed.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Chancellor Schroeder in a BBC-interview on 22.01.2003, see <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2682313.stm> (22.02.2008).

⁹⁶ See chapter 3.2.1.

⁹⁷ See for example the famous quotation of Former German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer at an International Security Conference in Munich in February 2003: “I am not convinced!”, see <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/02/10/wirq110.xml> (25.02.2008).

⁹⁸ For an insight into the foreign, especially American perspective, see Szabo 2004 in: FAZ, 06.02.2004, see www.sais-jhu.edu/pubaffairs/SAISArticles04/Szabo_FAZ_020604.pdf (20.02.2008).

⁹⁹ See Szabo 2004.

5.2 Transformation of the Armed Forces

5.2.1 The Weizsäcker-Commission

Confronted with a new, much more complex security environment and new military challenges and security threats, the German government realized that a transformation of its armed forces was highly necessary. In 1999, the German administration advised an independent commission led by the former Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker to analyze Germany's risks, interests and necessities in security issues and the future role of its armed forces.¹⁰⁰ In May 2000, this commission presented its detailed 170 page report.

In a nutshell, the commission suggested a fundamental strategic transformation of the structure, purpose and tasks of the Bundeswehr. The paper argued that, surrounded solely by allies and partners,¹⁰¹ Germany's security interests lay more in conflict prevention and crisis management abroad.¹⁰² Thus, the Bundeswehr will primarily be deployed abroad instead of being oriented on territory defence. In its current structure, the commission stated, the Bundeswehr has no future.¹⁰³

Its recommendations regarding armed forces transformation and strategic policy issues were summarized:

- Decrease the size of Bundeswehr from 338,000 to 240,000 while increase the number of operational forces from 60,000 to 140,000, avoiding duplication within Europe¹⁰⁴
- Create closer co-operation with allies within NATO, OSCE, the UN and especially the EU
- Development of a broader and more comprehensive approach towards security policy, including political, diplomatic and economic aspects, with the Bundeswehr as one instrument.¹⁰⁵

This paper acted as the keystone towards the implementation of a new security paradigm in German political culture, from restraining the use of force to a global military actor. It is the core document concerning the transformation of the Bundeswehr towards an operational army.

¹⁰⁰ See Weizsäcker 2000, p.13.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁰² See Weizsäcker 2000, p.15.

¹⁰³ See Weizsäcker 2000, p.13

¹⁰⁴ See Weizsäcker 2000, p. 38

¹⁰⁵ See Weizsäcker 2000, p.23

Its recommendations regarding Germany's security policy and its armed forces have now been mostly implemented.

5.2.2 The Defence Policy Guidelines 2003

*"Given the new comprehensive approach to modern security and defence policy and its attendant demand, it is impossible to predetermine future operations in terms of their intensity or geographic location. The political aim will define the goal, location, duration and type of an operation. The necessity for the Bundeswehr to participate in multinational operations may arise anywhere in the world and at short notice and may extend across the entire mission spectrum down to high-intensity operations."*¹⁰⁶

In 2003, the German Ministry of Defence decreed a new core document of Germany's security policy, the *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien* ("Defence Policy Guidelines"). These Defence Policy Guidelines can be understood as the legislative fulfillment and implementation of the results of the Weizäcker-commission.¹⁰⁷ In 95 points, these guidelines deal with the risks and opportunities Germany is faced with in security affairs, its current principles in Security and Defence Policy as well as the definition of mission and tasks of the Bundeswehr in the beginning of the 21st century. The main intention is to describe the process and target of the reform of the Bundeswehr:

*"The comprehensive reform of the Bundeswehr that is already underway will be further developed. In this connection, special emphasis is being placed on the prioritisation and shaping of the Bundeswehr's tasks in the new strategic conditions. Universal conscription in an adapted form remains an indispensable requirement for the operational readiness, effectiveness and economic efficiency of the Bundeswehr."*¹⁰⁸

Without a direct territorial threat, Germany's security and defence policy is globally oriented and the mission and tasks of its armed forces transformed from an defensive to an out-of-area context: "The core message of the DPG is that for now and in the near future, there is no conventional threat to German territory and that the Bundeswehr has to be adapted to a completely new mission spectrum."¹⁰⁹ With these guidelines, a new approach in German security policy became official. In context to the Defence Policy Guidelines, the German Ministry of Defence decided to restructure the Bundeswehr into three new force categories:

- "Response forces (about 35,000) for multinational high-intensity operations.

