



Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik  
Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy

Michaela C. Hertkorn, Ph.D.

## Why German-US Relations Still Matter to the Transatlantic Alliance

One Year after the War in Iraq

**DIAS ANALYSIS**  
**No. 7 August 2004**

[www.dias-online.org](http://www.dias-online.org)

Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik e.V.  
Juristische Fakultät der Heinrich-Heine-Universität  
Universitätsstr. 1 D-40225 Düsseldorf

Michaela C. Hertkorn

heads the Directorate for Transatlantic Relations at the Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy (DIAS) and works as a policy analyst and guest scholar at the Center for European Studies, New York University. She is Assistant Professor at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy, Seton Hall University, and a Faculty Member in the Department for International Affairs and NGOs at the New York University School for Continuing and Professional Studies. Michaela has studied political science at the University of Heidelberg and holds a PhD from the Free University Berlin.

Michaela C. Hertkorn can be reached at [hertkorn@dias-online.org](mailto:hertkorn@dias-online.org).

Michaela Hertkorn

Why German-US Relations Still Matter to the Transatlantic Alliance: One Year after the War in Iraq, DIAS Analysis No. 7, Dusseldorf, August 2004.

Published by

Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy  
Law Department of the Heinrich Heine University  
Universitätsstraße 1 D-40225 Dusseldorf

[www.dias-online.org](http://www.dias-online.org)

© 2004, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy (DIAS)

## Contents

<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>The Relevance of German-US Relations to NATO Transformation .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Methodology.....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>German-US Relations in the Post-9/11-Bush Phase with a Focus on Iraq .....</b>	<b>10</b>
The ultimate aftermath of 9/11 .....	10
The year 2002 and growing disagreement over Iraq .....	10
Diplomatic wrangling in 2003 – the Iraq ‘war clout’ .....	12
The problematic impact of troubled German-US Relations on NATO Transformation .....	13
The problematic impact of troubled German-US Relations within Europe and within the European Union .....	14
One year later: ‘mission un-accomplished’ and disagreements over how to stabilize Iraq and how to win the war against global terrorism.....	15

## Abstract

The paper discusses German-US-American relations one year after the end of war in Iraq. While troubled bi-lateral relations between the US and Germany in 2003 had their impact, both on the transatlantic relationship, but also on the intra-European theatre, Allies on both sides of the Atlantic in 2004 are still faced with the following questions: How long-term will the damage in bi-lateral relations be? How will this impact those foreign and security policy issues that are in the interest of both sides, such as the stabilization of the Middle East? This paper follows up on an analysis that was published by DIAS in November 2003. The current version takes some of the previous questions further, while discussing them in the context of nation-building, and addressing the question, to which extent soft and hard power need to be linked when solving today's international crises and conflicts, such as in Iraq?

## Introduction

A declaration on NATO transformation of October 6, 2002 stated the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needed to be “capable of taking action whenever the security of its members was threatened, upon the basis of the United Nations Charter. By making it clear that there is no safe haven for those who would threaten our societies or for those who would harbor such people”<sup>1</sup> the deterrent element of Alliance strategy was strengthened. The North Atlantic Council should decide actions on a case-by-case basis. Where NATO as a whole was not engaged, allies willing to take action should be able to make use of NATO assets, procedures and practices. The declaration stressed high priority goals essential to the full range of Alliance missions including the defense against terrorism. This new initiative was to be based on firm national commitments with specific target dates. National commitments should be made transparent for parliamentary monitoring and oversight. Priority should be given to projects maximizing multi-nationality, and which had the potential to become common NATO assets. NATO and European Union capabilities initiatives needed to be mutually reinforced and thoroughly harmonized through permanent co-ordination mechanisms and procedures in a spirit of openness. NATO should redouble its efforts to reduce the fragmentation of defense procurement efforts through the pooling of military capabilities, co-operative acquisition of equipment and common funding. It should reduce to a minimum the obstacles for the sharing of technology. The alliance had to be able to act wherever NATO’s interests were threatened, creating coalitions under NATO’s own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions, concerning both, old and new threats.<sup>2</sup> NATO General Secretary, Lord Robertson referred to the experience NATO had with post-conflict stabilization, as in Kosovo and Macedonia.<sup>3</sup> On October 8, 2002 Robertson declared, an enormous number of security issues on the Euro-Atlantic agenda required the greatest possible communication and coordination among Europeans and North Americans. The November 2002 Prague Summit would be a transforming event for the Alliance. It covered a wide range from terrorism, NATO’s military command arrangements and headquarters structure, to a further development of Partnership. The most visible issues referred to enlargement and improvements to NATO’s military capabilities.<sup>4</sup> The question of capabilities concerned the member countries of NATO and of the European Union (EU). Because each nation had only one set of forces, it was necessary to make the best use possible of the scarce resources, avoiding duplication and overlaps. The message was very clear: the European Capabilities Action Plan and NATO’s Prague

---

<sup>1</sup> Declaration on NATO Transformation, Standing Committee, Brussels, 6 October, 2002.

<sup>2</sup> To achieve this, the following steps were necessary. First, expansion of NATO’s membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing NATO’s common interests. Second, to ensure that the military forces of NATO member states had appropriate combat contributions to make in coalitions warfare. Third, development of planning processes to enable those contributions to become effective multinational fighting forces.

<sup>3</sup> Lord Robertson, *Fox News*, 1 August, 2003: From on August 11<sup>th</sup>, NATO would take over the command of ISAF in Afghanistan. With regard to Iraq, 11 NATO members had already pledged troops for the post-conflict stabilization and transition process. From on August 2003, NATO nations, like Poland and Spain, with the logistical support of NATO, would be on the ground in Iraq to share the burden. What Allies in EU and NATO needed to do in general, was to learn more about how to deal with conflict in pre- and post-settlement situations. NATO was used to deal with the sharp edges of the killing fields of the Balkans. The Alliance faced the challenge how to address post-conflict situations.

<sup>4</sup> Lord Robertson, EU Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Defense Policy and Common Security, *NATO on-line library*, 8 October, 2002.

Capabilities Commitment needed to be coherent. Work in full transparency on capabilities issues was imperative, if EU-NATO impasse was to be avoided or ended.<sup>5</sup>

## The Relevance of German-US Relations to NATO Transformation

In the following, this article will discuss the particular challenges for Germany as an evolving center power in Europe. Will Germany be willing and able to play a constructive role to help streamlining EU-NATO co-operation? On the other hand, will she continue to use her influence on EU to counter-balance the US – together with France?<sup>6</sup>

In the analysis of the author of this paper, troubled or tensed US-German relations, particularly – though not exclusively – on the issue of Iraq,<sup>7</sup> have had their problematic impact in two main areas: first, they added to divisions within the so-called intra-European theatre and within EU; second, they continued to hamper or hinder the so-called NATO transformation.

Germany as a key regional player needs to assist with the transformation of NATO, instead of encouraging division within the Atlantic community and its international or regional organizations. This means, Germany actively should promote the streamlining of capabilities and the closest as possible cooperation between EU and NATO in peacemaking and (post-conflict) peacekeeping. Further NATO and EU enlargement make the challenges ahead for the German government more obvious and crucial, as enlargement will in all likelihood enhance the number of US friendly member countries. A European Union that aims – whether indirectly or not - at duplicating or decoupling from NATO, will find itself quasi-automatically on a collision course with the US.<sup>8</sup> Such policy will not only harm the capability of the Alliance to meet the soft and hard power-related security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, but also diminish the prospect of a

---

<sup>5</sup> 'Transforming the Alliance', *NATO Review*, Summer 2002.

