



Düsseldorfer Institut für Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik  
Duesseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy

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Under Full Sail in a Millennium of  
Migration?

Enlargement in the East and “Push  
and Pull Factors” in the South

**DIAS ANALYSIS**  
**No. 9 November 2004**

[www.dias-online.org](http://www.dias-online.org)

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Babak Khalatbari/ Marc Lauterfeld, Under Full Sail in a Millennium of Migration?

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Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik e.V.  
c/o Juristische Fakultät der Heinrich-Heine-Universität  
Universitätsstraße 1 D-40225 Düsseldorf

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ISBN:

## **Under Full Sail in a Millennium of Migration? Enlargement in the East and “Push and Pull Factors” in the South**

The Mediterranean has always been the area for economic, social and human exchange between the States of the Northern and the Southern Mediterranean countries. Conquest, colonialism, trade, and last but not least migration, have shaped relations between its Northern and Southern shores. Focussing on Eastern enlargement, the European Union got the growing demographic problem and the readiness of the people to leave their home-countries out of sight. However, alongside with the enhanced endeavours of the European Union to reformulate commercial ties with North Africa, the Levant, and Turkey through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), illegal immigration gained importance as an area of research. Economic and security implications on both sides of the Mediterranean are coming to the fore.

Reasons for Southern emigration are manifold and obvious. A biblical saying goes “*in case the prophet does not come to the mountain, the mountain will come to the prophet.*” Same applies to migration. If prosperity does not come to the people, the people will come to the places of prosperity.

### **Migration in Figures**


The deteriorating socio-economic situation and the linked risk of distributional conflicts between the States in the South Mediterranean are the reasons why the European Council in June 1992, during the Lisbon summit, classified the Mediterranean region as significant strategically important for the first time.<sup>1</sup> Future and present scenarios, provided by the European Union, deal with the problem of uncontrolled South-North migration.<sup>2</sup> In addition, the demographic differences between the North and the South attract growing attention. In unison, the *Arabic Mediterranean partner countries* (MPCs) growth of up to 3% was estimated as an essential element of the heterogeneous prosperity between the EU and its Southern neighbour region on the other side of the coast. It is conspicuous that, over the past decade, net migration to the EU has been extensive.

<sup>1</sup> Hereunto the European Parliament figured already in 1991 out, that „... *the pressure of migration will be all the more massive and uncontrollable if the European Community does not establish new and more equitable trade relations with the Mediterranean third parties, and does not institute cooperation that is quantitatively different from that of the past in order to contribute to the development and growth of these countries.* (Resolution A3-121/91 on a renewed Mediterranean Policy Consideration 1, European Parliament)

<sup>2</sup> The legislation of alien law from all EU-member states can be found online: [http://194.235.129.80/euromesco/seccao\\_geral.asp?cod\\_seccao=5034](http://194.235.129.80/euromesco/seccao_geral.asp?cod_seccao=5034), 7<sup>th</sup> of January 2003, 14:24.

After reaching its peak of over 1 Million per annum in the early 1990's, net migration to the EU declined over the past decade, however, rising back up to 700,000 in 1999 again. The net legal immigration rate for the EU during 1990-98, was at 2.2 per 1000 inhabitants, compared to 3 for the United States and almost 0 for Japan.

**Figure I. Migration rates of the EU-15 and selected EU countries, 1988-1998**



Sources: Sopemi (2000) and Eurostat (2000).

It is estimated that illegal immigration in Europe is 60% higher, at about 500,000 per annum, than in the United States. The EU population is only 34% larger than the US population. Refugees seeking asylum in the EU between 1989 and 1998 have also exceeded an average of 350,000 per annum. About 20% of the applicants are accepted, in general.<sup>3</sup> The figures of foreigners of a typical EU country have steadily increased as a result of substantial net migration flows. In Germany, for example, this figure grew by about 3 million to 7.3 million between 1985 and 1999. The percentage of the population with foreign nationalities in the countries of the EU is 8.9%, in Germany, 9.1% in Austria, 8.7% in Belgium, 6.3% in France, 2.1% in Italy and 3.8% in the UK.