¹⁰⁶ Defence Policy Guidelines 2003, p. 12

¹⁰⁷ These Guidelines were the first for eleven years. The last ones, in 1992, were more focused on resource-issues.

¹⁰⁸ Defence Policy Guidelines 2003, p. 3

¹⁰⁹ Breuer 2006, p.212

- Stabilisation forces (about 70,000) for peace stability measures in low- and medium-intensity operations.
- Support forces (137,500 personnel, to include 40,000 undergoing training at any given time) to support all operations and ensure routine duty operations of the Bundeswehr at home."¹¹⁰

Thirteen years after unification, the change of strategies and instruments in German security policy became implemented in its legacy:¹¹¹

*"German defense policy has been plagued by an ad-hoc adaptation to evolving international pressures. The 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines mark an important stage of catching up with this reality as the Bundeswehr takes on an increasing number of operations."*¹¹²

5.2.3 The Bundeswehr Transformation Centre

*"Transformation means continuous adjustment to a permanently changing, ever more complex world. Thus transformation is to be considered a process in which the Bundeswehr takes current and future social, technological and security policy developments into consideration."*¹¹³

As a reaction to the quickly changing strategic and political environment, and the necessity of institutionalizing the process of transforming the armed forces, the German Ministry of Defence founded the "Bundeswehr Transformation Centre" in July 2004 by renaming and improving the former "Bundeswehr Analyses and Studies Center" and relocate it to Straußberg, not far from the German Ministry of Defence. The intention was to create an excellent and well-equipped think tank, integrated into the armed forces, for analysing and dealing directly with challenging security changes as needed: "The Bundeswehr and the security-political culture of the

¹¹⁰ Waypoints for the New Course, Berlin 2004, see http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cTcHSUGYxvqR6GJu5gixoNQ8fW99X4_83FT9AP2C3NCIckdHRQCs3f1L/delta/base64xml/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS80SVVFLzZfRF80SE8!Pyw_contentURL=/C1256F1200608B1B/W268SK9S091INFOEN/content.jsp (22.01.2008)

¹¹¹ Two other important documents in this context: The *Directive on the Further Development of the Bundeswehr*, Berlin 2003, and the *Grundzüge der Konzeption der Bundeswehr*, Berlin 2004

¹¹² Giegerich 2003, in <http://www.dias-online.org/155.0.html> (29.02.2008).

¹¹³ The brochure of the centre 2007, p.3 (http://www.zentrum-transformation.bundeswehr.de/portal/PA_1_0_P3/PortalFiles/02DB04000000001/W273XGLM385INFOEN/Zentrumsbroschuere+englisch.pdf?yw_repository=youtatweb)

Federal Republic of Germany need such think tanks, where innovation is promoted and rewarded."¹¹⁴

Divided in three Divisions and equipped with hundreds of staffers, the Center is working comprehensively on strategic and security issues: "The working methods of the center were and will be marked by a wide-ranging interdisciplinary attempt, which also covers for example legal aspects and issues of defense technology."¹¹⁵ The first Division, including several departments and branches, works on "Transformation of the Bundeswehr", analysing the necessary steps for the transformation-process. The second division, called "Concept Development and Experimentation", implements the first division's analyses and studies, developing feasible models. These models and concepts are tested and proved in the "Operations Research / Modeling and Simulation" Division.

This organization's comprehensive approach should guarantee excellent results and measurable output.

With the foundation of this think-tank, the armed forces transformation became institutionalized. The strictly civilian approach of armed forces as a tool for territorial defence alone is obviously expired. The Bundeswehr is nowadays an institutional part of German foreign and security policy.

5.3 White Paper 2006

*"Twelve years have passed since the publication of the last White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation of the Bundeswehr. During that time, the international environment changed dramatically."*¹¹⁶

After the above mentioned decisive political and legal acts towards developing a new security policy and transforming the armed forces, the German government published a new strategic White Paper on security in 2006. Implementing the previous political acts and ideas and tak-

¹¹⁴ The brochure of the centre 2007, p. 8

¹¹⁵ The brochure of the centre, p. 9

¹¹⁶ White Paper 2006, p. 5

ing new threats like international terrorism and the changes in international environment into consideration, this White Paper defines Germany's values and purposes in security policy and the mission and function of the Bundeswehr in the 21st Century. It is the current core document concerning Germany's new foreign affairs strategy and its perception of security issues in the new century. After a period of 15 years of constant transformation, during which foreign and security decisions were made on an ad-hoc, case-by-case basis, this strategic paper symbolizes the basis of a new and coherent security policy strategy.¹¹⁷