<sup>6</sup> Interview with Karsten Voigt, Auswärtige Amt, Berlin, 5 January 2001: NATO had always been about collective defense. ESDP would enable the Europeans to build capacities 'next to the Americans.' He stressed the Petersberg tasks. Most crises within European interest, as the Balkans needed 'exactly that.' He could not necessarily imagine a potential conflict in Europe, where more so-called hard power security was necessary, where peacekeeping developed into peacemaking or full war.

<sup>7</sup> Conflicts between the US and Germany manifested themselves on a variety of alternating issues, from the Kyoto Protocol and missile defense to the ICC; Michaela Hertkorn, 'The Impact of September 11<sup>th</sup> on ESDP and Coercive Prevention: The German Perspective', *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* (winter/spring 2003), 83 - 115.

<sup>8</sup> What concerns US leadership, four scenarios were envisioned: First, the US does not lead, and EU is unwilling or incapable to act. This was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 90s. Second, the US leads, and EU is not capable of doing it alone or to contribute a major share. This arguably was given during the Kosovo intervention. Third, The US assumes and claims its leadership role, and EU develops own security and defense capabilities. This may be the intention of ESDP, as promoted by the British, who have stressed the need for ESDP not decoupling from NATO. Such arrangement would likely strengthen NATO and see the transatlantic relationship inter-related with further European integration. Fourth, The US does not lead, and EU continues to develop its own security and defense policy. This carries the risk of ESDP being perceived, at least by some European countries, as independent from NATO. This may lead to a sustainable division of labor between NATO and EU. France has aimed at developing European hard power capabilities, separately from NATO. Germany – with its strong pacifist tradition as a domestic constraint – may have been tempted, to regard ESDP and its Petersberg tasks providing the ultimate soft power alternative to NATO hard power collective defense. How would these scenarios play out in the aftermath of 9/11 and throughout the Iraq crisis? See Michaela Hertkorn, 'The Relevance of Perceptions in Foreign Policy: A German – US Perspective', *World Affairs* (fall 2001).

functioning and well integrated common European foreign and security policy.<sup>9</sup> To contribute accordingly to NATO or to strengthen the common European foreign and security policy cannot be a question of either – or, as contributions by European and/or EU countries will matter in how the Alliance adapts to a new security environment, and whether NATO stays relevant.

A German foreign policy that is both constructive and responsible needs to take these inter-dependent factors and variables into account. By contrast, the diplomatic stunts<sup>10</sup> of the last months seems to have reinvented Germany as problematic partner in the Alliance and handicapped its role as second important partner to the US – next to Great Britain. It is clear, that such an outcome cannot be and is not in Germany's own national interest. It looks as if the current German government within a few months gave up on *fundamental principles*, which arguably characterized German foreign policy ever since the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War and throughout most of the 1990s. Such principles were: Never to go it alone; never to make the ultimate decision between Paris or Washington; never to get into a geo-political 'two frontier situation' between Paris and Moscow – without other strong diplomatic ties with London and Washington. While supporting to a large degree French plans and policy how to reform the institutions of the European Union, Germany furthermore seems to have abandoned its role to protect the interests of smaller EU countries within the Commission.

Holding on to such principles ever since the 1950s, allowed Germany to continuously mature into its growing role as partner in EU and NATO, under US leadership and under US protection throughout and in the aftermath of the Cold War. French-German partnership was initiated by the United States. German Reunification was possible only with the strong support of the US. If calls of German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder for Germany to become a 'normal' country mean all but the discontinuity of a functioning foreign policy ever since the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War, such 'normalcy' misses what is truly at stake for democratic Germany as the largest country in EU. While Germany's theoretically evolving role and potential – more than a decade after reaching sovereignty will be further discussed and highlighted in the following – general challenges could be characterized as sharing the burden and playing an integrating and organizing role as so-called "center-power".<sup>11</sup>

## Methodology

This paper is based on research regarding potential tensions between Allies on both sides of the Atlantic, while highlighting German-US relations. The overall goal was, to examine conflict manifestations on multiple policy issues of global relevance and of mutual interest to both Europeans and Germans on the one hand, as well as the US on the other hand. Such policy issues included for example burden sharing in the Balkans, missile defense and the Kyoto Protocol. While study-

---

<sup>9</sup> 'Frage unter Freunden – Wohin geht Amerika?', Sabine Christiansen (Sendung vom 6. August 2003), [www.sabine-christiansen.de/2003/07/06/c\\_archiv.html](http://www.sabine-christiansen.de/2003/07/06/c_archiv.html): Angela Merkel stressed, a Europe or European Union set in confrontation with the US would never be united.

<sup>10</sup> By France, Germany and Russia upon intervention in Iraq in spring 2003.

<sup>11</sup> The German government and the German public should become aware of the problematic impact the recent worsening of German-US relations had. In 2003, the strongest bi-lateral relations between the US and partners in NATO and EU seem to exist with Great Britain to the North of Germany, Italy to the South, Spain to the West and Poland to the East. This illustrates the following: Germany is out of the picture as a regional integrating power or player at the geographic center of Europe and therefore cannot but miss its potentially integrating and coordinating centric role.

ing German-US relations in recent years, the following three phases were identified: the pre-Bush, the Bush and the post-9/11-Bush phase.

**The so-called pre-Bush phase** (Figure 1) dealt with the case studies of long-term stabilization in the Balkans and a common European security and defense policy. The following questions were addressed: Does the US want Germany to play a stronger role in EU and NATO? How are such expectations perceived in Germany?<sup>12</sup>




Figure 1: Theses and Hypothesis in the pre-Bush era


**The so-called Bush-phase** (Figure 2) lasted from the Presidential Elections of George Bush in November 2000 to September 11, 2001, including the first two visits of President Bush to Europe by early Summer 2001. Main case studies were missile defense and NATO enlargement.

Before his first two visits to Europe in early summer 2001, the author of this paper had anticipated, the US administration might need Germany in EU and NATO because of Germany’s partnership with France and its good relations with Russian President, Vladimir Putin. However, in the summer of 2001, the Bush administration entered Europe via Spain and Italy, were warmly welcomed, and Britain – once saddened about the former Clinton-Blair axis - had already turned around. Furthermore, the sudden rapprochement of Putin and Bush on NATO enlargement and missile defense came as a surprise to German political elites. Having ‘charmed’ Britain, Spain and Italy, the *core assumption of this research project needed to be adapted*: The Bush administration might be

<sup>12</sup> The aftermath of Kosovo could be characterized by European uneasiness about US dominance in contrast to US uneasiness about European unwillingness or incapability to act without the US in the Balkans.

able to bypass Germany and France. The continuing flare up of German anti-Bush-anti-Americanism in news seemed to put Germany in confrontation with the US already back in July and August 2001.

This assessment served as basis for further analysis post-9/11. How would the relationship and potential issues of tensions develop in the longer perspective, if the war against global terror lingered on or even stretched to other countries?



6/9/04 / Seite 6  
© Michaela Hertkorn

Figure 2: Theses and Hypothesis in the Bush era

**The so-called post-9/11-Bush phase** (Figure 3) started on September 11, 2001, which arguably changed parameters defining transatlantic relations. Policy issues of tensions between the Allies, like the Kyoto protocol, missile defense or burden sharing, suddenly were not on top of the transatlantic agenda anymore. Germany declared its post-World War II era over and NATO faced a new collective threat. By autumn 2001, “NATO for-ever-transformed” became the major focus and case study of this research project.<sup>13</sup>

In September 2002, NATO Ambassadors in Poland discussed enlargement and how to streamline their capabilities. NATO’s Transformation Declaration of October 6, 2002, stated NATO would go global where the United Nations (UN) also based the threat on resolutions. The US proposition to create a NATO reaction force, which was accepted at NATO’s Novem-


<sup>13</sup> Why this? All former case studies could be subsumed under NATO’s role in peacemaking and peacekeeping, like in the Balkans. NATO would be of relevance for further rapprochement with Russia and the war against global terrorism.



ber Summit in Prague, will – it shall be argued here - have a lasting and possibly weakening impact on the European Union rapid reaction forces.<sup>14</sup>

Germany has been one of the unhappier countries given these developments. While Great Britain has perceived the common European security and defense policy (ESDP), as being incorporated in NATO, Germany’s current government has regarded ESDP as ultimate soft-power alternative to NATO. France has been suspicious about US leadership role in NATO for many years, and seems to have hoped for ESDP to create hard-power alternatives to NATO.<sup>15</sup>

What would happen to tensions between European countries, in particular Germany, and the United States in the longer run? What could and should European partners, like Germany contribute to a coalition against terrorism and to multinational peacekeeping forces, as for instance in Afghanistan, but also (possibly) in post-conflict Iraq? Which domestic constraints do theoretically or really exist for Germany’s current government coalition? Would September 11, 2001 strengthen the European commitment in NATO *or* a so-called common Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)? These were the core questions to be addressed and dealt with throughout in this post-9/11 phase.