### Three Phases of Migration

Post-war migration in Europe can be divided into three phases: the first phase beginning with the period of foreign worker recruitment after World War II and ending during the first oil price cri-

<sup>3</sup> Herbert Brücker and others (Ed.): Managing Migration in the European Welfare State, Berlin, June 2001, 1.

sis in 1973/74. The second phase starting in the mid 1970s until the 1980s, and the third taking place at the end of bipolarity and the following collapse of socialism in 1989. Dealing with the third wave of migration, forecasts on demographic trends outline the following scenario: The Arabic MPCs population will rise from 167,43 million in the year 2000 to 204,88 million until 2010. An UNDP study forecasts a rise to 250,47 Million people, based on an annual growth rate of 1.7375 per cent until the year 2020.<sup>4</sup>

*Roberto Aliboni's* interpretation of this forecast estimates that the actual number of 9 million people, who are currently unemployed in the region, will rise up to 15 million within the next years if the Arabic MDL countries fail to reconstitute their economic growth. This aspect could contribute to a distinct migration exodus, with the EU being the main destination.<sup>5</sup> An asymmetric forthcoming free trade zone will, most likely, enforce these developments, which would automatically broaden the gap between South and North irreversibly. Although liberal trade-relations are beneficial by matter of principle and have the potential to establish economic structures which enable the people to stay in their respective home-countries, an asymmetric liberation with different tariffs would bring about the contrary. Sub-regional instabilities and an euro-med-collapse would be the outcome. All this is not unknown.

**Figure II. Demographic trends and future scenarios in the Mediterranean**

STATE	HDI (2002)	Pop. in mil-	Pop. in mil-	Pop. in mil-	Pop. in mil-	Pop. in mil-
		lion 1975	lion 1997	lion 2000	lion 2010	lion 2020
<b>Algeria</b>	<b>0,68</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>28,9</b>	<b>30,31</b>	<b>36,21</b>	<b>43,18</b>
<b>Egypt</b>	<b>0,62</b>	<b>38,8</b>	<b>60,7</b>	<b>67,89</b>	<b>83,53</b>	<b>102,46</b>
<b>Jordan</b>	<b>0,72</b>	<b>1,9</b>	<b>4,8</b>	<b>4,91</b>	<b>6,6</b>	<b>8,73</b>
<b>Lebanon</b>	<b>0,74</b>	<b>2,8</b>	<b>3,4</b>	<b>3,5</b>	<b>4,01</b>	<b>4,76</b>
<b>Libya</b>	<b>0,76</b>	<b>2,4</b>	<b>5,2</b>	<b>5,29</b>	<b>6,51</b>	<b>8,36</b>
<b>Morocco</b>	<b>0,59</b>	<b>17,3</b>	<b>28,8</b>	<b>29,88</b>	<b>36,36</b>	<b>43,49</b>
<b>Syria</b>	<b>0,66</b>	<b>7,4</b>	<b>15,6</b>	<b>16,19</b>	<b>20,81</b>	<b>27,11</b>
<b>Tunisia</b>	<b>0,7</b>	<b>5,7</b>	<b>9,3</b>	<b>9,46</b>	<b>10,85</b>	<b>12,38</b>
<b>Region</b>		<b>92,3</b>	<b>156,7</b>	<b>167,43</b>	<b>204,88</b>	<b>250,47</b>

Data is established from: United Nations Development Programme (Ed.): Human Development Report 2001, Oxford 2001, 154; United Nations Development Programme (Ed.): Arab Human Development Report 2002, New York, 144.

Arnold Hottinger described the enormous gap of prosperity between the two Mediterranean shore sides five years ago: *“The 226 million people of the eleven South Mediterranean States gained in 1996*

<sup>4</sup> More details are presented in Figure II (demographic trends).

<sup>5</sup> Roberto Aliboni: Südmediterrane Herausforderungen. Antworten der EU-Staaten sind gefragt, in: Internationale Politik, Nr. 2, Bonn 1996, 11.

*a very unequally distributed income per head of 2336 US-Dollar, in contrast the 176 million people of the five States of the North gained an average of 20,777 US-Dollar. This represents approximately nine times more. At the same time the population of the South grew between 1990 and 1996 for 2.5 per cent each year while the population of the North stagnated at 0.3 per cent.”<sup>6</sup>*

### A Double Challenge

Having above figures in mind, the demographical situation is a double challenge. Firstly, there is a very large young population on the one hand and an emergent elderly population on the other. Secondly, the population proportion of the two shores has changed during the last half of the century. In the 1950s, 68% of the population lived in the Northern and 32% in Southern States of the Mediterranean. This trend has completely changed. Already in the 1990s the relation shifted from 42% to 58%. Prognoses for the year 2010 estimate a proportion of 34% to 66%. *Boustani and Fargues* describe the future scenario for the year 2025 as follows: „*Of the 170 million additional people living on the shores of the Mediterranean in 2025, 68 percent will have been born in an Arab country, 22 percent in Turkey, and only 10 percent in Europe.*“<sup>7</sup> More food, water and jobs are needed in order to cope with such a population growth. The chart below gives a differentiated overview about the MPCs annual demographic increase.

*Figure III. MPCs annual demographic increase*

Source: United Nations Development Programme: Human Development Report 2001, Oxford 2001, 154-156.