According to the paper, Germany's security policy values in the 21st Century are:

- "preserving justice and freedom, democracy, security and prosperity for the citizens of Germany and protecting them from dangers;
- ensuring the sovereignty and integrity of German territory;
- preventing regional crises and conflicts that may affect Germany's security, wherever possible, and helping to control crises;
- confronting global challenges, above all the threat posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD;
- helping to uphold human rights and strengthen the international order on the basis of international law;
- promoting free and unhindered world trade as a basis of our prosperity thereby helping to overcome the divide between poor and rich regions of the world."¹¹⁸

The third and fourth point had never been formulated before. As the third point specifies, Germany's security policy scope of action now encompasses the whole globe. One of its purposes is "confronting global challenges", which implies, a highly active and offensive approach in security policy. Germany's newly drafted values in security policy took into consideration Germany's new role and its changed international environment. While adapting to new necessities, the missions and tasks of Bundeswehr, now called "an instrument of German Security Policy"¹¹⁹, have been defined, and have implemented the latest developments:

"As an instrument of comprehensive and proactive security and defence policy, the Bundeswehr

- guarantees the capacity for action in the field of foreign policy;
- contributes towards European and global security;
- maintains national security and defence;

¹¹⁷ For an intensive discussion of this aspect, see Link 2004.

¹¹⁸ White Paper 2006, p. 21

¹¹⁹ White Paper 2006, p. 52

- provides assistance in the defence of our allies
- fosters multinational cooperation and integration.”¹²⁰

Especially interesting is the order in which its tasks are listed:

- “International conflict prevention and crisis management including the fight against international terrorism;
- Support of allies;
- Protection of Germany and its population
- Rescue and evacuation
- Partnership and cooperation
- Subsidiary assistance”¹²¹

Compared to its values in 1990, which were dominated by restraint of the use of force, Germany has newly implemented military aspects into its foreign and security affairs purposes.¹²²

The Bundeswehr, in a traditional post-war German understanding as an instrument of defence and deterrence, has become an instrument of a *proactive* security and defence policy, of which out-of-area missions are a key task. Its role and meaning changed in just fifteen years from strictly defensive to a comprehensive instrument in German foreign affairs.

The White Paper identifies constitutional requirements, financial needs and parameters of this new security paradigm.¹²³ It analyzes the current role of Bundeswehr as an army in operations, evaluates the transformation-process of the armed forces until the present and defines the prospective strategy. Compared to the 1994 White Paper, which dealt mostly with policy issues, it focuses more on structural and organisational aspects in security in defence affairs.¹²⁴ The reason for this lies in the different political situation. While in 1994 it was highly important to formulate the key facts of the changed international environment and thereby explain the necessity of a conceptual change in security policy and its armed forces, these points were obvious and widely accepted in society and in leading circles in 2006. In the period between unification and the 2006 White Paper, Germany accepted the changed environment and its new role, responsibilities and strategic necessities, implemented the resulting insights in its policy process and adapted a new and adequate security and military strategy.

¹²⁰ White Paper 2006, p. 53

¹²¹ White Paper 2006, p. 55

¹²² For details on the “out-of-area debate” in Germany, see Longhurst 2004

¹²³ see White Paper 2006, Chapter 3

¹²⁴ see Berndt 2006 in <http://www.miel-berndt.de/MB/Material/20060624/20060624%20Text.htm> (23.02.2008)

6. German security policy in 21. Century - still a "Civilian Power"?

In the last 17 years, after the end of the Cold War, Germany's approach in security policy and its strategic culture changed fundamentally. With a shifted international setting, new military threats and new responsibilities, Germany changed its strategic perception and disavowed its traditional restraint against the use of force. At first hesitant, in its participation in the UN-Mission in Somalia, Germany adapted a new approach, understanding its armed forces more and more as an instrument in foreign and security affairs. Partly by necessity, partly self-chosen, Germany's security paradigm drifted towards a more global and comprehensive orientation. Most recently with its participation in the Kosovo-War the Rubicon was crossed and Germany's rejection of the use of force expired. German support of a combat operation against a sovereign state without multilateral legitimacy and breaching international law was hitherto unthinkable.