6/9/04 / Seite 3  
© Michaela Hertkorn

Figure 3: Theses and Hypotheses in the post-9/11-Bush era

<sup>14</sup> ‘Diplomatic warfare breaks out in NATO after a call by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg for the creation of headquarters and planning staff from which a purely European Union based defense might emerge’, *BBC News Online*, [www.bbc.co.uk/](http://www.bbc.co.uk/) (30 April, 2003).

<sup>15</sup> ‘Wrangle over EU Rapid Reaction Force’, *CNN.com/WORLD*, 14 December , 2002; Johan Huizinga, ‘Greece Blocks EU Defense Force’, *Radio Netherlands Wereldomroep*, [www.rnw.nl/hotspots](http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots) (11 December, 2002); ‘Turkey Deal on Rapid Reaction Force’, *BBC News*, 3 December, 2001; ‘EU Rapid Reaction Force will be Ready in 2003’, *euobserver.com*, [www.euobserver.com/index](http://www.euobserver.com/index) (19 November, 2001); Chris Lindborg, ‘The EU Rapid Reaction Force: Europe Takes on a New Security Challenge’, *BASIC Papers, Occasional Papers on International Security Policy*, number 37, [www.basicint.org/pubs/](http://www.basicint.org/pubs/) (August 2001);

## German-US Relations in the Post-9/11-Bush Phase with a Focus on Iraq

### The ultimate aftermath of 9/11

Ultimately after September 11, 2001 one challenge seemed to be clear for Germany's government: they had to acknowledge and shoulder more hard power responsibility – possibly with regard to both, new and old security threats.<sup>16</sup> While research in the pre-Bush and Bush phase showed that tensions between the United States and (some of) its European Allies, like particularly Germany, persisted on varying issues up to September 11, 2001, an interesting question showed to be how misunderstandings and tensions on a range of potential topics would develop over time in the post-9/11-world? Therefore, we have to take a deeper look at how German-US relations developed in the aftermath of September 11, and ever since then. The following arguments will try to provide an answer, while highlighting the particular issue of Iraq

German Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger on December 11, 2001 characterized US-German relations as follows: “I cannot remember a time, when that relation was better”. On his first arrival in Washington in July 2001, the relationship had not been that good: “Your president was not given such good description in European media. We were faced with many problems, like the Kyoto protocol. After 9/11, I am faced with second-rate problems”.<sup>17</sup>

Ambassador Ischinger had the following suggestion for the US administration: “Being a world power brings many blessings. The question is not, how can you avoid, to be hated, but how can you soften things? Whenever you intervene, you will hurt somebody's interest. You cannot avoid that. The recipe – from a German perspective – is: what you did in post-2<sup>nd</sup>-World-War era in Germany and Japan. The UN was your creation. Use them! Set good examples. You will get maximum respect and maybe some love.

### The year 2002 and growing disagreement over Iraq

The previously described developments concerned the ultimate aftermath of September 11, 2001. It seems important to stress that while Ambassador Ischinger made these positive comments, the German government throughout December 2001 already provided contradictory signals. The Social-Democratic and Green government coalition in Germany refused to take over the lead for the multinational peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. Berlin thereby frustrated not only Washington, but also London.<sup>18</sup> In early January 2002, German news was occupied by the resignation of Italian Foreign Minister Ruggiero, which according to German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer,

---

<sup>16</sup> Global terrorism can be regarded as a new threat. Intra-state conflicts, such as in the Balkans, can be conceptualized as both, older and newer security threats – depending from the focus of analysis. The classical, old threat seems to refer to the former bi-polar international system during the Cold War.

<sup>17</sup> Wolfgang Ischinger, ‘Germany and the United States: Allies against Terrorism’, (presentation at the World Affairs Council, Washington DC, 11 December, 2002).

<sup>18</sup> ‘Streit zwischen Berlin und London droht Afghanistan-Resolution weiter zu verzögern,’ *FAZ*, 18 December, 2001; ‘Britain to lead Afghanistan force. Peacekeepers to coordinate with US,’ *The Washington Post*, 11 December, 2002; ‘Germany's government: still edgy,’ *Economist*, 24 November, 2001. While German contribution to ISAF led to a vote of confidence in the German parliament, called for by Schröder to assure the majority within his own coalition, Germany later offered to lead ISAF together with the Netherlands – during NATO Ambassador meeting in Poland, September 2002. This offer seems to have come as a quasi token for German opposition to US policy on Iraq.

meant considerable damage to European integration, while Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar quite in contrast showed comprehension for the decision of Berlusconi. By late January 2002, the “inhumane treatment” of captives in Guantanamo dominated German news. It was suggested that the “terror shock” had made the US “blind towards the rule of law”. Also in January 2002, Fischer declared with regard to US American policy on Iraq: “We won’t be treated as satellites.” The desk officer for European Union affairs at the German Embassy in Washington DC expressed during an interview with the author of this paper in March, 2002: “What concerns Iraq, we are just not playing as the US wishes us to do.” In interviews at Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik (a German think tank in Berlin) by Mid April 2002, experts on the United States shared the following view: “Global terrorism concerns the US, not Germany and not Europe.”

Overall, Iraq and the ‘peace process’ in the Middle East seem to have emerged as important or main conflict issues between the US administration and the current German government in spring and summer of 2002. Josef Joffe, a German journalist and an expert on Germany provided the following diagnosis in an article of the German weekly DIE ZEIT: “Europe mobilizes against the US: Germany’s Joschka Fischer and his colleague, Rezzo Schlauch, hold the Americans responsible for their own – the Germans’ – feeling of helplessness. Doing so, they reaffirm what they want to fend off.”<sup>19</sup>

It is fair to conclude that perceptions of threat in Germany and the US are different. The political leadership in Germany has not articulated that Germany or Europe were at war or in a warlike situation. However, given the considerable troops that contributed to Enduring Freedom off the Somali coast, the troops that have been part of ISAF and the German Amber Fox forces deployed in Eastern Afghanistan, this has been problematic from early on and still is.<sup>20</sup>

The speech of Bush in the German parliament in Berlin on May 23, 2002 was arguably an attempt to bridge the gap between the United States and German political elites on Iraq and the Middle East as a whole. In non-provocative, clear words, his messages were basic: the terrorists new the European map, too. The fact that the German government praised the speech, might have been an (early on) indicator, that Bush tried to help prepare the ground for Germany’s center-left government – with a strong pacifistic tradition – to sell the global war against terrorism, not only to the German public, but also their own party bases. In that logic, Fischer commented on the speech of the American President: “If Bush really connects development aid [as a tool of soft power security] with military force, than his speech truly was historic.”<sup>21</sup> During his visit in Berlin, Bush obviously promised not to put Iraq on top of his foreign policy agenda before German federal elections in September 2002, and was given Schröder’s assurance, Germany would not openly oppose US policy on Iraq. Obviously, this promise was later broken for domestic policy concerns in the re-election process.