#### Annual Growth rate

	2000	1975-1999	1999-2015
<b>Algeria</b>	<b>1.82%</b>	<b>2.6%</b>	<b>1.5%</b>
<b>Egypt</b>	<b>1.82%</b>	<b>2.3%</b>	<b>1.5%</b>
<b>Jordan</b>	<b>2.9%</b>	<b>3.8%</b>	<b>2.5%</b>
<b>Lebanon</b>	<b>1.97%</b>	<b>0.9%</b>	<b>1.3%</b>
<b>Libya</b>	<b>2.13%</b>	<b>3.1%</b>	<b>1.9%</b>
<b>Morocco</b>	<b>1.87%</b>	<b>2.2%</b>	<b>1.6%</b>
<b>Syria</b>	<b>2.59%</b>	<b>3.1%</b>	<b>2.40%</b>
<b>Tunisia</b>	<b>1.12%</b>	<b>2.1%</b>	<b>1.20%</b>

Consequently, it can be said that after the East-West conflict a general paradigm change has taken place: from the security dilemma to the survival dilemma. In developing countries the survival di-

<sup>6</sup> Vgl. Arnold Hottinger: Arabic suffering and passions, in: NZZ Folio, Das Mittelmeer, Nr. 6, 1998, 41.

<sup>7</sup> Rafic Boustani and Philippe Fargues: Atlas du Monde Arabe: Geopolitique et Societé, Paris, 39.

lemma derives from uncontrolled population growth and regional impacts of the global change of the climate.<sup>8</sup> This has implications with regard to urbanisation, soil erosion, desertification, cumulative water deficiency and comestible goods as well as environmental pollution. If the 'century of refugees' has already turned into the 'century of migration', *Peter Opitz* realised that currently the number of economic refugees easily transcends the number of political refugees but the number of environmental refugees will outperform the number of economic refugees soon.<sup>9</sup>

### **Enlargement in the East and 'Push- and Pull-Factors' in the South**

Migration studies distinguish between 'push- and pull-factors' of migration. Civil wars, military conflicts, terrorism and grinding poverty belong to the push-factors. The aspiration and hope for better living conditions, freedom and security are defined as the pull-factors.<sup>10</sup> As a consequence, an intense migration pressure lies on the EU. The essential push factors are: the extreme population growth of the South with all sorts of social problems entailed, controlled economies whose gains passes off the average population and enriches a small elite, asymmetric trade relationships and, thirdly, an emerging factor in future: environmental pollution.<sup>11</sup> Also the search for jobs and the refugees' hope for a better future<sup>12</sup> boost the flow of migration to Europe.

The impact of EU enlargement will also be intense. The current 25 Member States of the EU and the remaining three candidate countries and the Mediterranean partner countries of the EU (MPCs), are being gradually integrated into a large Free Trade Zone (FTZ), which will cover 37 countries altogether in 2010. This FTZ will be the biggest free trade area worldwide, by far. The combined population is about 710 million people. In the year 2000, for example, it's the combined average GDP per capita is 15,652 US-\$ and the joint GDP amounted to approximately 11.1 trillion US-\$ purchasing power parity.<sup>13</sup> Romania and Bulgaria are already welcomed as Member States in 2007. Brussels will start accession negotiations with Ankara, too.

These fundamental shifts in the configuration of the EU will most probably have spill over effects for the entire area of the free trade zone, too. Most of the tariff barriers will be re-

<sup>8</sup> Michael Renner: *Fighting for Survival. Environmental decline, social conflict and the new age of insecurity*, London 1997, 198.

<sup>9</sup> Peter J. Opitz: *Migration/Weltflüchtlingsproblematik*, in: Wichard Woyke: *Handwörterbuch Internationale Politik*, Bonn 1998, 252.

<sup>10</sup> Reginald T. Appleyard: *Emigration Dynamics in Developing Countries*, in: *International Migration*, Bd. 33, 3-4, 1995, 293-311; Peter J. Opitz: *Welten im Umbruch, Menschen im Aufbruch. Das Weltflüchtlingsproblem*, in: Opitz, Peter J. (Ed): *Weltprobleme*, Bonn 1995, 151.

<sup>11</sup> Franz Nuscheler: „Neue Völkerwanderungen“ aus dem Süden: Bedrohung oder Halluzination, in: *Jahrbuch Dritte Welt* 1999, München 1998, 27.

<sup>12</sup> Out of seven world regions, the Arab countries had the lowest freedom score in the late 1990s, UNDP: *AHDR 2002*, 27.