Germany elaborated step by step a new security paradigm, compatible to its strategic needs and implicating the new role of its armed forces as a global actor. The ground-paving ideas of the Weizäcker-Kommission were implemented in the Defence Policy Guidelines in 2003 and later in the current White Paper. Germany's resolute deployment in Afghanistan 2001 and its reluctant behaviour during the Iraq war 2003 showed a formerly unknown self-confidence. Germany's foreign affairs identity and its security policy strategy is still dominated by multilateralism and dedicated to international law and human rights, like the White Paper in 2006 exemplarily showed. Multilateralism is especially increasing for German security policy in the context of the European integration process and the European Security and Defence policy.

But one of the major characteristics of a civilian power, namely the restraint from the use of force, is not valid anymore regarding Germany's current foreign policy identity. Its global military engagement until 1990 increased constantly. Compared to Germany's values regarding the use of its armed forces at the time of unification, contemporary German military deployment and its current strategic guidelines are no longer civilian. For this reason and in the context of the primary connotation of this foreign affairs role concept, Germany is not a pure civilian power anymore.

Due to its dedication to multilateralism and international law, especially in security and defence issues – an unilateral deployment would not be possible – civilian values still exist and, in fact, dominate Germany's foreign and security identity. Considering the changes in the international environment and compared to other actors in security issues, Germany's foreign and secu-

rity affairs orientation is still dominated by civilian values and approaches, like for example its preference for non-military instruments for conflict resolution.

Due to its constantly increasing deployment of troops, its changed perception in security policy and its new security paradigm, Germany could not be described as a pure civilian power in 2008. But while still supporting multilateralism, international law and other civilian values, a fundamental renunciation of this role concept is not identifiable.

In 2008, Germany is no longer a pure civilian power. In fact, Germany is an emancipated, civilian-oriented power with a careful but self-confident relation to its armed forces. Therefore, Maull's statement of a modified continuity in Germany's foreign and security affairs is applicable, but the description of Germany as an ideal manifestation of this role-concept is not valid.

Annex

A.1 Interview with Peter Struck, former German Minister of Defense (in German, approved 20.12.2007)

Interviewfragen zur Bachelor-Arbeit Titel: Still a "Civilian Power"? – The changing approach in German Security Policy after 1990"

1. Was sind, Ihrer Meinung nach, die richtungsweisenden Momente und Ereignisse der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach 1990?

Prägend war zunächst das Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts selbst. Die ursprünglich damit verbundenen Hoffnungen auf eine Friedensdividende haben sich nur teilweise erfüllt. Das dominierende Bedrohungsszenario der Vergangenheit – ein Angriff des Warschauer Paktes – spielt heute keine Rolle mehr. Wir haben es heute mit neuen Bedrohungen zu tun: z.B. regionalen Konflikten, dem Zerfall ganzer Staaten, dem islamistischen Terrorismus und der Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen.

Das Ende des Ost-West-Konfliktes war aber auch geprägt durch eine erheblich gestiegene Handlungsfähigkeit der Vereinten Nationen, die heute bei der Konfliktprevention und –regulierung eine viel wichtigere Rolle spielen als zu Zeiten des Kalten Krieges.

Mit diesen Veränderungen einher ging auch ein Wandel der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Die Eckpfeiler – enge Einbindung in EU und NATO, enge Partnerschaft mit den USA – gelten unverändert. Aber im Zusammenhang mit dem Bedeutungszuwachs der Vereinten Nationen ist auch Deutschland als bevölkerungsreichstem Land in der EU, als großer Wirtschaftsmacht, als bedeutendem UN-Beitragszahler unweigerlich mehr Verantwortung zugewachsen.

Richtungsweisend war sicher auch der 11. September 2001. Die Anschläge von New York und Washington haben deutlich gemacht, wie akut die Bedrohung durch den internationalen Terrorismus ist. Das Netzwerk des internationalen Terrorismus hatte unter den Taliban in Afghanistan einen Rückzugs- und Ruheraum gefunden, der zur Ausbildung und Vorbereitung von Anschlägen genutzt wurde. Es war richtig und konsequent, hiergegen vorzugehen. In diesem Zusammenhang habe ich den Satz geprägt, den ich auch heute noch für richtig halte: „Deutschlands Sicherheit wird auch am Hindukusch verteidigt“.

2. Kann man heute, angesichts von mehr als 7,000 Soldaten in international-geführten Einsätzen, von einem neuen militärischen Bewusstsein Deutschlands sprechen?