What followed in summer 2002, was Schröder arguing, Germany would not be pulled into “US American adventures” in Iraq or “click heels”. He highlighted the necessity of a German path in this regard. This did not only cause irritation in Washington, but also – and cannot probably not be stressed enough - made other European allies wonder about Germany’s overall

---

<sup>19</sup> ‘Amerika. Atlantische Aufwallungen. Bündnisfall Irak: Europa macht gegen USA mobil,’ *ZEIT.DE*, 25 February, 2002.

<sup>20</sup> Michaela Hertkorn, ‘The Impact of September 11<sup>th</sup> on ESDP and Coercive Prevention’, *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* (Winter/Spring 2003), 83 - 114.

<sup>21</sup> ‘In Reichstag, Bush condemns terror as a new despotism, seeks to reassure allies’, *New York Times*, 24 May, 2002.

reliability as an ally, friend and partner in Europe and within the transatlantic community.<sup>22</sup> The upheaval, which Schröder's stand on Iraq generally caused in America, may show to the world that the US values the opinions and support of its allies. No matter what opinion individual allies or member states in the European Union or NATO may have taken with regard to Iraq, one observation shall be allowed at this stage: German foreign policy seems to be characterized by a strong degree of reactive responsiveness, otherwise called 'Vogelstrauß-Policy'. Correspondingly, an article in DIE WELT on September 27, 2002 stated, "NATO General Secretary, Lord Robertson, worries about the relations between Berlin and Washington. To stay away from the classified briefing by the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at the NATO [Ambassador] meeting in Poland, as German Defense Minister Struck did, and then to express that there was no new proof available [with regard to Iraq], does not show the Germans take the situation seriously enough."<sup>23</sup>

### **Diplomatic wrangling in 2003 – the Iraq 'war clout'**

In the end, the German government kept its ultimate no to any use of force, whether based on a UN mandate or a so-called coalition of the willing forming a multinational force. For example, after a meeting between Robertson and Fischer in early September 2002, the German Foreign Minister declared: "one should not expect any change of policy on Iraq by the German government. Schröder and I have already made up our minds."<sup>24</sup> This attitude in the end prevailed: *Before* the inspectors made their report to the UN Security Council on January 27, 2003 the German government – together with France – opposed strongly any "war with Iraq" and stressed inspectors needed more time.<sup>25</sup> On February 5, 2003, *before* the presentation of US Secretary of State, Colin Powell in front of the Security Council, Schröder insisted publicly on his absolute "no against war".

By late January and throughout February 2003, US diplomatic efforts for a short while seem to have aimed at pulling Germany away from France. However, the common French-German-Russian Memorandum on US and British policy in Iraq sealed German diplomatic and foreign policy options, or ultimately bound them to French national interests.

It is important to stress that not every representative of Germany's governing parties supported the government course on Iraq. Hans Ulrich Klose, a foreign policy expert with the Social Democrats, declared - in the Hamburger Tagblatt - in July 2002: "Attack on Iraq: Bundeswehr will be present." He was convinced the German army would participate, and such an attack would not even need another UN mandate. In February and March 2003, Germany's opposition started to come out against Schröder's anti-American course. Angela Merkel, head of the largest opposition party, the Christian Democrats, argued early February 2003, she would have signed

<sup>22</sup> The proposal of Chirac of early September 2002, to still bridge the gap between European allies and the US on Iraq, and the strong support by Blair, could have alarmed Schröder and Fischer of the following. The US might have proof on Iraq having weapons of mass destruction, and linking it somehow to Al Qaeda. Another alarming sign for Germany to be possibly on the road to isolation in EU and NATO – later together with France - could have been Italy, Spain and Poland rapidly declaring support for the US.

<sup>23</sup> 'Robertson sorgt sich um das Verhältnis Berlin – Washington', *die Welt*, 27 September, 2002.

<sup>24</sup> 'Stance on Bush policy could swing elections in Germany,' *New York Times*, 9 September, 2002; 'Blair assails Hussein, backs Bush on Iraq', *Washington Post*, 4 September, 2002; 'French leader offers formula to tackle skepticism, and some support – Italy,' *New York Times*, 17 September, 2002; 'Polen: Verständnis für US-Militärschlag', *tagesschau.de*, 24 September, 2002.

<sup>25</sup> Even though, they both had endorsed serious consequences in resolution 1441.

the letter of the eight European countries in support of the United States.<sup>26</sup> It arguably seems tragic that the 1968-generation – of all generations – has missed a historic opportunity to help end a dictatorship.<sup>27</sup> Whether and to which degree Germany would be involved in the post-conflict reconstruction and in the long-term transformation of Iraq into a stable and democratic society, has been open and still is.

What did these, arguably problematic developments in German-US relations mean for the transatlantic community as such in the 2003? As pointed out before, worsened and tensed German-US relations seem to have had a problematic impact in two regards: first, for NATO transformation; second, for further EU integration and the common European foreign and security policy.

## The problematic impact of troubled German-US Relations on NATO Transformation

As argued before, September 11, 2001 changed the parameters defining transatlantic relations. Lord Robertson on May 7, 2002 argued, the main, logical consequences of September 11, 2001 were and were going to be: NATO enlargement and the NATO-Russia Council. NATO as a diplomatic platform was transforming to new challenges.<sup>28</sup>

The National Security Strategy cites “strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends”, as one important part of its international strategy “to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends”.<sup>29</sup> While the United States would constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, they would not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise its right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against its people and its country. In leading the campaign against terrorism, the United States would forge new, productive international relationships and redefine existing ones in ways that meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The US proposition to create a NATO reaction force was accepted at NATO’s November Summit in Prague 2002.<sup>30</sup> Throughout the Prague Summit, German media focused on the ques-

---

<sup>26</sup> Angela Merkel introduced a plan to refocus German foreign policy around six issues of core interest to German foreign policy. (Speech in the German parliament, [www.cdu.de](http://www.cdu.de), 3 April, 2003). Wolfgang Schäuble emphasized that a confrontation course against the US – together with France, or led by France – was not in the German national interest. (Presentation at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Paris, [www.kas.de](http://www.kas.de), 7 April, 2003)

<sup>27</sup> Did not the 68-generation of the former Federal Republic of Germany confront their parents with the question: where were you during Hitler’s regime? Did you support or oppose Nazi tyranny? At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, this generation of former rebels against (untested) authority (arguably of dictators), missed a chance to demonstrate that they learned the lessons of history and meant what they said, by applying it to another real-life context. Helga Haftendorn, an expert on German foreign policy, expressed her distress about the degree of anti-Americanism by the Schröder government. (Presentation at the German General Consulate, New York, 8 April, 2003); ‘The many faces of Joschka Fischer’, BBC News Online, 8 April, 2003: [Fischer is] “the most determined opponent of the Anglo-American project” – before Jacques Chirac”.

<sup>28</sup> Presentation by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, the 20<sup>th</sup> Manfred-Wörner-Seminar for German-American-Understanding, Brussels, 7 May, 2002.

<sup>29</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, [www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html) (September 2002).