<sup>13</sup> The source of all calculations is the World Bank's *Development Report 2002*.

moved and market size increases. This induces implications to trade and investment. In addition, there are indirect effects.<sup>14</sup>

However, economic difficulties appear to be already determined.<sup>15</sup> The 10 new Member States have increased the population of the EU by approximately 20% while GDP has only been enhanced by 4%. This means that GDP per capita in the EU more than doubles the GDP in the new Member States. The rigorous tendency of some Member States of the EU to subordinate Euro-Med political long-term multilateral goals to unilateral short-term trading interests could be described as an economic boomerang. Uneducated labour, not finding employment in its home-countries will not qualify to the sophisticated needs of European employers and will increase the problems of the European social welfare systems. A decade ago, a World Bank report has already documented: *“Unemployment is a serious economic, social and political phenomenon throughout the region. More than 15 percent of the active population is unemployed in the countries of the Maghreb, Egypt, and in Iran, while in Jordan and in Yemen the unemployment rates exceed 25 percent. The consequences of past demographic growth will continue to show up as extraordinary increases in the working age population during the next 20 years. If the region is to find social stability thanks to the productive employment of those currently unemployed and of the work force that will enter the labour market in the future, the rhythm and the nature of economic growth must develop considerably compared to what they have been in the recent past.”*<sup>16</sup>

From the illegal immigrants' perspective, Europe is, of course, very attractive. As Joffé pointed out: *“No wonder that migration seems an attractive option, despite European xenophobia and official discrimination.”*<sup>17</sup> Some Arab MPCs support this movement. For them the control of illegal migration towards Europe mutated from a punishable act to a booming business.<sup>18</sup> At the same time, xenophobia among the European population increases. Exaggerated comparisons state that *“... the twenty-first century could once again find Islam at the gates of Vienna, as immigrants or terrorists if not as armies. Indeed, massive Islamic immigration into France may already have reversed Charles Martel's victory in 732 at the Battle of Tours.”*<sup>19</sup>

However, the nucleus of such comparisons should be taken seriously. The political and economic stability of all Arab MPCs should be in the own security interest of the EU. Inter alia

<sup>14</sup> Indirect effects are, for example, increased competition in markets, fundamental changes in economic policies and, last but not least, all sorts of alterations regarding institutions and legal systems.

<sup>15</sup> The GDP of the EU population (376.4 Mio.) have an amount of 7,8 trillion US-\$, the GDP of the 10 NMS population (75.1 Mio.) have an amount of 327 million US-\$, the GDP of the MPS population (164 Mio.) have an amount of 357 million US-\$.

<sup>16</sup> World Bank (ed.): Annual Report 1992, Washington 1992, 58.

<sup>17</sup> George Joffé: Europe and the Mediterranean, London 2000, 3.

<sup>18</sup> Ali Bensaad: Durch die Wüste – Reise ans Ende der Angst, in: Le Monde diplomatique, September 2001, 18 and Michael Pugh: Europe's boat people: Maritime cooperation in the Mediterranean, Institute for Security studies of WEU, Chaillot Paper 41, Paris 2000, [www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai41e.html](http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai41e.html), 23.03.2001, 16:47.

<sup>19</sup> William S. Lind: Defending Western Culture, in: Foreign Policy, No. 84, Fall 1991, 45. Same line of argumentation by Samuel P. Huntington: The Clash of Civilizations?, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, 22-49.



this is due to the fact that, “... *a declining North Africa would be a recipe for the rise of Islamist regimes and a major exodus of economic migrants and political refugees to Europe.*”<sup>20</sup>

### Conclusion

A fair Euro-Med free trade zone would mean a substantial change in comparison to the present status quo of the Arabic MPCs. An equal playing field for trade should be established. Otherwise, the Arabic MPCs will not be able to cope with Western economies. In terms of migration, this would contribute to the kindling of a demographic bomb. Instead, a temporary brain-drain<sup>21</sup> can be measured as a fair strategy because immigrants could enhance the knowledge transfer to their home-countries. Hence, a brain drain could be turned into a brain gain. Arab governments should engage highly qualified expatriate Arabs in domestic research & development programmes. For all these purposes, a successful labour migration could be arranged in partnership with the EU.

Although the enlargement process has drawn-off attraction, the South cannot be ignored any longer. It should be made clear, in fact, that Member States, who lobby protectionism ignore that problems are getting bigger, not smaller in the future. In consequence, helping the Mediterranean partner countries in economic and infrastructural terms<sup>22</sup> and equalling the playing-field supports economic welfare and political stability. Such an initiative would have potential to reduce migration on the one hand and, on the other hand, would export prosperity towards the Southern Mediterranean. Concerning the old biblical saying from the outset, it is the European task to move the mountain earlier than the prophet decides to come.

<sup>20</sup> Richard Gillespie: Introduction: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative, in: Gillespie, Richard (Ed.): The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Political and Economic Perspectives, London 1997, 1.

<sup>21</sup> The first brain-drain debate came up in the late 70s; Jagdish N. Bhagwati: International Migration of the Highly Skilled: Economic Ethics and Taxes, in: Third World Quarterly, 3/1979, 57-71.

<sup>22</sup> Especially a scientific assistance to build up an Arabic Knowledge Society is needed. See: UNDP (Ed.): Arab Human Development Report 2003.

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