Ich würde von einem Bewußtsein gewachsener internationaler Verantwortung sprechen. Dabei geht es um mehr als nur Militär. Einsätze der Bundeswehr, z.B. auf dem Balkan und in Afghanistan, sind stets begleitet von intensivem zivilen Engagement etwa im Bereich des Wiederaufbaus nicht nur der zerstörten Infrastruktur, sondern auch tragfähiger staatlicher Strukturen. Militär alleine kann Frieden auf Dauer nicht herstellen und sichern. Man muss allerdings feststellen, dass dieses Bewusstsein der gewachsenen Verantwortung noch nicht überall in der Gesellschaft verankert ist. Es gibt nach wie vor Skepsis gegenüber Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr unter dem Dach der UN und im Verbund mit den Partnern in der EU und der NATO. Hier muss noch Überzeugungsarbeit geleistet werden.

3. Ist, Ihrer Meinung nach, zukünftig mit steigenden Einsatzverpflichtungen bzw. – notwendigkeiten der Bundeswehr zu rechnen?

Angesichts der gewachsenen Handlungsfähigkeit der UN und der nach wie vor zahlreichen Krisen- und Konflikt-herde weltweit kann man das nicht ausschließen. Dabei wird in jedem Fall sorgfältig zu prüfen sein, ob eine Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an einer internationalen Mission sinnvoll und geboten ist. Die gewachsene Verantwortung Deutschlands umfasst auch die Freiheit, Nein zu sagen, wenn wir den Einsatz von Militär für falsch halten.

Bundestag (in German, approved 23.01.2008)

Zu Frage 1.

Bezeichnenderweise sind die richtungsweisenden Momente ausschließlich im Bereich der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik festzumachen. Die Bundesregierungen verfolgten das Ziel einer Renaissance des Militärischen als legitimes Instrument der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Die Petersberger Erklärung der WEU 1992 ebnete den Weg für deutsche Auslandseinsätze. Die deutsche Beteiligung am völkerrechtswidrigen Angriff auf Jugoslawien wegen des Konflikts im Kosovo riss moralische Schranken gegen den Einsatz der Bundeswehr ein. Die Verabschiedung des Strategischen Konzepts der NATO 1999 erweiterte die Legitimationsgrundlage für Auslandseinsätze. Die im gleichen Jahr getroffenen Beschlüsse des Europäischen Rats in Köln zur Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik führten gemeinsam mit den Beschlüssen von Nizza 2000 zum Aufbau militärischer Kapazitäten der EU unter reger Beteiligung Deutschlands. Damit verbunden war erneut eine Ausweitung der Legitimation für den Einsatz militärischer Gewalt zur Durchsetzung europäischer und deutscher Ziele. Schließlich ist noch die Entscheidung des NATO Rats zu nennen, der als Reaktion auf die Anschläge auf das WTC 2001 die Beistandsklausel aktivierte. Operation Enduring Freedom und weitere Unterstützungsmaßnahmen für den US-amerikanischen „Krieg gegen den Terror“ beförderten eine Abbau der parlamentarischen Kontrolle der Streitkräfte und führte zu einer Art Blankoscheck für den weltweiten Einsatz der Bundeswehr, sei es zur Terrorismusbekämpfung oder zu Sicherung von Transportwegen. Gerade die Beteiligung am „Krieg gegen den Terror“ bedeutete auch eine Verrohung der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Menschenrechtsverletzungen durch die USA, wie z.B. in Guantanamo, wurden geduldet und hingenommen.

Zu Frage 2.

Spätestens seit dem Amtsantritt von Verteidigungsminister Rühle verfolgte die Bundesregierung das Ziel, das Einsatzspektrum der Bundeswehr auszuweiten und die Bundeswehr tatsächlich im Ausland einzusetzen, um innerhalb der NATO, aber auch der EU und UNO auf Augenhöhe mit den anderen Militärmächten die deutschen Interessen durchzusetzen. Dies veränderte zwangsläufig auch das Selbstverständnis in den Streitkräften und bei den politischen Entscheidungsträgern. Deutlich wird dies u.a. im neuen Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesregierung welches die militärische Dimension wie selbstverständlich als normales Instrument der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik aufführt. Aber es zeigt sich auch in der Entscheidung des Verteidigungsministers im Bendler Block ein Ehrenmal für die im Auslandseinsatz gestorbenen SoldatInnen und Soldaten zu bauen.

Zu Frage 3.