<sup>30</sup> Secretary Rumsfeld en route to a meeting of NATO Ambassadors in Poland on September 22, 2002 outlined several initiatives for NATO: First, improving capabilities, NATO countries had already agreed on; second a NATO response force. NATO’s mixed capabilities needed to get together so that in the event of a problem in or out of NATO area, NATO would have a responsive capability that was real and functioned together. This was a good way to assure NATO relevance. The third issue involved NATO command structure and headquar-



tion, whether Bush and Schröder would shake hands. “Mr. Bush assailed nations that are ‘inward-looking or isolated by indifference’, clearly a reference to Chancellor Schröder’s use of his opposition to the American campaign against Saddam Hussein, as a centerpiece of his recent re-election campaign (...) From John F. Kennedy’s ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ speech, to Ronald Reagan’s controversial visit to the Bitburg cemetery, postwar American presidents have emphasized reconciliation and unity when speaking of Germany, not memories of war. This time, however, Mr. Bush seemed to be reminding Germans that Europe today stood shoulder to shoulder with America despite them, not because of them”.<sup>31</sup>

Particularly troubling was the blockage of NATO to provide Turkey with defensive weapons, shortly before intervention in Iraq in Spring 2003. While NATO finally managed to overcome this deadlock, continued tensions between the US administration and some NATO members on the post-conflict transformation in Iraq, still seem to point at more trouble on the Atlantic horizon.<sup>32</sup> Concerning the question, who or which organization(s) should provide security for the European sphere, a NATO Review in the wake of Iraq accordingly reads:<sup>33</sup> “Yet it is also true that, for the United Kingdom and others, especially the recently oppressed peoples of ‘new Europe’, the United States’ new mission is an Atlantic mission. They wish to keep the United States fully engaged in Europe. They are wary of a European Union dominated by France and Germany. And they are increasingly willing to be engaged elsewhere in the world together with the United States. Now enjoying their first taste of the US-led liberal international order, the Pax Americana, they have not interest in creating a European ‘counterweight’”.

## The problematic impact of troubled German-US Relations within Europe and within the European Union

Another unfortunate impact of troubled German-US relations seems to have concerned the European theatre itself. Strong German-US relations contribute to intra-European stability. Without them, France may have begun to complain about a possibly too strong British influence in the transatlantic community. This may have reinforced French policy throughout early spring 2003, to get EU to formulate its own common policy on Iraq, which would then isolate Great Britain. On the other side, after Schröder did not succeed in London by the end of September 2002, to get British Prime Minister Tony Blair to help him restore US-German relations, Schröder’s focus may have shifted across the Rhine, as to get France to join ranks to counter US-American and British policy on Iraq.

These are – in the analysis of the author of this paper – some of the underlying dynamics of the diplomatic cleavages and overall drama the world experienced on the issue of Iraq in the spring months of 2003, within the EU, NATO and the UN. TIME magazine provided the fol-

---

ters. While the US proposition for a NATO response force was initially welcome by Spain and Italy, German Defense Minister Struck announced to examine the initiative carefully, with France highlighting the need for corresponding UN resolutions. See Michaela Hertkorn, ‘On German-US Relations from Pre-Bush to Post-9/11-Bush: Why Do German Relations Matter to the Transatlantic Relationship’, *DIAS Analyse*, [www.dias-online.org](http://www.dias-online.org) (November 2003); Michaela Hertkorn, ‘German-US Relations from Pre-Bush to post-9/11-Bush’, *International Journal for Politics and Ethics* (October 2002).

<sup>31</sup> Serge Schmemmann, ‘A speech recalls Europe’s ghosts’, *New York Times*, 23 November, 2002.

<sup>32</sup> ‘Kein Irak-Einsatz des Dänisch-Deutsch-Polnischen Korps’, [www.bmvg.de/sicherheit/030509\\_multinationales\\_korps.php](http://www.bmvg.de/sicherheit/030509_multinationales_korps.php) (28 May, 2003).

<sup>33</sup> ‘Rethinking NATO’, *NATO Review in the Wake of Iraq*, [www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art2.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art2.html) (spring 2003).

lowing analysis in this regard: “The administration missed what was happening in Europe. In the summer 2002, to save his skin in federal elections, Schröder came out against military action in Iraq under any circumstances. He and Chirac had long had chilly relations, but last fall the French and German governments began to work toward a set of common positions on a variety of issues. For the French, this was vital. With Germany set to take a seat on the Security Council in January, Paris would no longer be facing the Americans alone”.<sup>34</sup>

When France<sup>35</sup> and Germany came out against “any military action on the basis of UN resolution 1441”, one week before UN inspectors reported to the Security Council, this did not (necessarily) represent the common European policy on Iraq. By contrast, it made the splits within the EU, Europe as such, NATO and the UN Security Council obvious.<sup>36</sup> During an emergency EU Summit on February 17, 2003, Chirac threatened Central and Eastern European countries they would risk their future EU membership if they supported the United States on Iraq. Such experience might induce ‘smaller’ Western and Eastern European countries to wonder, whether France and Germany should be allowed to impose their concepts of further European integration on the EU as a whole. A letter by eight European countries – partly in EU, partly not – had obviously infuriated Paris, because it precisely highlighted intra-European and intra-EU splits on Iraq, but also on other transatlantic issues. Such divide was further illustrated, when a Summit of four NATO members decided on a purely EU based defense.<sup>37</sup>

### One year later: ‘mission un-accomplished’ and disagreements over how to stabilize Iraq and how to win the war against global terrorism

As argued before<sup>38</sup>, policies on the European security and defense policy (ESDP) in Europe have been remarkably different. Germany has promoted ESDP as soft-power alternative to NATO. The British government has lobbied for a strong NATO link. Paris has hoped for ESDP to create counter-balancing structures independent from NATO. The French position seems not new, however. When Paris proposed the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC) in the early 1950s, it was an attempt to avoid German rearmament in NATO. Paris hoped for a strong European defense pillar that was more or less independent from NATO. When the EDC was defeated in the French Assembly in 1954, the US proceeded with re-arming Western Germany. Western integration in Europe was thus intrinsically linked with strong transatlantic ties.

Transatlantic disagreements and disputes in Europe about how to deal with Iraq and US foreign policy in the aftermath of 9/11, seem to reflect a deeper struggle about security-related

<sup>34</sup> *Time Magazine*. Special Edition, 31 March, 2003.

<sup>35</sup> An interesting question regarding the French-German Duo seems to be, who uses whom more in the end: France–Germany, or Germany–France? Former foreign policy advisor to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Joachim Bitterlich, argued that, given recent French diplomacy in EU, NATO and UN, France had achieved to reclaim its position as ‘country number one’ in Europe: ‘Frankreich, die Nummer eins’, [www.welt.de](http://www.welt.de) (18 February, 2003).

<sup>36</sup> In summary, recent splits in the EU, NATO and UN seemed to have weakened the ability of the international community to use successfully the threat of force as a means of preventive diplomacy in the Iraq crisis. The fact that individual members in the transatlantic community – in EU and NATO, or not – have not been able to streamline their policy on Iraq in 2002/2003, did not increase the chances for preventive diplomacy. An intervention in Iraq has thus in the end become more, not less, likely.

<sup>37</sup> ‘Diplomatic warfare breaks out in NATO after a call by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg for the creation of headquarters and planning staff from which a purely European Union based defense might emerge’. *BBC News Online*, [www.bbc.co.uk/](http://www.bbc.co.uk/) (30 April, 2003).

<sup>38</sup> See 2.3.

agenda-setting; the question being, who should be in charge designing both, the transatlantic and European security agenda. Should Europeans contribute more to the European pillar within NATO and increase their defense budgets to make the Alliance fit for the 21<sup>st</sup> century? Alternatively, should Europeans strengthen their own, common European security and defense policy, including the establishment of their own army headquarters? .

While French reactions to the US-led war in Iraq were probably not astounding, even though the depth in differing world views might have surprised foreign policy experts in Washington, D. C.; what was clearly new was the German stand!<sup>39</sup> It can be concluded that in the end, Germany's profound foreign policy shift represented a turn-around of its Cold War and post-Cold War foreign policy in the 1990s. This changed the whole intra-European dynamic and left a strong impact on overall transatlantic relations.<sup>40</sup>

Former French President Charles De Gaulle in 1960 proposed to former German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to increase German-French bi-lateral cooperation on all political, economic, cultural and defense issues, thus weakening US leadership in NATO. Adenauer when faced with the (ultimate) decision between Washington, D. C. or Paris, opted for protection from Washington.<sup>41</sup> In 2003, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder chose otherwise, in the end prioritizing close bi-lateral cooperation with France on European integration, over strong bi-lateral relations across the Atlantic. This is a novelty in post 2<sup>nd</sup> World War Germany. The long lasting consequences of this decision are not yet foreseeable, when it comes to Germany's future foreign policy options.

Was the shift of German foreign policy based on a conscious decision? On the other hand, did the German government stumble onto the new path because of unfortunate election rhetoric in summer 2002, which plaid on so-called anti-American sentiments within the German population?

At a 'mini-summit' of only four European allies and EU member states, Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg announced their plan to launch a European defense policy and army, which was to be fully independent from NATO. The four heads of state were obviously ready to risk not just further divisions in NATO, but also a so-called 'two-speed Europe'.<sup>42</sup> While the announcement was met with considerable resistance both in NATO and in EU, the question was raised, how such a European Union army should be financed – specifically given the lack of British support and participation? New NATO and EU member states from Eastern and Central Europe have been particularly unhappy about frictions between EU and NATO. They wish not to be put into a position, where they have to decide between the US on the one hand and some

---

<sup>39</sup> Elizabeth Pond, *Friendly Fire. The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Michael Stuermer, 'A German Revolution Waiting to Happen: Visions of America after September 11', in Christina V. Balis and Simon Serfaty (eds.), *Visions of America and Europe. September 11, Iraq, and Transatlantic Relations* (Washington, D. C.: CSIS, 2004); Guillaume Parmentier, 'Diverging Visions: France and the United States after September 11', in Balis and Serfaty (eds.), 2004; Jean-Marie Colombani and Walter Wells, *Dangerous De-Liaisons. What's Really Behind the War Between France and the US* (Hoboken, NJ: Melville House Publishing, 2004).

<sup>40</sup> Gary Schmitt, 'Over There. America and Its European Allies', *Weekly Standard*, 7 June, 2004.

<sup>41</sup> Helga Haftendorn, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001), 73.

<sup>42</sup> Paul Reynolds, 'EU: Two Speeds Ahead?', *BBC News*, 15 December 2003; Angus Roxburgh, 'Analysis: Legacy of Summit Failure', *BBC News*, 15 December, 2003; Katja Ridderbusch, 'Die Ergebnisse des Vierergipfels irritieren Freunde und Verbündete', *WELT.de*, 2 May, 2003;



continental European countries on the other hand. Having good relations with both the US and Western Europe is in their best economic and security-related interest.

How Europeans and the EU will shape their security structures, will have an important effect on the Allies' capabilities to fight the war against global terrorism, and how the Alliance will adapt to security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. These challenges are outlined in the US American National Security Strategy of September 2002, NATO's transformation declaration of fall 2002, and the European Security Agenda of December 2003.<sup>43</sup>

Plans for EU military and defense structures that are independent from NATO, however seem to have suffered two setbacks in December 2003. First, at a meeting of NATO foreign and defense ministers early December 2003, the decision was made not to include a defense clause in the constitutional draft of the EU, and not to create a separate EU military headquarter.<sup>44</sup> Second, the EU on December 13, 2003 failed to agree on the constitutional draft, mainly because of Spanish and Polish resistance. However, also other smaller countries both in East and West expressed their reservations, such as the Netherlands, Denmark or the Czech Republic.<sup>45</sup>

With regard to intra-European or intra-EU relations, the dynamics have remarkably changed after March 11, 2004, a day that witnessed Al Qaeda terrorist attacks in Madrid and the successive fall of the Aznar government. Before 3/11, the strongest bi-lateral relations between Washington D. C. and some of its European allies were with Great Britain to the North of Germany, Italy to the South, Spain to the West and Poland to the East; thus circling around France and Germany. Now, that Spain is out of the picture – given a new Spanish socialist government in Madrid – the parameters for both transatlantic and intra-EU relations have been altered again.<sup>46</sup>

How important are these dynamics of changing sub-alliances within the transatlantic arena? US Senator John Kerry, for example, in spring 2004 referred to 'foreign leaders', who wished him to win the US American Presidential elections in November 2004 because the world needed 'a new policy'.<sup>47</sup> While the dynamics of so-called sub-alliances seem to change frequently, whenever a new government assumes power, to understand their implications may provide indicators for shifts in national foreign or Allied foreign policy.

In Spring 2004, transatlantic and intra-EU indicators highlighted the following developments: Germany may have realized that 'being the junior partner of France', instead of the 'junior partner of the US' may actually have hurt its own national interests. Consequently, Chancellor Schröder seems to have tried to convince some of Germany's neighbors, that France and Germany are not intent on dominating the EU, though the bilateral relations with France are a driving force for further EU integration. Corresponding visits by the German Chancellor to both,

---

<sup>43</sup> 'A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy', Brussels, [www.europa.eu.int/](http://www.europa.eu.int/) (12 December, 2003).

<sup>44</sup> 'Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Defense Ministers Session', Chairman's Summary, [www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-151e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-151e.htm) (2 December, 2003); 'Statement to the Press' by Secretary General following NAC Foreign Ministers Meeting, [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s031204b.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s031204b.htm) (4 December, 2003).

<sup>45</sup> Andreas Middel, 'Die kleinen Länder machen ihrem Protest gegen die EU-Verfassung Luft', *WELT.de*, 21 June, 2003; Hans-Jörg Schmidt, 'Václav Klaus bleibt bei seiner Ablehnung der EU', *WELT.de*, 13 June, 2003;

<sup>46</sup> Christopher Caldwell, 'Zapatero's Spain', *Weekly Standard*, 10 May, 2004; Nikolaus Nowak, 'Irak: Zapatero und Schröder für Gemeinsame Initiative', *Die Welt*, 29 April, 2004; 'Zapatero bei Schröder in Berlin, Madrid und Paris Planen UNO-Initiative zu Irak', *SDA – Basisdienst Deutsch*, 28 April, 2004; 'Spain's New Government Shifts the Balance in the European Union', *Economist*, March 20, 2004;

<sup>47</sup> 'New Ads Call Kerry Rich Liberal Elitist', *CNN.com*, 8 March, 2004.

Poland and the Netherlands for instance aimed at putting an end to the deadlock regarding the EU constitution.<sup>48</sup> The new government in Spain changed its resistance to the EU constitution; and, without Spain at its side, Poland has announced its own support for the common constitution.<sup>49</sup> Prime Minister Blair declared in April 2004, he would initiate a referendum on the constitution in Great Britain. German opposition parties welcomed this move.<sup>50</sup>

France, on the other hand – with strong Italian, British and Spanish ties interrupted – does not solely depend on Germany anymore and thus can afford to move closer to both the US and Great Britain. A common peacekeeping mission with the US in Haiti in 2004 plus the visit of President Bush to Normandy to celebrate the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of D-Day in June 2004 may serve as indicators in this regard. An article in the *Economist* ‘Of entente, understanding and Verständnis’ states: “Meanwhile the French realize that, in a EU of 25, the Franco-German motor is not going to be enough to preserve their influence”.<sup>51</sup>

A common summit of President Chirac, Chancellor Schröder and Prime Minister Blair in Berlin by mid February 2004, was described as so-called ‘ménage à trois’. The question was, whether Great Britain tried hard – and needed – to make certain that its own interests were added to the French-German agenda.<sup>52</sup> Given the fact that Schröder and Chirac have been meeting on a bi-lateral level many times in 2003, nobody should be surprised that other EU member states and neighbors wonder, what the two ‘big ones’ may be up to.<sup>53</sup>