Ja, die Einsatzverpflichtungen werden steigen. Im Rahmen der militärischen Integration in der NATO und der Militarisierung der EU entstehen immer stärkere Verpflichtungen seitens der Bundesregierung sich an militärischen Einsätzen der EU und NATO zu beteiligen. Innerhalb dieser Strukturen werden Automatismen aufgebaut, die ein „Nein“ der Regierungen schwerer machen. Der Einsatz in Afghanistan zeigt bereits heute, wie sehr die „Bündnissolidarität“ dazu führt, dass die Bundeswehr das Aufgabenspektrum beim ISAF-Einsatz kontinuierlich ausweitet und mehr Verpflichtungen übernimmt.

In diesem Zusammenhang allerdings von Notwendigkeiten für einen Einsatz der Bundeswehr zu reden, halte ich für falsch. Im Sinne einer friedensorientierten Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik ist der Einsatz militärischer Gewalt kontraproduktiv.

- A.3 Interview with Karl von Wogau, chairman of the subcommittee on Security and Defense in the European Parliament (in German, approved 08.01.2008)

Interviewfragen zur Bachelor-Arbeit

Titel: Still a "Civilian Power" – The changing approach in German Security Policy after 1990

1. Was sind, Ihrer Meinung nach, die richtungweisenden Momente und Ereignisse der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach 1990?

Richtungweisend für die deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik in der Zeit nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges und dem Wegfall der starren Konfrontation zwischen zwei Blöcken wurde die neue Unübersichtlichkeit des internationalen Systems, eine verstärkte Unvorhersehbarkeit von Entwicklungen und das Bewusstsein, globalen Herausforderungen gegenüberzustehen, die nur gemeinsam mit anderen bewältigt werden können.

Beispiele für diese Herausforderungen sind die in der Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie von 2003 genannten Bedrohungen wie Terrorismus, die Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen, regionale Konflikte, Scheitern von Staaten und Organisierte Kriminalität, aber auch andere Herausforderungen wie die Globalisierung, die Sicherheit der Energieversorgung oder der Klimawandel. Diese Herausforderungen, die kein einzelner Staat allein bewältigen kann, haben dazu geführt, dass Deutschland im Bereich der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik verstärkt auf ein gemeinsames europäisches Vorgehen setzt und sich mit seinen Partnern in der Europäischen Union für eine Weltordnung auf der Grundlage eines effektiven Multilateralismus einsetzt.

2. Kann man heute, angesichts von mehr als 7,000 Soldaten in international-geführten Einsätzen, von einem neuen militärischen Bewusstsein Deutschlands sprechen?

Deutschland unterstützt aktiv die Entwicklung einer handlungsfähigen Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik und beteiligt sich an gemeinsamen Einsätzen unter Führung der Europäischen Union sowie an sonstigen international geführten Einsätzen. Dies hat tatsächlich mit "Bewusstsein" zu tun, nämlich wie bereits gesagt mit dem Bewusstsein, dass wir die Herausforderungen, denen wir gegenüberstehen nur mit unseren Partnern gemeinsam bewältigen können.

3. Ist, Ihrer Meinung nach, zukünftig mit steigenden Einsatzverpflichtungen bzw. –
notwendigkeiten der Bundeswehr zu rechnen?

Deutschland wird sich auch weiterhin aktiv an europäischen und internationalen Einsätzen beteiligen.

Der Umfang und die Art künftiger Einsätze lassen sich nicht vorhersehen. Es ist jedoch klar, dass gemeinsames Training und kompatible Ausrüstung für die Streitkräfte innerhalb der Europäischen Union immer wichtiger werden.

- A.4 Interview with Prof. Eberhard Sandschneider, Otto-Wolff-Director of the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations (in German, approved 21.12.2007)

Interviewfragen zur Bachelor-Arbeit

Titel: Still a "Civilian Power"? – The changing approach in German Security Policy after 1990

1. Was sind, Ihrer Meinung nach, die richtungsweisenden Momente und Ereignisse der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach 1990?

Einsatz der Bw in Somalia 1992, IFOR-SFOR Einsatz in BiH 1995, Krieg im Kosovo und KFOR 1999, 11.09.2001 und Einsatz in AFG, Verweigerung der Zustimmung zum Irak-Krieg 2003 und damit verbundener Emanzipation von den USA

2. Kann man heute, angesichts von mehr als 7,000 Soldaten in international-geführten Einsätzen, von einem neuen militärischen Bewusstsein Deutschlands sprechen?

Nicht a priori militärisches Bewusstsein aber doch zunehmendes Bewusstsein, dass in gewissen Situationen der Einsatz von Streitkräften notwendig sein kann. Mit einer erstaunlich erfolgreichen „Salamitaktik“ wurde die Bevölkerung im Laufe der 90er Jahre auf Einsätze zunehmender Intensität vorbereitet. Vorläufiger Höhepunkt dieser Entwicklung war die Entsendung deutscher Spezialkräfte (KSK) nach Süd-AFG. Trotzdem ist in DEU immer noch eine höhere Skepsis ggü militärischen Einsätzen zu konstatieren als dies in anderen westlichen Ländern der Fall ist.

3. Ist, Ihrer Meinung nach, zukünftig mit steigenden Einsatzverpflichtungen bzw. – notwendigkeiten der Bundeswehr zu rechnen?

Davon ist auszugehen, da zum einen die übernommenen Verpflichtungen zumindest mittelfristig weiter bestehen bleiben und zum anderen die Verbündeten immer stärker auf ein stärkeres deutsches Engagement in dieser Frage drängen. Die Diskussion um den Einsatz der Bw im Süden AFG ist ein Beispiel dafür, dass von DEU immer stärker auch in „robusten Situationen“ Bündnissolidarität gefordert wird. Darüber hinaus wird mit der Amtsübernahme einer neuen US-Administration aller Voraussicht nach insbesondere von den USA eine aktivere deutsche Rolle in diesen Fragen gefordert werden. Zusätzlich kommt DEU bei der Entwicklung der GASP und ESVP eine Schlüsselrolle zu, die mittel- bis langfristig auch militärische Konsequenzen haben wird.

- A.5 Interview with Thomas Kossendey, Parliamentary State Secretary to the Federal Minister of Defense (in German, approved 20.12.2007)

ANTWORTEN THOMAS KOSSENDEY

1. Was sind die richtungsweisenden Momente und Ereignisse der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach 1990?

Ich möchte hier drei Themenbereiche besonders hervorheben:

Zum einen ist es sicherlich die Europäische Integration und Erweiterung, die außen- und sicherheitspolitisch für uns von herausragender Bedeutung ist. Dabei kommt der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) und der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP) eine zentrale Stellung zu.

Die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie (ESS): „Ein sicheres Europa in einer besseren Welt“ bildet seit 2003 den konzeptionellen Rahmen für die GASP und ESVP und zeigt Wege auf, wie die EU ihr politisches, wirtschaftliches und auch militärisches Gewicht wirksamer zum Tragen bringen kann. Die ESS ist das Bekenntnis der EU zur Verantwortung in Europa und in der Welt. Sie dient der strategischen Positionsbestimmung und ist Grundlage für den strategischen Dialog mit Partnern, insbesondere den USA.

Zum anderen ist ohne Zweifel die kontinuierliche Weiterentwicklung der transatlantischen Partnerschaft und der NATO zu nennen, die trotz aller Belastungen fester Bestandteil und Eckpfeiler deutscher Sicherheitspolitik geblieben ist. Die Grundaussagen, die das Strategische Konzept der Allianz bereits 1999 getätigt hat, sind trotz aller Veränderungen des sicherheitspolitischen Umfeldes nach wie vor gültig. Kollektive Sicherheit, Krisenbewältigung und Partnerschaft mit Nicht NATO-Mitgliedern sind dabei für mich die Schlüsselemente.

Die Allianz stellt sich den neuen Herausforderungen auf der Grundlage der Comprehensive Political Guidance der Staats- und Regierungschefs von 2006 durch politische und militärische Transformation. Dabei ist für mich klar, dass die europäischen Mitgliedstaaten Schritt für Schritt mehr Verantwortung übernehmen müssen und der strategische Dialog innerhalb der Allianz, aber auch mit der EU und den VN im Mittelpunkt der Bemühungen stehen muss.

Richtungsweisend und von besonderer Bedeutung war sicherlich auch für die deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach 1990 die Übernahme von mehr Verantwortung im internationalen Umfeld durch den Einsatz militärischer Mittel. Hierbei hat die Bundeswehr Herausragendes geleistet. Ich erinnere hier beispielhaft an die ersten Einsätze, die Minenräumaktion der Deutschen Marine nach dem Zweiten Golfkrieg im Persischen Golf 1991 und die Entsendung eines Feldlazaretts nach Phnom Penh im Rahmen einer UN-Mission 1993. Es folgten Einsätze in der Adria, in Somalia und auf dem Balkan. Nach dem 11. September 2001 beteiligt sich Deutschland an der „Operation Enduring Freedom“ in Afghanistan und am Horn von Afrika. Derzeit ist Deutschland mit über 7.000 Soldaten weltweit im Einsatz. ISAF in Afghanistan, ALTHEA und KFOR auf dem Balkan sowie UNIFIL vor der libanesischen Küste sind die prominentesten Einsätze. Daneben müssen aber auch die vielen humanitären Hilfeleistungen in Katastrophen und Unglücksfällen erwähnt werden, welche die Bundeswehr seit 1990 durchgeführt hat.