With regard to a common European foreign and security policy, the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 arguably added a sense of urgency in Europe: Terror had finally ‘hit home’, and was concerning Europe, too – whether just as allies of the US, or not. France, for example, though not a partner in the war in Iraq, nevertheless feels threatened given its large Muslim population, plus its recent law banning all religious symbols in public places, such as schools.<sup>54</sup>

The EU in spring 2004 agreed on further anti-terror measures.<sup>55</sup> A ‘Bin Laden tape addressed to Europeans in April 2004 and the murder of an Italian hostage in Iraq,<sup>56</sup> might actually have provided an incentive for Europeans to unite, instead of pulling ‘US protagonists’ away from those countries that did not support the war in Iraq originally.<sup>57</sup> Given the latest and largest enlargement round in EU - ten countries joined on May 1, 2004 - and NATO, where seven coun-

<sup>48</sup> Ray Furlong, ‘Schröder Holds Key Warsaw Talks’, *BBC News*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/> (March 23, 2004); ‘The Future of the European Union – Debate’, Draft Constitution, [http://europea.eu.int/futurum/index\\_en.htm](http://europea.eu.int/futurum/index_en.htm) (13 January, 2004).

<sup>49</sup> Jan Cienski and Stefan Wagstyl, ‘Poland Will Probably Call Poll Over EU Constitution’, *FT.com* (27 April, 2004).

<sup>50</sup> ‘Blair Confirms EU Constitution Poll’, *BBC News*, 20 April, 2004; ‘Britten sollen über EU-Verfassung abstimmen’, *WELT.de*, [www.welt.de/data/2004/04/20](http://www.welt.de/data/2004/04/20) (20 April, 2004); ‘Chirac Backs Blair Over EU Vote’, *BBC News*, 10 May, 2004.

<sup>51</sup> ‘French Foreign Policy. Of entente, understanding and Verständnis’, *Economist*, 10 April, 2004.

<sup>52</sup> ‘The European Union. Ménage à Trois’, *Economist*, 21 February, 2004.

<sup>53</sup> ‘Schröder: Deutschland und Frankreich in der EU entscheidend’, *WELT.de*, [www.welt.de/data/2004/04/15/](http://www.welt.de/data/2004/04/15/) (15 April, 2004); John Burgess, ‘Germany and France Driving EU, to Distraction of Other Members. Two Say Close Relationship Does Not Harm Europe’s Interests’, *Washington Post*, 22 February, 2004.

<sup>54</sup> Michel Gurfinkiel, ‘Can de Villepin Change His Spots? France’s Surprising New Hard-Liner’, *Weekly Standard*, 7 June, 2004.

<sup>55</sup> ‘EU Approves Anti-Terror Package’, *BBC News*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go> (23 March, 2004); ‘Terrorism in Europe. Fighting Bank’, *Economist*, April 10, 2004; Gerard Alexander, ‘Europe’s Non-Strategy. The EU isn’t Taking Terror Seriously’, *Weekly Standard*, 10 May, 2004.

<sup>56</sup> Tamsin Smith, ‘Italy Grapples with Kidnap Ultimatum’, *BBC News*, 27 April, 2004.

<sup>57</sup> Richard Bernstein, ‘Tape, Probably Bin Laden’s Offers Truce to Europe. Leaders Dismiss Any Negotiations’, *New York Times*, 16 April, 2004; Mike Wooldridge, ‘Europe Unites at Madrid Memorial’, *BBC News*, 17 March, 2004.

tries became new members on March 29, 2004, the EU and NATO seem to be moving closer conceptually.<sup>58</sup>

Five countries, three Baltic States, plus Slovenia and Slovakia, joined the EU and NATO 2004. Six of the seven new NATO countries, with the exception of Slovenia, seem to be supporting the coalition in Iraq;<sup>59</sup> in total, 20 of 26 NATO members currently are involved in Iraq, either supporting the Polish contingent or contributing individually.<sup>60</sup> While NATO took over the lead of ISAF in Afghanistan in 2003,<sup>61</sup> NATO supports the Polish contingent in Iraq. So, will NATO as an organization assume a larger peacekeeping role in Iraq? Will the NATO Summit in Istanbul by late June 2004 provide a definite answer to this question?<sup>62</sup> While Senator John Kerry came out in support of a NATO role in post-war Iraq, on April 30, 2004, President Bush outlined his Iraq vision on May 24, 2004, foreseeing both a UN mandate and NATO involvement.<sup>63</sup> A range of security-related problems in post-war Iraq point at the important question, whether the US Administration sufficiently planned for the post-conflict transition process. The corresponding challenges concern for instance the civil-military interface, which NATO and European-US American allies seem to have managed better in the aftermath of war against Serbia and Montenegro in Kosovo in 1999.<sup>64</sup> Before the election of President Bush in November 2000, supporters of and advisors to the President expressed, the main aim of the US Army was to win wars.<sup>65</sup> Would this mean that Americans were to win wars, while European allies would focus on cleaning up afterwards? Can such an important distinction be sufficiently paraphrased as hard power vis-à-vis soft power? Is any such distinction helpful? On the other hand, should not the intrinsic

<sup>58</sup> 'Policy in the Balance', *Economist.Com*, April 29, 2004; 'A May Day Milestone', *Economist.Com*, 29 April, 2004; Simon Serfaty, 'EU-US Relations Beyond Iraq: Setting the Terms of Complementarity', *EURO-Focus*, Volume 9, number 3 (11 April, 2003); Giacomo Luciani and Felix Neugart, 'Toward a European Strategy for Iraq', *CAP Policy Paper*, March 2003.

<sup>59</sup> Information obtained at a Transatlantic Security Relations Seminar, Center for European Studies, New York University (Presentation by the Ambassador of the Republic of Estonia to the United States of America), 16 April, 2004.

<sup>60</sup> The numbers in question consider the pulling out of Spanish troops in spring 2004. The author of this paper is in the process of obtaining information from defense ministries of all NATO members, whether the individual governments have been or are going to support NATO or the Polish leadership in Iraq, either before or after the transition of power in Iraq by the end of June 2004. Post-transition, the potential contributions by individual NATO members concern specifically the training of police and border control as requested by the Iraqi interim government.

<sup>61</sup> 'Eurokorps für Afghanistan vorgesehen', [www.bundeswehr.de/wir/einsatz/](http://www.bundeswehr.de/wir/einsatz/) (16 May, 2004); 'NATO Takes Over Afghanistan Command', *BBC News*, 11 August, 2003.

<sup>62</sup> 'Summit Meetings of Heads of State and Government', Istanbul, Turkey, [www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/-04-0483.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/-04-0483.htm) (28 – 29 June, 2004).

<sup>63</sup> 'This Moment in Iraq is a Moment of Truth', Remarks by Senator John Kerry, Westminister College, Fulton, MI, 30 April, 2004; 'President Outlines Steps to Help Iraq Achieve Democracy and Freedom', Remarks by the President on Iraq and the War on Terror, United States Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 24 May, 2004; 'Iraqis to Have Veto Over Troops', *BBC News*, 25 May, 2004; 'Fresh Iraq Plan Awaits UN Verdict', *BBC News*, 2 June, 2004; 'Text: Iraq Draft Resolution', *BBC News*, 2 June, 2004; 'UN Envoy Defends Iraq Government', *BBC News*, 2 June, 2004.

<sup>64</sup> Michaela Hertkorn (2001), 116 – 139.