2. Kann man heute, angesichts von mehr als 7.000 Soldaten in international geführten Einsätzen, von einem neuen militärischen Bewusstsein Deutschlands sprechen?

Durch die Entsendung unserer Soldaten auf drei verschiedene Kontinente in die unterschiedlichsten Einsätze hat sich kein neues militärisches Bewusstsein in Deutschland entwickelt. Ich kann auch überhaupt nicht nachvollziehen, wenn in diesem Zusammenhang oftmals von einer Militarisierung der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik gesprochen wird.

Mit der Beteiligung an den von den Vereinten Nationen mandatierten Einsätzen kommen wir unserer Verpflichtung gegenüber der Völkergemeinschaft nach, mehr internationale Verantwortung zu übernehmen. Dies ist unserer Bevölkerung durchaus bewusst. Ich glaube auch, dass der an sicherheitspolitischen Fragen interessierten Öffentlichkeit ebenso verständlich ist, dass neben zivilen auch militärische Mittel notwendig sind, um einen effektiven und nachhaltigen Beitrag zur internationalen Krisenbewältigung leisten zu können. Dieses Grundverständnis sicherheitspolitischen Denkens und Handelns wurde bereits im „Aktionsplan Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung“ der Bundesregierung aus dem Jahre 2004 verankert. Auch das „Weißbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr“ weist darauf hin, dass ein präventiver, umfassender und vernetzter Ansatz erforderlich ist, um aktuellen und zukünftigen sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen begegnen zu können. Dieser schließt nationale staatliche – zivile und militärische – sowie multinationale Akteure, aber auch z.B. internationale Nichtregierungsorganisationen und die Zivilgesellschaft mit ein.

Leitgedanke deutscher Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik ist ein umfassendes Verständnis von Sicherheit unter Berücksichtigung nicht nur politischer und militärischer, sondern auch ökonomischer, ökologischer, gesellschaftlicher und kultureller Bedingungen und Entwicklungen. Die Veränderungen in der Ausrichtung deutscher Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik hin zu mehr Übernahme internationaler Verantwortung sind meiner Meinung nach im Bewusstsein unserer Gesellschaft durchaus verankert und werden überwiegend positiv aufgenommen. Eine intensivere öffentliche Befassung oder Diskussionen sicherheitspolitischer Fragestellungen halte ich aber dennoch für wünschenswert.

3. Ist künftig mit steigenden Einsatzverpflichtungen bzw. –notwendigkeiten der Bundeswehr zu rechnen?

Es ist sehr schwierig, diese Frage eindeutig zu beantworten, denn keiner von uns kann in die Zukunft schauen und politische Entscheidungen voraussagen. Gerade wenn es um so wichtige Fragen wie den Einsatz unserer Streitkräfte geht, wird die Entscheidungsfindung von einer Vielzahl von, möglicherweise jetzt noch nicht bekannten, Faktoren abhängig sein. Doch lassen Sie mich Folgendes feststellen:

Wir haben Verantwortung auf dem Balkan, im Kosovo und in Bosnien-Herzegowina, in Afghanistan, im Libanon, in Georgien und in einigen Ländern Afrikas übernommen. Bei allen Erfolgen, die die Internationale Gemeinschaft bislang erringen konnte, müssen wir allerdings erkennen, dass keine dieser Krisen und Konflikte so weit gelöst ist, dass ein Abzug der internationalen Truppen – und damit der Bundeswehr – derzeit ohne Gefahr für die Stabilität der Länder und der gesamten Region möglich wäre.

Wir zielen in nahezu allen Einsatzgebieten darauf, die Eigenverantwortung der örtlichen Regierungen und Bevölkerungen zu stärken. Dies erfordert Geduld und langen Atem. Wir werden die Zahl und die Intensität der Einsätze, so hat es den Anschein, daher kurzfristig nicht wesentlich verringern können, auch um das bisher Erreichte nicht aufs Spiel zu setzen.

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