<sup>65</sup> Paula J. Dobriansky and David B. Rivkin, *Washington Post*, 30 January, 2001; Michaela Hertkorn, 'The Relevance of Perceptions in Foreign Policy: A German – US Perspective', *World Affairs* (fall 2001), 63: "The critical question seems to be whether a common European security and defense policy can become more than a reflection of European concern in the aftermath of Kosovo. Is the creation of ESDP – as formulated at the Cologne EU summit of July 1999 and the Nice summit of December 2000 – an attempt to counterbalance US power, while theoretically facing the challenge of coercive prevention? Paula Dobriansky and David Rivkin stated that the 'United States can and must maintain a first-rate military establishment capable of fighting and winning wars. President Bush articulated this fundamental truth in stating that the core US strategic mission is to deter war by preparing to win swiftly and decisively'".

and necessary link between so-called soft power-related security and hard power-related security, or the link between structural and operational security policy be emphasized?<sup>66</sup> In other words, security is the core challenge when nations or the international community try to protect and safeguard a long-term political transition process. Without enforcement of the rule of law and security, there is no lasting peace; without investing in education and cultural-political transformation, there will be no long-term security.

After September 11, 2001, it seemed impossible that the United States and any US administration would ever be able (again) to ignore so-called soft power-related security policy, such as nation- and peace-building, when trying to transform former hostile regimes into peaceful societies.<sup>67</sup> Back in 1999, John McDonald stressed: “The exit strategy the US military keeps talking about, will work when the departing US troops leave behind peaceful societies.”<sup>68</sup> Correspondingly, Susan Woodward identifies security as the top priority in any nation-building- process.<sup>69</sup> In a model to prevent the re-emergence of violence, Jane Holl identifies the establishment of security, well-being, and justice as the core challenges in any post-conflict situation that demands long-term commitment.<sup>70</sup>

General Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee emphasized the necessity to outline a new transatlantic vision, which links elements of collective defense with collective security.<sup>71</sup> A renewed NATO vision needed to comprise preventive elements as designed in the 1990s, but also deterrent aspects stemming from the Cold War period. Allies on both sides of the Atlantic shared more than values, and the long-term stabilization [and democratization]<sup>72</sup> of the Middle East was in the national interest of allies in Northern America and Europe. The 2002 NATO Summit in Prague had provided a corner stone concerning the future of NATO. It was questionable, however, whether Istanbul would provide a definite answer about the role of NATO as an organization in post-war Iraq.<sup>73</sup>

While the German government in recent weeks and months repeatedly stressed their reservations about a larger NATO role and involvement in Iraq, the German Chancellor and Foreign Minister, also emphasized they would not veto such a NATO mandate.

Now that the United Nations have agreed unanimously on a post-war resolution for Iraq, this important decision should provide the Iraqi interim government with more legitimacy and thus, the country with a better chance for a successful transition.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>66</sup> ‘NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership’, <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/index.html> (10 February, 2004); ‘First Joint EU-NATO Crisis Management Exercise (CME/CMX 03)’, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/po3-133e.htm> (November 11, 2003).

<sup>67</sup> See drafts, Annex.

<sup>68</sup> Michaela Hertkorn (2001), 126; Chris Seiple, *The US Military Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions* (US Army War College: Peacekeeping Institute, 1996).

<sup>69</sup> Susan Woodward, ‘Nation Building and the Division of Labor’, Nation-Building Brownbag Session, Lilian Vernon Center for International Affairs, New York University, 11 December, 2003.

<sup>70</sup> Michaela Hertkorn (2001), 133.

<sup>71</sup> ‘NATO at the Crossroads – The Prospects for Success at the Istanbul Summit’, Speech by General (ret.) Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, Washington, D. C., 30 April, 2004.

<sup>72</sup> Added by the author of this paper.

<sup>73</sup> Richard Bernstein and Mark Landler, ‘German Leader to Oppose Sending NATO Troops to Iraq’, *New York Times*, 21 May, 2004; Jeffrey Gedmin, ‘An Orgy of Anti-Americanism. They Hate Us. They Really, Really Hate Us’, *Weekly Standard*, 24 May, 2004.

<sup>74</sup> ‘Iraqi Leader Urges Troops to Stay’, *BBC News*, 6 June, 2004; ‘Bush Expects Iraq Plan Approval’, *BBC News*, 8 June, 2004; ‘Just a Beginning’, *BBC News*, 8 June, 2004; ‘Iraq Plan Gets Unanimous Backing’, *BBC News*, 8 June, 2004; ‘G8 Leaders Gather for US Summit’, *BBC News*, 8 June, 2004.

Germany should do everything in its power to support a long-term transformation, precisely because of its own post-second-World-War experience under Allied protection.<sup>75</sup>

The recent D-Day Celebrations may have served as strong reminder of the following:<sup>76</sup> “While the argument can be made that Western Germany in the aftermath of World War II benefited from a complex political and economic reconstruction process, it also seems fair to point out that this process had to be safeguarded militarily, arguably for four decades. Altogether, this allowed West Germany to transform its political culture or system from dictatorship to democracy. Given such first hand historical experience, Germany in fact does have the potential and does face the challenge to contribute more to complex reconstruction and peace(building) processes. However, contributions in question should not and cannot exclusively focus on economic and political dimensions. They also need to focus on the military dimension, which guarantees safety during and in the aftermath of interventions, as well as throughout the long-term peace process. It is precisely the history of Germany, which enables it to play a constructive and active role together with its Allies and in the context of NATO and other regional organizations!”<sup>77</sup>

---

<sup>75</sup> Michaela Hertkorn (2001), 142.

<sup>76</sup> Elaine Sciolino, ‘In First, Allies and Axis Unite on Norman Coast to Remember D-Day’, *New York Times*, 7 June, 2004.

<sup>77</sup> Michaela Hertkorn (2001), 142.

## DIAS ANALYSIS

- 1 Rainer Winkler August 2003  
Die Irak-Krise im Bundestagswahlkampf 2002 [The War in Iraq and Germany's 2002 election campaign]
- 2 Rouven Klein October 2003  
Die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP): Finalität europäischer Integration und Projekt dauerhaften Friedens. Eine Konzeption auf der Grundlage der Zivilisierungstheorie von Dieter Senghaas [Europe's Security and Defense Policy (ESDP): Finality of the European integration and a project of eternal peace. A concept based on Dieter Senghaas' Theory of Civilization]
- 3 Michaela Hertkorn November 2003  
Why German-US Relations Matter to the Alliance. Germany's theoretically evolving role as a center power in Europe
- 4 Heiko Borchert December 2003  
Linking Corporate Governance with Good Governance: An Increasingly Important Foreign Policy Task
- 5 Heiko Borchert und Daniel Maurer January 2004  
Baukasten, Ablösung oder Neubeginn? Fünf Szenarien zur Zukunft der NATO [Tool Box, Dissolution, or New Start? Five Scenarios on the Future of NATO]
- 6 Marc Houben July 2004  
Operations in Iraq. The New Face of International Crisis Management
- 7 Michaela Hertkorn August 2004  
Why German-US Relations Still Matter to the Transatlantic Alliance: One Year after the War in Iraq

*DIAS ANALYSIS are ready for download via the Institute's website at [www.dias-online.org/analysis.shtml](http://www.dias-online.org/analysis.shtml).*

### **Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy (DIAS)**

Founded in 2003, DIAS is an independent, interdisciplinary policy think tank at the Heinrich-Heine-University of Dusseldorf, Germany. Our purpose is to address the broad spectrum of foreign and security policy topics, thereby paying attention to different disciplines such as political science, management studies, economics, history, and international public law. DIAS offers a forum for young academics and leaders to exchange views and ideas on foreign and security policy issues and provides consulting services and strategic advice to clients in the public and private sectors. DIAS also seeks to better inform and engage the interested public by convening discussions, round tables and other open events. To this purpose it organizes an annual Security Conference and task forces with policy-makers, NGOs, academics, business representatives, the public, and the media.

© Copyright 2004, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, Universitätsstrasse 1, 40225 Dusseldorf, Germany, [www.dias-online.org](http://www.dias-online.org)